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Tony Stark

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Posts posted by Tony Stark

  1. On 3/21/2019 at 12:40 PM, Chris L said:

     

     Electric works great in my mind until I wonder what has to be burned to generate the electric power to recharge it ....


     

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  2. 22 hours ago, TaiidanTomcat said:

     

    Beyond SDBs you have JDAMs. Big heavy bombs with more mass and less warning than missiles. More flexibility as well as again you don't need specialized weapons to kill stuff

     

    There is also the fact that AESA can be used to hurt radars and "cyber warfare" but we don't talk about any of that. 

     

    Deputy commandant of Marine Air was recently bragging about an F-35 engaging an enemy fighter at the same time participating in air to ground actions. Pretty impressive demonstration. Hopefully brings home the notion of F-35s being more capable than a 1 for 1 replacement.

     

    Don't forget JASSM. It may not be employed by F-35, but numerous other platforms can carry it. DEAD will see F-35s and JASSMs. JASSMs everywhere.

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  3. On 5/15/2017 at 9:06 PM, TaiidanTomcat said:

    Lastly a quick remark on the F-35 and stealth. Stealth is the F-35s most obvious feature, and it's an easy club to beat it's competitors with (especially other western fighters in fighter selections) but stealth is not it's only feature, and the costs of 5th generation aircraft sensors pale in comparison to the cost of stealth. 50 percent of the F-22 cost according to Rand was sensors. Sensors that ensure 5th generation fighters see first/shoot first. 


    Yup. ATF program was really about developing three next generation aspects, and merging them all into one platform:
    1. An LO airframe that could match the performance of the F-15
    2. Engines
    3. Sensors

  4. On 5/13/2017 at 8:24 PM, 11bee said:

    Agree 100%. Just got to keep in mind that as our stuff improves, the bad guys aren't resting on their laurels either.   Not saying that they have the upper hand by any means, just that it's a continual effort by both sides to out-do the other    


    In other breaking news, water is wet.

  5. On 5/13/2017 at 0:04 PM, 11bee said:

     

    But at the same time, there are some folks who say that was the very reason why the F-117 was all of a sudden retired, with no replacement on line.   Never gonna know for sure who has the upper hand until the jet goes up against a first rate opponent, which hopefully will never happen. 

     

     

    Aside from the aforementioned advanced in LO technology, remember that the F-117 was a subsonic platform that had no self-defense capability (not even RWR), a payload limited to two 2000-lb LGBs and it's primary sensors were a couple of FLIR turrets. 

  6. On 5/12/2017 at 9:14 AM, Grey Ghost 531 said:

     

     

    Low frequency means long wavelength. Long wavelength means low resolution. The LF radar will detect a target but it will not locate the target. They'll know something's out there, somewhere. With bi-stable radar (separate transmit and receive stations) they'll do better, but it will take lots of computing power. It's possible to track stealthy targets, just MUCH harder. The post you saw was probably a Su fanboi site and to be judged for accuracy appropriately.


    Exactly. The other limitation of LF radar is that it can't be used for targeting missiles. LF radars are usually very large (fixed sites) and require lots of power, so they're vulnerable.

  7. Sen. John McCain, SASC chairman, has said he “will not authorize a program that has a cost-plus contract,” and has cited commercial development of cell phones as an example of the kind of development he would like to see. Such a sentiment is one we all share, unfortunately the reality of costly weapon-development programs is such that Northrup Grumman, Lockheed-Martin, and Boeing are unwilling to invest the type of capital required to build a half-billion dollar aircraft with one potential buyer. The same cannot be said of cell phones where there is a global market.

    For those reading that and thinking, "That's not a bad idea..." I'm going to break down why his dementia is a terrible thing.

    Wireless carriers like AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon have hidden the actual cost of phones for years. They charge you a couple hundred dollars up front and hide the rest of the cost in your wireless bill each month, which you’re locked into for two years. While still a hefty $200, a subsidized smartphone is only a fraction of the $500, $600, $700, or even $800 you’d otherwise spend for a good phone at retail. Smartphones are so expensive that you can often buy an HDTV or laptop for less

    The iPhone 5 retailed for around $650, but according to iSupply, an iPhone 5 16GB model has a Bill of Materials of just $206.85. it cost at least $8 to manufacture an iPhone 5 (remember, it's built in China for cheap), $20 royalties and licensing per unit, operating expenses such as R&D (yes, Senator, we pay for that too) run $18.85, with sales, general, and administrative costs (which include everything from paying the electric bill to Tim Cook’s $10,3M salary) runs $42.33 per phone.

    So, it costs at least $288.03 for Apple to build (and run its operation around) its most popular device.

    The iPhone 5 16GB retails for $649.99. This is what it costs at an Apple store and what you’ll pay for it if you don’t sign up for a two-year wireless contract with your carrier. But this cost includes a retail markup. It’s difficult determine the exact markup but Apple’s balance sheet indicates it makes an average of $581.09 per iPhone. If we assume this is true, that gives it a retail markup of $68.90. Remember $581.09. We will use it again when calculating the profit Apple makes off of each phone.

    Apple sold a total of 31.24 million iPhones from April to June 2013 and had a gross profit margin of about 36.9 percent across all of its product lines. The gross profit margin is the profit Apple earns on all of the devices it sells when you include variable costs, like the cost of obtaining components and manufacturing a product, but not other costs like software development, sales, and administration. Though Apple’s total gross margin is 36.9 percent, it’s iPhone margin is likely much higher. Reuters estimated that Apple made as much as 49-58 percent profit margins on iPhones from Oct. 2010 to March 2012. The iPhone 5’s profits likely remain much higher than its overall margin, which is pulled down by the thinner profits Apple makes on the iPad and other products.

    If we take the $581.09 wholesale price of the iPhone 5 16GB model and subtract the manufacturing costs we estimated at $226.85, we get $354.24, which leaves a 61 percent gross profit margin. Subtract the “R&D, Administrative, & Licensing” costs we calculated at $61.18 (10.5 percent) from that total and we end up with $293.06, or about about 50.4 percent of the wholesale cost of an iPhone. This is in line with Reuter’s 49-58 percent estimate for iPhone sales, though we’ve added in Apple’s fixed costs as well

    iphone-5-price-breakdown-676x438.png

    Apple is making a lot of money on iPhone sales. A lot. Because of the precedents it sets with the world’s most popular phone, smartphone prices only seem to rise in the United States. Manufacturers are looking for ways to lower the cost of production and price in other parts of the world, though. While a $700 smartphone isn’t uncommon here, buyers in developing countries will not, and cannot, pay that much for gadgets. As a result, manufacturers like Apple have been hard at work finding ways to whittle down the costs of building smartphones. Qualcomm, which builds a huge number of smartphone processors and cellular radios, is trying to to find ways to build low-cost, high-efficiency processors that can be sold in China and India, where the majority of its 2 billion+ residents have never seen smartphones, but will certainly want them as their level of income increases.

    Worldwide, Apple sells an estimated 25,782 smartphones an hour. 19 million smartphones a month. But smartphone costs here in the United States haven't really dropped since the fist iPhone hit the market in 2007. And those development costs are spread out among the insane number of devices sold.

    Someone take away the Senator's car keys before he confuses the gas pedal for the brakes and drives into a crowd of people.

    Note that McCain does not share the "build it like a cell phone" mentality when it comes to other strategic assets, like CVNs for example.

    McCain never met a Navy project he didn't like. He's trying really hard to get a ship named after himself.

    The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John S McCain is named after John S. McCain, Sr., and John S. McCain, Jr., both Admirals in the United States Navy. John S. McCain, Sr., commanded the aircraft carrier USS Ranger, and acted as commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force during the latter stages of World War II. John S. McCain, Jr., commanded the U.S. Navy submarines USS Gunnel and USS Dentuda during World War II. Subsequently he held a number of posts, rising to Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command before retiring in 1972. These men were the grandfather and father of Senator McCain.

    It must really get under McCain's skin that Jimmy Carter - a peanut farmer who pardoned those who dodged the draft on his second day on office - has a submarine named after him.

  8. Fair enough points...I won't ask why the Government/Military hasn't learnt...

    People make emotional or political decisions, not logical ones. People come and go; those who have come before take that experience with them and the new people that come in and think they're Marco Polo.

  9. And no Virginia, I mean Tony Stark, this is not a common occurrence. At least not to this extent. Yes when the B-1 B was built, capability was left on the table and built in later. Yes, when the F-22 was built some significant capability was left out and it took a decade longer to field than originally thought.

    Yeah, it's pretty common.

    F-22's sideways-looking radar was deleted. IRST was downgraded from multi-color to single color, before being omitted altogether. The ejection seat requirement was downgraded from a fresh design to the ACES II. The HMD was omitted, as was AIM-9X. All those were cut due to budget; better to get a new plane on the ramp and

    F-16 had a LOT of capability left out when it hit IOC. So much so, that the AF didn't get the plane they wanted until the Block 30, well over a decade after IOC.

    This was touched upon two months ago.

    That kind of broad generalization of expectations results in a grossly inaccurate "apples to oranges" comparison. Neither the F-15 nor the F-16 had the software requirements that the F-35 has necessary to reach both IOC and FOC.

    The software used in in the X-35 in 1996 was that for basic flight control, flight testing and communications. There was no radar, no weapons systems, no sensor fusion. F-35 AA-1 in 2006 had to have an entirely new "OS" written for it, so that development is running 10 years. And bear in mind, Microsoft, Apple and Google have been developing their operating systems over decades.

    Secondly, that comparison ignores both the similarities and differences between the developments of the F-16 and the F-35 and their goals.

    Congress and the DoD are concerned (either justifiably or overly concerned, depending on your perspective) with the cost of concurrency, even though it has always been the plan for the F-35 to repeat the proven F-16 approach. Unlike serial programs, where development — test — production nicely dovetail one after the other, concurrency is where they overlap. Based on their statements and testimony to the U.S. Congress, today’s DoD officials believe that F-35 concurrency adds unbounded and unaffordable retrofit costs to incorporate fixes for problems found in later tests into earlier production airplanes. They intend to keep F-35 production at very low (and costly) production rates until at or near full specification performance is demonstrated. For the F-35, final testing is not scheduled for completion until 2017.

    The point, of course, is the contractor isn't slowing down the development and production of the F-35. The customer - DoD & Congress - is. And part of the reason for that is being driven by the belief that all the fixes necessary to apply to the current crop of F-35s are too expensive.

    By contrast, from the start, the F-16 went to high-rate production; 352 airplanes were on firm order within four years and three years later, more than 500 had been delivered worldwide. This fast production was based on several important decision criteria. First, there was confidence that the early configuration of the F-16 would be superior to the F-4 Phantom it was replacing, even though the performance specification had not been fully demonstrated through testing. Contractor and government tests were in parallel, and results were shared to gain quick confidence in the basic airplane.

    Second, low cost could only be achieved through high-rate production.

    Third, service leaders knew that the airplanes would be continuously upgraded, so there was never a final configuration for production.

    Lastly, there was never a plan to retrofit older airplanes as newer capabilities were added. Rather, each airplane configuration was fielded for a mission suited to its performance. And when retrofit was initiated, it was accomplished as part of a scheduled block change to keep the cost low. To date, there are 138 versions of the F-16, as well as 15 block changes, with each block a decisive improvement in capability.

    Read that very carefully, because it explains precisely what should be happening with the F-35. It also makes a very important point that many critics seem to miss - "when retrofit was initiated, it was accomplished as part of a scheduled block change to keep the cost low." Or, once final configuration is agreed upon, all aircraft will be brought up to date with a scheduled block change.

    The problem for the F-35, of course, is the slowdown in production as implemented by DoD & Congress makes it hard for the efficiencies and economies of scale full production would bring. Additionally, it is obviously impossible to put fighter in service in volume if DoD slows the production process. These delays have directly affected the software development insofar as they have "kicked the can down the road" as it were for certain benchmarks to be addressed.

    Why does this happen with every new plane? Because we learn a lot of lessons, but then we (and by we, I mean elected officials mostly) forget them (assuming they bothered learning them in the first place). People come and go, and when they leave, they take that operational experience with them. It's up to the newbies to learn as much as they can from them before they go.

  10. I fully expect to get the full afterburner in the face for this but hey...f&£k it.

    Here is my simple question. Why, after "50 years" of delays, various failures, cost overruns etc, etc, in aircraft procurement do governments/air forces still fall for the same old bulls€!t from aircraft manufacturers about we'll give you X for $Y? Haven't they learnt their lesson?

    Your "simple" question assumes the following:

    1. It assumes that all of the responsibility falls solely upon the manufacturers. That assumes that Lockheed, Boeing, Northrop, General Dynamics, Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Convair, Rockwell, Honeywell, Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, Martin-Baker, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Rolls-Royce, FLIR Systems, BAE, Raytheon, etc. are all consistently incompetent.

    2. It assumes that the customer (DoD, USAF, USN, USMC, partner nations, etc) are not at fault in any way, shape or form; that they never request changes, that they never change requirements, that partners on the client side are always, in 100% agreement on everything, 100% of the time. It assumes that bureaucracy, bloat, rules, regulations, etc. on the customer side never gets in the way, or causes any delays or problems what so ever.*

    3. It assumes that developing new technologies (materials, manufacturing, avionics, etc.) is as smooth to develop as simply recycling old technologies. Every generation of aircraft has had new technologies that didn't exist previously, technologies that had to be developed to meet requirements that didn't exist in the previous generation, technology that has to counter threats that didn't exist previously, technology that has to be cutting edge for decades.

    4. It assumes that nothing unexpected or unforeseen ever happens.

    5. It assumes that civilian and political leaders never cut funding for R&D, thus delaying progress and inhibiting features that were a part of the initial requirements set forth for the project, and it assumes that even in the face of said budget cuts, the originally spec'd project should still be delivered. Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor doesn't have to keep running to the bank to support government projects. I have to pay my employees' wages, cover their health insurance, contribute to their 401k, employment taxes, pay operating costs such as electricity, water, maintaining facilities, etc. If you come to me and say "hey, can't pay you this month, Congress cut my budget." then I now have to either dip into savings or go take out a loan to pay my subcontractors, to pay my employees, I have to pay that loan back with interest. If I have to dip into my cash reserves, then I'm going to charge you extra, because you've shown that you're inconsistent in paying me; it's not enough that I have those savings replenished, I know have to have extra to cover me in case this happens again.

    * Kelly Johnson, founder of Lockheed's Skunk Works division, very famously refused to do work for the US Navy for this very reason. Another one of his rules was that the number of people having any connection with the project must be restricted in an almost vicious manner. Use a small number of good people (10% to 25% compared to the so-called normal systems). The more people involved on the project, the longer it takes, the more costly it becomes. That is not unique to the defense industry.

  11. Yut.

    Never said it was perfect, simply saying to deserves a better brand of critic. Preferably unbiased, and versed in the history and technical aspects of fighter development. When you are mixing genuine problems, with ridiculousness, mole hills turn into mountains and mountains get utterly missed. Worse still these reports get drilled into psyches and don't change. Which is why once again, we see the fuel trucks referenced

    It's worse than that. The whole article was lazy. It was nothing but the same - and old - talking points, many of which have been either refuted or disproven. But they garner clicks and shares and gives a bunch of people with no experience an excuse to whine. And yes, that's what they are, whines, and as such, they have no reason to be respected.

    AND is insanely behind schedule as they whittle away capability to make it fit into what time remains, it strikes me as a bit delusional

    What are you, new? That's happened to every new aircraft procurement project in the past 50 years.

  12. Thank god they referenced the hot fuel trucks.

    And the control law test with the F-16D.

    "The Air Force, Lockheed and foreign buyers have all pushed back against these claims"

    Then why even bring it up at all?

    This article is pretty darned informative, and has answered a few questions recently posed (yes, Virginia, LM did support the recent "deployment" to Hill):

    http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-f-35-stealth-fighter-the-ultimate-weapon-or-the-ultimate-17016?page=2

    Informative my @$$.

    "As of 2016, the Air Force’s F-35A can carry a maximum of two of the 500-pound weapons in its internal bomb bays. The jets can carry more weapons on external racks, but must sacrifice their stealthy characteristics in the process.

    By comparison, photographs from recent strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq show Warthogs carrying three GBU-12s on one pylon. F-16s routinely lug pairs of precision weapons under each wing."

    The implication being that the F-35 can't carry as much as the A-10 or F-16. He makes no mention of the lack of any LO requirement over Iraq or Syria, in which case an F-35 can out-carry the Viper and at least match the Hog's bomb-carrying payload.

    "The most recent concern is a discovery that the F-35’s ejection seats may not be safe. Tests have shown that pilots weighing between 103 and 136 pounds have at least a one in five chance of dying if they bail out"

    No one seems to mind that F/A-18s have had this same issue for decades.

  13. Tyler Rogoway's least favorite Norwegian, Major Morten “Dolby” Hanche is back. Major Hanche is a pilot from the Royal Norwegian Air Force experienced pilot with more than 2,200 hours in the F-16, as well as a graduate of the U.S. Navy Test Pilot School, and is the first Norwegian to fly the F-35. Earlier this year, Major Hanche "cleared the air" so to speak, about what flying the F-35 in BFM was actually like. And he's back to tell us about his experiences flying against Draken's A-4s

    In this post I’m giving a brief overview of my impressions after having flown several sorties over the past few weeks against A-4 Skyhawks. This post is intended as a supplement to my previous posts on modern air combat and stealth.

    First thing first – is it relevant to train air combat against an old A-4? Can we draw any relevant lessons from this at all? After all, this is an aircraft that served during the Vietnam war!

    I believe this kind of training is relevant for several reasons:

    • The F-35’s sensors and “fusion” provides me as a pilot with good situational awareness. For an F-35 to simulate an opponent against another F-35, it has to restrict the effects of fusion and the various sensors. Even then it is difficult to “dumb down” the aircraft enough. It requires discipline to not be tempted to using information that an opponent in reality would not have access to.
    • The A-4s we faced in these exercises had sensor performance along the lines of our own upgraded F-16s. They also carried jammers intended to disturb our radar.
    • The pilots we faced were very experienced. We are talking 2000 hours plus in aircraft like the F-16, F-15E, F-15C and the F-22, with detailed knowledge of “fifth generation” tactics and weapons. When also cooperating closely with intercept controllers on the ground (GCI) they could adapt the training and offer us a reactive and challenging opponent. Note the word “reactive.”
    • The A-4 is a small aircraft with a corresponding signature. Many potential opponents in the air are bigger and easier to find than the tiny A-4.

    So what did I experience in my encounters with the A-4? I got to try out several different sets. (Everything from one-on-one “Basic Fighter Maneuvers” to one F-35 against two A-4s, two F-35s against two A-4s, two F-35s against four A-4s and three F-35s against four A-4s). I am left with some main impressions.

    • The individual sensors of the F-35, one for one, are good. I flew one sortie alone against two A-4s, and limited myself to using only the radar during these sets (no support from ground controllers, no Link-16, no data sharing from other formation members, no support from passive radar warning systems or IFF – Identification Friend or Foe). Nonetheless my radar detected the targets in time for me to optimize my intercept, deliver weapons at range, and if necessary, arrive undetected to the visual arena.
    • “Fusion” means both automatic control of the various sensors, and the combination of all different sensor data into one unified tactical picture. I believe “fusion” to be one of the most important aspects of the F-35. “Fusion” allows me to focus on the tactics, rather than detailed management of my sensors. In my encounters with the A-4s, “fusion” worked better than I have seen it before. It was reassuring to see how well it worked. The good «situational picture» that I saw provides us with several advantages; we can make smarter tactical decisions, and it takes less time before we can gain full “tactical value” from fresh pilots. (I had to smile a little when two of us in the F-35s effortlessly kept tabs on four opponents. That is no trivial thing in the F-16.)
    • The most important lesson for me personally was to see just how hard it was for the A-4s to find us, even with GCI support. We deliberately made high-risk tactical decisions to see just how far we could stretch our luck, and still remain undetected. At least for my part, this reinforced my confidence in the effectiveness of our tactics. I hope all my colleagues in the F-35 get to have the same experience as I have.

    (BFM – F-35 against A-4, might not be fair. Still, the A-4 started as the offensive part every time. At the end of each set, I was pointing at the A-4. Every time.)

  14. FARNBOROUGH: USAF reopens door for GE to compete for future F-35 engine

    The US Air Force has contractually re-opened the door for GE Aviation to challenge Pratt & Whitney for a potential propulsion upgrade for the Lockheed Martin F-35.

    Both companies received separate $1 billion deals in early July to complete detailed designs of rival versions of an adaptive cycle engine, which includes a fuel-saving mode in cruise flight that can extend the range of a fighter by 20% to 30%.

    Both deals also include priced options that, if exercised, could have GE and P&W run competing adaptive cycle engines in an F-35 after 2021, says Jean Lydon-Rogers, president of GE military engines. P&W also confirms receiving the same priced option in the contract awarded under adaptive engine transition programme (AETP).

    The deals give GE an opportunity to re-enter the F-35 programme six years after Congress ordered the US Department of Defense to cancel the company’s F136, which was being developed as an alternate engine to the P&W F135.

    The USAF launched the AETP programme to develop a next-generation engine for future combat aircraft, including a notional concept for a Lockheed F-22 replacement after 2030. Ongoing analyses for the so-called sixth-generation fighter includes a wide range of options, including a major upgrade of the F-35.

    “One of the reasons we’re doing those technology programmes is for the possibility of an upgrade to the F-35,” says Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, speaking to journalists on 10 July in London.

    GE has participated in the USAF’s adaptive cycle engine development efforts since 2007, keeping the company’s military engine technology up to date as P&W fields hundreds of F135 engines and develops an undisclosed propulsion system for the Northrop Grumman B-21 bomber.

    “The other thing we see for the [uS] Air Force as an advantage is we need to continue to advance our industrial base in those areas and our technology in the propulsion systems,” says Lt Gen Arnold Bunch, military deputy for the assistant secretary of the air force for acquisition.

    An adaptive cycle engine is intended to save fuel in engines designed for high speed and fast acceleration. A conventional supersonic engine uses a minimum of fuel-saving air flow bypassing the engine core. An adaptive engine opens a second stream of bypass air flow in cruise flight, allowing the aircraft to reduce fuel burn while not rapidly accelerating or taking-off.

    The USAF kicked off development of the adaptive engine programme in 2007 with GE only. In 2012, P&W and GE were both selected to continue development under the adaptive engine technology development programme. The award of the AETP contracts last will bring both companies to close to a final design of a new engine with adaptive cycle technology.

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