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Less Carriers in the Future...


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ICBMs have been targeting land bases for over 50 years, we should get rid of them too ...

Gregg

The ICBMs are going away, because they haven't been used in Afghanistan.

Regards,

Murph

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The ICBMs are going away, because they haven't been used in Afghanistan.

Maybe that's the problem... Who's to say ICBMs and SLBM aren't good counterinsurgency weapons? We've never tried using these things... You can't resist if you are dead. :rofl:

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I remember the geniuses in congress tried to off the A-10 against the advice of the people who flew them and the people on the ground who like knowing that they're overhead when the crap hits the fan., IIRC it was just before Desert Storm.

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you know it will, how many time have we seen systems dubbed outdated for the conflict come back and save the very asses that condemned them in the first place? versatility and the big picture are things that the critics of these systems seem to miss, sometimes even by just trying to make every system so versatile that they let the numbers of such fall too low.

Agreed. The Tank has been declared "dead" after every war since world war I.

Really Iranian speed boats? Didn't we play that game once already and win?

ah58d3.jpg

OH-58 Persian Gulf

Can't find a way to make a Phalanx hit a moving speedboat when the things can track and kill fast flying missiles?

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So let me get this straight. Just because we enjoy overwhelming military superiority over pretty much all the rest of the world, and because our strategic deterrents have effectively done their job for the better part of 60 years... now is the right time to essentially lower our guard by severely diminishing our strike capability? Really?

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So let me get this straight. Just because we enjoy overwhelming military superiority over pretty much all the rest of the world, and because our strategic deterrents have effectively done their job for the better part of 60 years... now is the right time to essentially lower our guard by severely diminishing our strike capability? Really?

Uh yeah duh! Its like wasting money on immunizations for diseases you never even get anyway!

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I think we'll need the carriers too. My biggest reason is that I just don't see a better way to move airpower around the world. To the best of my knowledge we can't send our bombers around the world with out them to launch refueling aircraft. (Or growler type airplanes to fly out front) Another thing is there is no better example of American military power in existence. Waving the flag often looks arrogant but it also makes our enemies think twice. Carriers own the air around them.

Unfortunately they are super expensive. Buying a carrier with money we don't have just doesn't work. Something has to be cut. That is always the real debate. Unfortunately, I see no reason to believe that the USA will maintain total air dominance forever. There are just too many people out there that want a piece of that action. Those other countries are getting thier acts together and are starting to make very impressive gains in aviation. So the real question to me is what do we have for protective systems? Every carrier is supposed to have some destoyers and subs nearby.

There is another game changer out there too. UCAVs. I can't help but wonder if they can change the very nature of carrier design.

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To the best of my knowledge we can't send our bombers around the world with out them to launch refueling aircraft. (Or growler type airplanes to fly out front)

The strategic bomber fleet does not use carrier aviation for refueling. Actually, quite the opposite. More often than not, carrier assets are refueled by Air Force "big wing" refueling. And B-2s operate independently more often than not. The majority of missions flying into Afghanistan are reliant on AF tankers for their missions, due to the huge distances involved in flying off the boat.

The ICBMs are going away, because they haven't been used in Afghanistan.

That doesn't mean somebody isn't going to try. Prompt Global Strike Weapon

For the record, I don't think the article intimates that the carriers are going away, just that the numbers might be reduced.

Regarding the discussions of the carrier being a "sunset" system, I think you have to consider what level of sunset we're talking about. Obviously it's always useful to have the ability to operate offshore and fly assets over a region. The big deck amphibs kind of bear out this line of thinking as well, and are a far more useful means of "showing the flag," particularly in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. Like it or not, that's what the US military does most frequently. So much so that the Navy has now made it a core mission.

What I find interesting (and it's spelled out in numerous other articles of late) is the fact that many Navy professionals think the tide is shifting (pun unintended) away from the carrier as the centerpiece of US maritime power projection. Offensive power projection might be a better caveat. If you consider how vulnerable the carrier can be to the vast array of anti-access/area-denial systems that are rapidly proliferating, it certainly is worth considering the alternatives. After all, if you have to park the carrier so far away that it can't do its primary mission, what good does it do you to have 11 of them? Also consider the political vulnerability a carrier becomes in that scenario. Many people in this thread have mentioned that the carrier is "a symbol of American power." Well, what happens if you demonstrate the ability to destroy that symbol, quickly and violently? Seems like a quick way to gain international prestige amongst the list of countries that dislike the US.

All of this is just thought, of course, and hopefully we don't have the type of "violent" pardigm shift that occurred in WW2 to shift US Navy away from the battleship and onto the carrier. I'd be much happier if the alternatives were well thought out by smart people ahead of time.

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More often than not, carrier assets are refueled by Air Force "big wing" refueling. And B-2s operate independently more often than not. The majority of missions flying into Afghanistan are reliant on AF tankers for their missions, due to the huge distances involved in flying off the boat.

Thank God for Big Wing Tankers :worship:

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The strategic bomber fleet does not use carrier aviation for refueling. Actually, quite the opposite. More often than not, carrier assets are refueled by Air Force "big wing" refueling. And B-2s operate independently more often than not. The majority of missions flying into Afghanistan are reliant on AF tankers for their missions, due to the huge distances involved in flying off the boat.

That doesn't mean somebody isn't going to try. Prompt Global Strike Weapon

For the record, I don't think the article intimates that the carriers are going away, just that the numbers might be reduced.

Regarding the discussions of the carrier being a "sunset" system, I think you have to consider what level of sunset we're talking about. Obviously it's always useful to have the ability to operate offshore and fly assets over a region. The big deck amphibs kind of bear out this line of thinking as well, and are a far more useful means of "showing the flag," particularly in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. Like it or not, that's what the US military does most frequently. So much so that the Navy has now made it a core mission.

What I find interesting (and it's spelled out in numerous other articles of late) is the fact that many Navy professionals think the tide is shifting (pun unintended) away from the carrier as the centerpiece of US maritime power projection. Offensive power projection might be a better caveat. If you consider how vulnerable the carrier can be to the vast array of anti-access/area-denial systems that are rapidly proliferating, it certainly is worth considering the alternatives. After all, if you have to park the carrier so far away that it can't do its primary mission, what good does it do you to have 11 of them? Also consider the political vulnerability a carrier becomes in that scenario. Many people in this thread have mentioned that the carrier is "a symbol of American power." Well, what happens if you demonstrate the ability to destroy that symbol, quickly and violently? Seems like a quick way to gain international prestige amongst the list of countries that dislike the US.

All of this is just thought, of course, and hopefully we don't have the type of "violent" pardigm shift that occurred in WW2 to shift US Navy away from the battleship and onto the carrier. I'd be much happier if the alternatives were well thought out by smart people ahead of time.

Look at ODS though, it was the land bases that were vulnerable to Scud attacks and not the Carriers ...

Why are China and Russia both wanting big deck Carriers if they are a soon to be a relic ?

I believe as new weapons come about, new defenses are also developed to counter those ...

I can see Carrier Battle Groups being equipped with energy beam type Phalanx systems in the not to distant future and the underwater threats are always being targeted for new systems as well ...

Gregg

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Look at ODS though, it was the land bases that were vulnerable to Scud attacks and not the Carriers ...

Different time, different technology, different adversary. Arguably, land bases were not terribly vulnerable even to SCUDS. The primary utility of that weapon was as a terror device, capable of instilling fear in a population. Hence the reason it was so important to make a solid show of support to the Israelis, as a direct SCUD hit against their population centers threatened the political cohesiveness of the coalition (because it was assumed Israel would retaliate).

That said, many of the same systems capable of threatening carriers in an anti-access scenario would also hold major land bases hostage. It complicates the problem, to be sure.

Why are China and Russia both wanting big deck Carriers if they are a soon to be a relic ?

Again, I'm not arguing that they're soon to be a relic. There will be plenty of utility left in having a carrier, but for leading the force in a contested environment, there might be a different centerpiece of naval power projection. It could be that the carriers don't arrive until a more permissive environment is created.

As for China, that answer is easy: prestige, regional influence, and international recognition. China wants a blue water navy with force projection throughout its own perceived sphere of influence. That includes the Western Pacific, the Spratleys, and down through the Strait of Malacca. A carrier would undoubtedly help them to influence operations throughout that sphere. If they can simultaneously deploy defensive systems that deny other nations the ability to operate in that environment, then they've scored a huge influence victory. And most of those places I listed are interesting to more than a few parties.

I'm unaware of any Russian efforts currently underway to pursue a "big deck" carrier. Long term, perhaps, but not at the moment.

I believe as new weapons come about, new defenses are also developed to counter those ...

Agreed. However, since the current threats to the carriers appear to be diverse and operating in a wide range of mediums, I think it complicates the problem significantly. We're not talking about a single threat here, we're talking an entire range of systems designed specifically to sink a US carrier. It's difficult to develop a counter-technology to such a wide range of systems. I also think a maneuvering, guided, salvoed ballistic missile threat is a huge challenge, and one that it might take some time to overcome.

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I also think a maneuvering, guided, salvoed ballistic missile threat is a huge challenge, and one that it might take some time to overcome.

From what you have said it seems that the space component will become more dominate. A salvoed threat to Guam would be in my opinion even more of a challenge. Guam isn't made from steel and can't zig zag. It's a lot bigger than a carrier but has a civilian population which may complicate things. Naval battles have dominated military campaigns in the Pacific. If you can't project power using ships how do you prevail in that region? Will we need to control space to control the access to that region? As it stands now space defense is the role of the Army and Navy (less the ABL) while power projection (ICBM's) in space is an Air Force mission. Would probably work better if both offense and defense would be in the same organization. So are the real questions whether or not we configure our forces to become a space power and will space superiority replace air superiority?

Douglas McArthur admonished everyone to not get into a land battle on the Asian Continent. Think we are in for interesting times. BTW great discussion.

Mark

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Perhaps one of the alternatives to the traditional aircraft carrier in an anti-access environment might be another idea from the past- a submersible carrier. Perhaps similar in concept to the Japanese I-400 class: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-400_class_submarine

Obviously we'd have better aircraft/drones and a better aircraft/drone launch& recovery systems and perhaps an *** load of cruise/ballistic missiles and some form of anti-air capability ( the last point is already being addressed by the USN on current subs with a AIM-9X variant).If as the submarine guys say, there are submarines and there are targets, why not combine the best of both worlds?

Such a vessel wouldn't have to worry about incoming cruise or ballistic missiles, and nothing fights subs better than another submarine... of course it doesn't address the Secretary's valid point that the Navy must move away from incredibly expensive, low volume assets, since I am sure such a concept would no doubt exceed even the Ford's impressive price tag in both R&D and construction.

But hey, I'm thinking outside the box... Maybe I'll be hired by the OSD as consultant for my brilliant insights... or directly appointed as the new Secretary of the Navy. Move aside Mabus! :)

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How about sharks with fricking laser beams? :cheers:

lasers_20080206161421.png

I would have thought that a small craft like a speedboat would find it difficult getting through the fleets outer picket assets though.

As a deterrent though, nothing beats a battle group's visibility. That sort of force multiplier should never be understated even if the active naval assets (multinational) form around the USN battle group for logistical support.

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From what you have said it seems that the space component will become more dominate.

Mark - unfortunately, space is yet another realm where our heretofore uncontested dominance is about to be....well, contested. This article sums up a lot of the PRC's anti-access efforts, and talks a bit about some of the ongoing DoD efforts to develop a counter-strategy.

As it stands now space defense is the role of the Army and Navy (less the ABL) while power projection (ICBM's) in space is an Air Force mission. Would probably work better if both offense and defense would be in the same organization.

Not entirely accurate, as elements of each reside in different component services for organize-train-equip. However, in a given regional scenario or under a combat scenario, both the offensive and defensive components would be wholly joint, under the regional combatant commander or an appointed JTF commander. Traditionally, under that construct the JFACC is the Integrated Air and Missile Defense commander, which would involve Ballistic Missile Defense and its associated assets. That gets sticky these days, as many of the BMD assets are ships, which might fall under the JFMCC. Are they CHOPed to the JFACC? Really though, that's a command and control decision.

I wholly agree about the threats to land bases from salvoes of ballistic and cruise missiles. In fact, that's been a given. I'd say we always assume and take measure to counter potential threats to our land bases (hardening, camoflauge, concealment, dispersal, etc.). Until recently, however, it's pretty much been assumed that a Carrier Strike Group would be able to sail into a region using the maritime commons and project power ashore. The whole point of anti-access strategies is to deny US forces that kind of operational reach, while simultaneously denying forward basing options.

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich is one of the leading experts on the subjects, and has written numerous papers (he's quoted in the article I linked above). The whole point of anti-access strategies is to deny US forces the ability to get into theater and achieve a buildup of forces. Historically, any time an adversary has allowed the US to mass its technologically dominant forces, they've lost (the battle, at least, although the strategic challenges of stability and post-conflict reconstruction seem to be sticking points). At any rate, one of his core arguments is that it is unlikely another adversary will allow the type of operations that occurred in Desert Storm, because they'd never allow the US 6 months to deploy and mass forces prior to an attack.

Recognizing this, the US has relied extensively on being able to rapidly deploy air and naval power into a region to achieve devastating, rapid superiority through air and sea strikes. Anti-access strategies attempt to neutralize that by forcing the US to operate from greater than desired ranges and deny traditional forward basing options.

****BREAK****

Trying to return to the point at hand, I think one of the major salient points the SecDef made in this speech is the fact that the current acquisition and build process is broken. Granted, he's talking about ship building capacity, but the same could be said of military aviation as well. The two also have similarities: once lost, the ability to construct those types of systems is not easily recapitalized.

Random thoughts....I should probably be working on a model. I'm sure I have an F-18 or six around here somewhere that needs building....

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The problem with "four times as effective" is that you're reduced "four times the effectiveness" if only one is lost. Raptors fair equally as any other aircraft if caught on the runway.

So what your saying is, If the F-22 is comparable to 4 F-15s. Then if one F-22 crashes or is lost in a conflict, then technical you lost 4 F-15s as well.

I really don't get where the mind set is in D.C these days.

At one time you built a better stronger military, so you did not need to use it. The threat of force was enough not to fight a war.

This day and age, They are down sizing the force to make sure we need them to fight a war.

The best and cheapest wars fought by the F-15, Ohio class Subs and our ballistic missiles, are those they stopped from happening.

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Random thoughts....I should probably be working on a model. I'm sure I have an F-18 or six around here somewhere that needs building....

I am sure I speak for a lot folks who appreciate you and Murph giving us your thoughts on this and other subjects not many of us are as familiar with. Its nice to get some info from someone "in the know. "

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I am sure I speak for a lot folks who appreciate you and Murph giving us your thoughts on this and other subjects not many of us are as familiar with. Its nice to get some info from someone "in the know. "

True, I always love bouncing stuff off of those guys for their insights and they're always gracious ... :cheers:

No matter how dumb I come off ... :D

Gregg

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The Navy's rebuttal ...

What a surprise! The Navy doesn't think it can live without a bazillion dollars worth of carrier battle groups. I'm shocked at their attitude. I'd always figured the Navy for a group of folks who were always looking to do more with less.

We've got three pages worth of opinions here, but nobody seems to be looking at the elephant in the living room: WE SIMPLY CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO FIGHT THE COLD WAR! Gang, like it or not, the "new normal" (which we haven't reached yet) is going to be at a considerably lower level of everything in America than it was before 2008. The collapse of our economy (or at least the very, very near collapse) should be a huge lesson for all of us. We live in a house of cards, and the wind is blowing. We can't just keep ginning up the printing presses to make more money to pay for things like 11 carrier battle groups that, in all honesty, we really, truly don't need. I'm not advocating doing away with the Navy, but we have to be realistic. America has been on an orgy of spending for the past 60 years, and the time has come to pay the piper. We need to stop spending like drunken sailors (so to speak) and get a grip on the economic reality of the 2010's.

Just my little old opinion..

J

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I think it's shortsighted to assume we're going to need an 11-carrier force through 2045 simply because I believe technological and force employment changes are on the horizon which we can't fully conceptualize at this point. They might be able to justify those readiness/presence numbers in the short term, but if we DO see a change in the types of maritime forces that generate forward presence/force projection, committing to 11 carriers for 3 decades seems a bit ridiculous. Then again, I believe the Air Force has similarly "committed" itself to the B-52 through 2040.

Economic realities will certainly play a role, but they're a much greater impact than military spending, and involve a whole spectrum of programs and initiatives being proposed and funded which the US cannot afford.

To avoid temptation on the political spectrum, I'd prefer to keep this discussion focused on the technological/force structure/capabilities aspects of Gates' speech and responses.

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The issue of economic realities, as proposed by Jennings, boils down to much more than defense spending, and ironically, if people allowed it to develop without falling into the usual, tired political trench warfare that sells advertiser time on the 24-hour news channels, it would generally work itself out to be constant for all sides of the discussion. It is correct that the United States has developed a wholly new political economy over the past six or seven decades. But this isn't at all limited to defense. Since the 1930s, at least, we've had a "new federalism," altogether different from what the United States was or had previously, that involved all sorts of federal initiatives, federal tax dollars and federal debts. And state governments have gotten involved, or have been pulled into this as well. "New Deals" and "Great Societies" were more than simply defense dollars, although defense spending has been intimately intertwined with them as well.

There are those who would rush to a distinction between defense spending and, say, welfare programs such as Medicaid or Women with Infant Children (WIC), or continued tax support (well beyond gas taxes) for interstate highways, or support of new high-speed rail initiatives, or support of the arts, or support of math and science education, or any number of federal and state involvements. I don't respect those distinctions very much anymore. To me, they all involve a basic tenet which is that we commit collective resources to a supposed or intended end, regardless of different people's moralistic huffing over their pet favorites. In the past, we simply didn't collect as many taxes, and so didn't spend. And so we didn't have social security, and our Armed Forces represented a frontier constabulary and a brown-water coastal Navy, both poorly supported and poorly regarded by a quintessentially civilian society. Following from this, we can step right over political partisanship and likely agree that, to whatever extent overall economic development (or lack thereof) impacts government spending, it will likely either draw from or contribute to federal spending across the board.

This is an interesting discussion to me, because I wondered when we'd get to asking, as a matter of policy, if the carriers were so expensive that it was eating into their usefulness. Prior to World War I, both the British and German admiralties fantasized about the titanic battleship fight that they were sure to win in the next war. But when it really, really came down to doing the deed, both sides realized how frightening it was to commit such resources in what seemed like a very dangerous gamble. (After all, what if our side loses? And loses everything, in a single gruesome afternoon in the North Sea?) The result was colossal indecisiveness.

Also, I am interested in this problem of procurement and industry. To what extent is our defense industry increasingly eroding, because the development of advanced weaponry has less application in the civilian world? Should we be buying old airliner designs for tankers, instead of jointly developing a new design suitable for tanking missions in gray paint, and airline work in civilian livery, thus allowing Boeing to capitalize a single project for both markets? Or is that now unrealistic, given divergent technical needs of air carriers and air forces? Just a single example, but there may be more.

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