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More software problems. But a 16% MC rate isn't bad is it.

http://fortune.com/2016/04/28/f-35-fails-testing-air-force/

HEY! Post like that are NOT welcome on this thread. Not welcome at all. Please stand by while one of the regulars drafts a cutting response to explain why you are wrong, uninformed, quoting from a biased site, etc, The response will be replete with funny memes and personal attacks. This "incident" never happened. Understand?

As penance, you need to post 6 cool pics of the F-35 in action (if you can find a picture of one that is actually functional).

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HEY! Post like that are NOT welcome on this thread. Not welcome at all. Please stand by while one of the regulars drafts a cutting response to explain why you are wrong, uninformed, quoting from a biased site, etc, The response will be replete with funny memes and personal attacks. This "incident" never happened. Understand?

As penance, you need to post 6 cool pics of the F-35 in action (if you can find a picture of one that is actually functional).

I expect the replies to include comments about the failure to procure a Kiowa replacement, Gates lack of planning, and of course some memes that have nothing to do with the topic.

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Congress Is in Doubt Over Cost and Need in Air Force Buildup

- New York Times

Among the charges under this headline: The Air Force is buying needlessly complex and expensive fighters, and it is asking for more warplanes than it needs.

Critics were particularly incensed about USAF’s fighter recapitalization plan. Why does the Air Force feel it has to have new models when the Navy has already developed a perfectly good modern fighter both services could use?

"This is a dubious purchase costing billions," the Times quotes Sen. Carl Levin (D) of Michigan as saying. "Why not use a less expensive plane?"

This article sounds like an assault on the Air Force’s F-22 and F-35 fighter programs, but it isn’t new at all. Rather, it is from April 8, 1982. Levin was not chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as he would later be between 2007 and 2015, but a low-ranking member. The aircraft purchase he was objecting to was the F-15, which in decades to come would prove to be one of the most successful combat aircraft in history.

To be fair, Congressional critics at the time were complaining about Air Force plans to purchase large numbers of F-15s for defense of the continental US, while many felt the Navy F-14 could do that job at a lower price. And this was is 1982, 10 years after the F-15 first flew.

During the F-16s air-to-ground gunnery evaluations at Edwards, the test pilot rolled in on the target, fired the M61 Vulcan 20mm cannon, and experienced a sudden uncommanded left roll. The pilot was able to instantly regain control of the aircraft and after a quick controllability check, resumed the gun test. On the very next pass, as soon as the pilot pulled the trigger,the aircraft rolled sharply left again. Back to base! In post-test analysis, the problem was traced to electrical interference between the gun and a control wire from the flight control computers. When the computers 'heard' the gun motor over the line, it mis-interpreted the interference as a left roll command from the flight control stick and immediately complied. Shielding the wiring solved that problem. F-16 designers struggled with canopy, engine and cockpit issues as well.

Both the F-15 and F-16 suffered from teething problems that led U.S. News and World Report to characterize them both as “America’s Jinxed Warplanes.”

But this news piece from the past points out a basic fact of warplane development. For 30 years, most new models have been the subject of caustic criticism. Technical setbacks are treated as surprises which threaten a system’s viability—or its very existence. Airframes always seem to be too complicated, too high-tech, too expensive, and not what the US really needs. That’s the criticism, at least.

Lost in the volume is recognition of the fact that modern warplanes are among the most complex machines ever designed. It takes patience and hard work to make them deployment-ready. Many of today’s Air Force legacy systems came out of "a long, arduous, and turbulent process," notes a RAND Corp. monograph on fighter acquisition. "Nonetheless, these often vitriolic debates ended in the design and development of several of the world’s most capable fighters."

The F-15 Eagle, E-3 AWACS, and the C-17 Globemaster III, to pick three, all had significant teething problems, and all developed into aircraft the Pentagon can’t do without today.

The reformers continued to pick at the Eagle as the years rolled by. In 1981, Sprey wrote an airpower section in a book issued by the Heritage Foundation which questioned the F-15’s effectiveness. The F-15 was larger and more visible than its predecessor the F-4, wrote Sprey, making it vulnerable in daylight close-in dogfighting. He claimed the Eagle was too dependent on radar guided missiles, which "are not likely to be more effective than those used in Vietnam."

Since 1960, Sprey wrote in the 1981 piece, too much of the Air Force tactical aviation budget had been devoted to complex night/all-weather systems "of highly questionable capability." Sprey urged the Air Force to emphasize the F-16 over the F-15 because "in visual combat, the F-16 has been demonstrated to be the superior aircraft."

This was the point where the military reformers misfired.

Future air combat would not, as they assumed, take place largely in daytime, close-in engagements. The F-15 would go on to become the dominant air-to-air force in the skies precisely because of its radar missiles and long reach. In the first Gulf War, the F-15 accounted for 36 of 40 Air Force aerial victories. Of those, 28 involved radar guided missiles. Worldwide, the Eagle has racked up an unprecedented kill ratio of 104-to-zero.

Writing in 2004, David R. Mets of Air University summed it up this way: "The Korea-style dogfight seems to have all but disappeared from the air-to-air battle. The agility of both [the F-15 and F-16] remains highly useful in dodging surface-to-air missiles, but that is not what Boyd and the [military reform] acolytes had in mind." And the F-15 was not the only Air Force system hit in its early years as overly dependent on high technology.

Today, the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System seems beyond criticism, an obvious force multiplier without whose radar Air Force operations might be blind. AWACS can track enemy aircraft and guide friendly forces straight to them, making it an invaluable asset for both offensive and defensive air operations. But during development, AWACS was derided as a boondoggle: unnecessary, unworkable, and vulnerable.

On April 13, 1974, The New Republic ran an article on the ungainly airborne radar system. Titled "AWACS: The Plane That Would Not Die," it called the airborne warning and control mission "a complete phony." It described the aircraft simply as a means to keep money flowing to contractors. The article even took a shot at the airplane’s appearance, describing it as a "mushroom with elephantiasis."

The author appeared to have little understanding of the mission of airborne command and control which the AWACS was designed to fulfill, and less understanding of the technology involved. But the story, and similar criticism in other media, helped fuel opposition to the system in Congress. Serious criticisms of the AWACS, leveled by the General Accounting Office and others, included worry that the slow E-3 airframe would be highly vulnerable to Soviet fighters and thus unable to get close enough to contested airspace to be of any use in a European conflict.

"It was claimed that electronic countermeasures (ECM) would render the [AWACS] radar useless. The large number of targets in [Europe] would saturate the tracker," said Robert E. Cowdery and William A. Skillman, engineers who helped develop the radar for Westinghouse, in a history of the system published in a professional engineering journal in 1995.

Worried about these allegations, the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1974 requested the Secretary of Defense to certify that AWACS could perform in the cluttered environment of Central Europe. The Pentagon’s Research and Engineering branch set up an ad hoc committee of experts to study the problem and allow lawmakers’ concerns. Members conducted "ground-flooder" ECM tests, among other things, and by the end of 1974 had established to their own satisfaction that the AWACS performed just fine. "As a result, the Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that the performance of AWACS in ECM was adequate to meet the projected threat," wrote Cowdery and Skillman.

Since then, the "mushroom with elephantiasis" has become a symbol—perhaps the pre-eminent symbol—of an Air Force operational presence. It has directed traffic in conflicts from Grenada, to the Persian Gulf, to the Balkans, and recently over Iraq and Afghanistan. AWACS flew more than 7,000 combat hours in the first Gulf War, alone.

NATO has its own AWACS fleet, as do France and Great Britain. Saudi Arabia operates five. Japan also has four, based on a Boeing 767 airframe. After Sept. 11, 2001, seven NATO AWACS deployed to the United States to monitor commercial air traffic. It was "a mission never foreseen by any planner, but one which captures the uncertainty of weapon system planning," wrote Walter J. Boyne.

Mobility aircraft have not been immune to similar sorts of criticism, and more recently the C-17 has survived intense turbulence on its way to airlift pre-eminence.

"The C-17 program encountered political opposition and limited funding, plus technical development and program management difficulties, which affected the program’s cost, production, and delivery schedule," wrote Betty Raab Kennedy, an Air Mobility Command historian, in a 1999 analysis of C-17 acquisition. At its onset in the late 1970s, the C-17 had a difficult time winning support in Congress. Lawmakers felt DOD had not clearly demonstrated the need for additional strategic airlift capacity. Thus, development funding was not approved until 1981.

Then, in 1982, DOD decided its airlift shortfall was so urgent it could not wait for development of a whole new aircraft. It asked for 50 new C-5s to make up part of the airlift gap. Congress approved the money, but asked for an airlift master plan to guide the way forward. This assessment concluded the C-17 was the most cost-effective solution to the airlift problem, but the study was not completed until the end of 1983, adding further delay.

"By the mid-1980s, the C-17 program appeared to be on track, if somewhat behind schedule," wrote Christopher Bolkcom of the Congressional Research Service in a 2007 report. But the C-17 had taken so long to get going that key personnel had drifted away from prime contractor McDonnell Douglas and production difficulties followed. These hiccups delayed the program even further and increased development costs.

In April 1990, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cut the production program from 210 to 120 aircraft, due to both the collapse of the Soviet Union and domestic budget constraints. Cuts of this sort have an inevitable effect: They increase the aircraft’s unit price, fueling a new round of criticism.

In 1993, Defense Secretary Les Aspin disciplined four senior Air Force officials for their handling of the program. Among other things, they had improperly channeled cash to McDonnell Douglas at a time when the company was having financial problems.

Finally, in December 1993, the C-17 program reached its darkest hour. DOD announced the C-17 program would be killed by 1995 if McDonnell Douglas did not improve performance.

In fall 1995, as the deadline loomed, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists dubbed the C-17 a "$340 Million Ugly Duckling." The airlifter’s unit cost had skyrocketed, according to the article, while technical glitches such as airflow problems around the cargo doors persisted. Quoting the GAO, the Bulletin piece said the C-17’s specialized and expensive short-landing abilities had little use in any foreseeable conflict.

Convening at the end of 1995, a crucial Defense Acquisition Board decided to proceed with the full 120 C-17 program. The airlifter’s combination of long reach with relatively short takeoff and landing requirements was not duplicated by other alternatives. "The DAB regarded the C-17 as best providing the greatest amount of flexibility in meeting the strategic airlift requirements," wrote Kennedy.

Since then, C-17s have become the backbone of the US air transport fleet, lauded for their versatility and high reliability. Globemaster IIIs have delivered military goods and humanitarian aid all around the world, neatly bridged the gap between the tactical C-130 and the massive C-5, and allowed USAF to fully retire its old C-141s.

In its first operational use, an October 1994 delivery to the Persian Gulf, the aircraft moved a five-ton "rolling command post," five vehicles, and other supplies. In a 1995 deployment of peacekeepers and cargo to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, the C-17 flew 26 percent of airlift missions while delivering 44 percent of cargo. Today, C-17s are routinely flying the 26-hour round-trips from Germany to Afghanistan, while dropping supplies directly at forward US operating bases.

The C-17 goes wherever the President goes, as it is the airlifter of choice for the armored limousines of the executive branch.

Weapons systems today still receive the same media wire-brush attention accorded past development efforts. The F-22, the F-35, and other programs all must achieve their technological advances under constant scrutiny. Developmental testing, which is designed to identify problems so that they can be corrected, is often regarded as if it were a program’s final grade. A single flop in testing generates headlines and has the potential to send a system to the scrap heap.

Many members of Congress, meanwhile, love a show and must vote to continue system funding every year.

This means service leaders have a doubly demanding task, wrote Boyne in Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the US Air Force. "They must have a vision of what will be required for the defense of the nation for many years into the future. At the same time, they must be proficient in the political gamesmanship necessary to shepherd the ideas of their predecessors through all the hazards into operational use."

Developing an advanced military aircraft is no easy feat, but the Air Force—and the nation—are better off when systems make it into service with problems identified and corrected. The past 30 years of military operations might have been very different if the military leadership had given up on the F-15, AWACS, or C-17 early on.

Designing and producing a new military aircraft is a challenging and at times torturous business. Problems often emerge relatively late in the development process or even when the first aircrafts are rolling off the production line. Then, the manufacturer has to scramble to fix the problems. Almost invariably, the initial unit price proposed for the aircraft turns out to be optimistic or at least dependent on production rates that are difficult to achieve. Yet, over the past four decades at a minimum, the United States has fielded a succession of military aircraft – fighters, bombers, transports, intelligence collection platforms and even unmanned aerial systems – that dominate the skies.

The experienced F-35 program is typical of a military aircraft program. It has had its share of technical, cost and schedule problems. It also suffers from some unique challenges such as that of building three different variants of the same aircraft, including one that can take off and land vertically. Yet, even as the cost of the F-35 comes down, problems are corrected and the threats to fourth-generation aircraft become more severe, the critics continue to hound the program.

If you think that the F-35 is a particularly problem-plagued aircraft or that it must be a lemon because of all the criticisms leveled against it, you are wrong. Virtually every modern military aircraft, particularly fighters, have been subject to nearly identical criticisms. In fact, each of the airplanes that the critics say should be preferred over the F-35, the F-15, F-16, F/A-18 E/F and the A-10 were in their day the targets of similar critiques, sometimes by the very same individuals who today are excoriating the Joint Strike Fighter.

In fact, as often happens with critics, they forget the travails of previous programs and the obstacles overcome that eventually yielded superior aircraft. The F-16 was no different than any other developmental aircraft. It had its share of problems, yet they were overcome and the result was one of the premier fighters of its age.

Software issues have been known for some time and are being worked on. Flight controls, radar functionality, communications, navigation and identification, electronic attack, sensor fusion and weapons deployment, the F-35 has more than 9 million lines of software code (roughly 162,000 pages of printed text.). Developing, integrating and testing more than 9M lines of code on a supersonic stealth fighter is no small task.

Work on the software never stops. There will always be software updates pushed out; improvements, updates, bug fixes. Just ask Microsoft, Apple, and Google; all of whom push out updates to their desktop and mobile devices frequently, and often in response to things discovered after the last version was pushed out. What's being done with the F-35 now In the civilian world, would be referred to as Beta testing. That means send the software out to see how it works in the real world environment and identify problems so that they're addressed before a full version is released to the market.

Development of the aircraft's OS is ongoing. That's why this deployment to Idaho was conducted by the 31st Test and Evaluation Squadron as opposed to a line fighter squadron. Their job is to either find ways to break the airplane or find ways to make the airplane break the things on the ground its supposed to. And if it the plane breaks, then they go back and sit down with the engineers and explain how - from the pilot's perspective - what's wrong, or not optimally engineered for a 3D environment. What version of the software were they flying? In one example, two of four F-35s loaded with an earlier version of the combat jet’s software were forced to abort a test of the aircraft’s radar jamming and threat detection capabilities due to software stability problems encountered at startup.Most jets are flying 2B software. IOC will be 3i software and FOC will be 3F software.

Point is, development is ongoing and there will never really be an "end" to it. The software will always be maturing; there will always be a next iteration of the software. That's neither a limitation of the aircraft, nor a conspiracy on the part of Lockheed, nor negligence on the part of the AF/Navy/USMC, it is simply the nature of software development.

Edited by Tony Stark
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The JSF program started in 1996, the prototype X-35 first flew in 2000, and the first F-35 flew in 2006. Teething problems should be expected, but for a 20 year old program it has a lot of problems. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and the F-16 in 1974, and within a few years were in operational service. The F-15 got its first air to air kill in 1979, just 7 years from the first flight, and the F-16 bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

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Interesting article above ^^^. Certainly food for thought and its amazing how the turmoil surrounding the F-35 is really nothing new. Thanks for posting it.

:cheers:

Don.

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The JSF program started in 1996, the prototype X-35 first flew in 2000, and the first F-35 flew in 2006. Teething problems should be expected, but for a 20 year old program it has a lot of problems. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and the F-16 in 1974, and within a few years were in operational service. The F-15 got its first air to air kill in 1979, just 7 years from the first flight, and the F-16 bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

You made an excellent points. Everyone would expect the technology to move forward instead of moving backward, so is the design and development process. Yes, I understand that F-35 is newer technology. But if the technology is not mature and ready, the war fighter cannot afford it. It is not just the initial money cost, it was the maintenance time and complexity that caused the B-2 and F-22 programs to be cut short. The F-35 program needs to demonstrate that it is different, but has not been successful in showing it yet.

There is a good reason that the Navy is so reluctant to give up the Super Hornet for the JSF. Others compare them on paper. The Navy compares them on real world operation and will embrace the F-35 in no time once F-35 can demonstrate that it can deliver what it promises.

Only One of Six Air Force F-35s Could Actually Take Off During Testing

And FORTUNE is not a libral, anti-defense news outlet.

Edited by Kei Lau
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You made an excellent points. Everyone would expect the technology to move forward instead of moving backward, so is the design and development process. Yes, I understand that F-35 is newer technology. But if the technology is not mature and ready, the war fighter cannot afford it. It is not just the initial money cost, it was the maintenance time and complexity that caused the B-2 and F-22 programs to be cut short. The F-35 program needs to demonstrate that it is different, but has not been successful in showing it yet.

There is a good reason that the Navy is so reluctant to give up the Super Hornet for the JSF. Others compare them on paper. The Navy compares them on real world operation and will embrace the F-35 in no time once F-35 can demonstrate that it can deliver what it promises.

Only One of Six Air Force F-35s Could Actually Take Off During Testing

And FORTUNE is not a libral, anti-defense news outlet.

I am not opposed to the F-35, and eventually it will work. It is a program too big to fail, but some like to pretend it doesn't have major problems.

I am not surprised though, I was in the Air Force as a C-5 loadmaster when the C-17 first started operations. Based out of Charleston, SC it didn't have the range to fly across the Atlantic without refueling. To pretend it wasn't a problem the C-5s were directed to also stop for fuel enroute to places like Germany, even though we had more than enough range to make it without stopping.

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The JSF program started in 1996, the prototype X-35 first flew in 2000, and the first F-35 flew in 2006. Teething problems should be expected, but for a 20 year old program it has a lot of problems. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and the F-16 in 1974, and within a few years were in operational service. The F-15 got its first air to air kill in 1979, just 7 years from the first flight, and the F-16 bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

That kind of broad generalization of expectations results in a grossly inaccurate "apples to oranges" comparison. Neither the F-15 nor the F-16 had the software requirements that the F-35 has necessary to reach both IOC and FOC.

The software used in in the X-35 in 1996 was that for basic flight control, flight testing and communications. There was no radar, no weapons systems, no sensor fusion. F-35 AA-1 in 2006 had to have an entirely new "OS" written for it, so that development is running 10 years. And bear in mind, Microsoft, Apple and Google have been developing their operating systems over decades.

Secondly, that comparison ignores both the similarities and differences between the developments of the F-16 and the F-35 and their goals.

Congress and the DoD are concerned (either justifiably or overly concerned, depending on your perspective) with the cost of concurrency, even though it has always been the plan for the F-35 to repeat the proven F-16 approach. Unlike serial programs, where development — test — production nicely dovetail one after the other, concurrency is where they overlap. Based on their statements and testimony to the U.S. Congress, today’s DoD officials believe that F-35 concurrency adds unbounded and unaffordable retrofit costs to incorporate fixes for problems found in later tests into earlier production airplanes. They intend to keep F-35 production at very low (and costly) production rates until at or near full specification performance is demonstrated. For the F-35, final testing is not scheduled for completion until 2017.

The point, of course, is the contractor isn't slowing down the development and production of the F-35. The customer - DoD & Congress - is. And part of the reason for that is being driven by the belief that all the fixes necessary to apply to the current crop of F-35s are too expensive.

By contrast, from the start, the F-16 went to high-rate production; 352 airplanes were on firm order within four years and three years later, more than 500 had been delivered worldwide. This fast production was based on several important decision criteria. First, there was confidence that the early configuration of the F-16 would be superior to the F-4 Phantom it was replacing, even though the performance specification had not been fully demonstrated through testing. Contractor and government tests were in parallel, and results were shared to gain quick confidence in the basic airplane.

Second, low cost could only be achieved through high-rate production.

Third, service leaders knew that the airplanes would be continuously upgraded, so there was never a final configuration for production.

Lastly, there was never a plan to retrofit older airplanes as newer capabilities were added. Rather, each airplane configuration was fielded for a mission suited to its performance. And when retrofit was initiated, it was accomplished as part of a scheduled block change to keep the cost low. To date, there are 138 versions of the F-16, as well as 15 block changes, with each block a decisive improvement in capability.

Read that very carefully, because it explains precisely what should be happening with the F-35. It also makes a very important point that many critics seem to miss - "when retrofit was initiated, it was accomplished as part of a scheduled block change to keep the cost low." Or, once final configuration is agreed upon, all aircraft will be brought up to date with a scheduled block change.

The problem for the F-35, of course, is the slowdown in production as implemented by DoD & Congress makes it hard for the efficiencies and economies of scale full production would bring. Additionally, it is obviously impossible to put fighter in service in volume if DoD slows the production process. These delays have directly affected the software development insofar as they have "kicked the can down the road" as it were for certain benchmarks to be addressed.

Edited by Tony Stark
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There is a good reason that the Navy is so reluctant to give up the Super Hornet for the JSF. Others compare them on paper. The Navy compares them on real world operation and will embrace the F-35 in no time once F-35 can demonstrate that it can deliver what it promises.

you may want to tune in to the latest.

Only One of Six Air Force F-35s Could Actually Take Off During Testing

And FORTUNE is not a libral, anti-defense news outlet.

so?

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it was the maintenance time and complexity that caused the B-2 and F-22 programs to be cut short.

Not true. Both the B-2 and F-22 programs were cut due to sticker shock and "lack of missions." We cut back on the number of B-2s and the price per aircraft increased. We recoiled in horror, and cut back even further, and the process repeated. And with the end of the Cold War, the B-2's mission was questioned. The same thing happened with the F-22.

If we had listened to the critics in the 1970s and 80s (and, in fairness, if the companies building the aircraft hadn’t been able to fix the problems) we would not now have the F-15, F-16, F/A-18 E/F, A-10, B-1, AWACS or C-17. But each of these platforms surmounted technical problems and operational issues to perform magnificently. Our mistake (or more exactly the mistake made by Secretaries of Defense Dick Cheney and Robert Gates) may have been listening to critics regarding the B-2 and F-22.

Now, the F-22 is in constant demand by theater commanders and the B-2 has proven itself useful such as in Allied Force and the opening of Iraqi Freedom. Now that the F-35 appears on a development and cost track very much like all its predecessors, maybe the critics should show a little humility and take a rest.

As for the maturation of the software, I addressed that previously.

Edited by Tony Stark
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Only One of Six Air Force F-35s Could Actually Take Off During Testing

And FORTUNE is not a libral, anti-defense news outlet.

I would argue that around here, any publication that posts negative info on the F-35 is a liberal, anti-defense news outlet.

I agree with the other posts, the program has to succeed and ultimately it will but the delays are just mind boggling. The Israeli's stated in 2012 that the JSF's stealth features would remain effective against top-line threats for only another 5-10 years. They will be lucky to even have this aircraft in fully operational service by then. Some of the other "cutting edge" systems such as the FLIR are already shown to be lacking compared to the latest designs that are out there today. Is it possible that the F-35 will be the first aircraft in history to be obsolete before it's even in full service, deployed in significant numbers? Maybe future F-35's can be flown right from the LM factory to an upgrade facility (hopefully not run by LM) so they can be disassembled and brought up to current spec as the Gen 2, new and improved F-35D/E/F?

I'm kidding (a bit).

Edited by 11bee
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The JSF program started in 1996, the prototype X-35 first flew in 2000, and the first F-35 flew in 2006. Teething problems should be expected, but for a 20 year old program it has a lot of problems. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and the F-16 in 1974, and within a few years were in operational service. The F-15 got its first air to air kill in 1979, just 7 years from the first flight, and the F-16 bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

If you are just looking at timelines you are completely ignoring the facts. F-35B was operational last year. and just like the teen series they still had problems even after they were declared operational. Nothing new under the sun other than people like you just shooting out dates and then conveniently forgetting the fact that those teen aircraft also had trouble post IOC-- some not solved until decades later.

You aren't going to compare the timelines to more recent programs? like the F-22 for example? You can thank the teen fighters for a lot of this in fact. The Navy Ramrodding the F-14 through with sub par engines that caused a quarter of the force to be lost over 30 years, and 1,800 F-16s built and delivered before the definitive block 30 came out (just get em on the ramp boys! we'll fix em later!) . Not to mention the issues with the F-100. By teen series standards the F-35 would be in serial production and we would crank out about 1,000 or so before we started getting the ones we like. And yes, the Teen series fighters were declared operational with far problems than what we are seeing from the JSF. The Navy didn't even have enough engines for the Tomcat, they would fly them from NY to Cali, and then TRUCK the engines back for the next F-14. The F-18s cracking issues the list goes on. There is a reason the airplanes were considered good until the teen started getting the C/D after the number.

By 1970s standards the F-35 would have started full production years ago and declared operational, and if the engines didn't work? oh well, just re-engine them later. fix em. Create the F-35D within just a few years to make up for all the lemons on the ramp. Like I said a lot of the way things are done now are thanks to the government feeling ripped off in the 1970s, and the "scandals" of the teen fighters.

as for "major problems" compared to what? Like the YA-10 shooting itself down with its own ingested gun gasses? :thumbsup:/> Tomcat crashed on its first flight. there was a lot more urgency back then too thanks to the cold war.

You need to actually study the history, and the problems to make an accurate comparisons program vs program. And thats not a meme or a joke, its just you being either deliberately "forgetful", or ignorant of what you speak of.

Criteria is much more stringent today, thanks to the teen series taking the taxpayer for a ride. Back then it was far easier to simply declare a fighter operational, whether it was or not.

Edited by TaiidanTomcat
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I am not opposed to the F-35, and eventually it will work. It is a program too big to fail, but some like to pretend it doesn't have major problems.

I am not surprised though, I was in the Air Force as a C-5 loadmaster when the C-17 first started operations. Based out of Charleston, SC it didn't have the range to fly across the Atlantic without refueling. To pretend it wasn't a problem the C-5s were directed to also stop for fuel enroute to places like Germany, even though we had more than enough range to make it without stopping.

So then, you're acutely aware that all major aircraft programs have problems, and that the F-35 is nothing new in this regard. However, I fail to see your point, as no one has ever said that the F-35 doesn't have it's share of problems. It's to be expected and as I've pointed out previously, many of those problems were avoidable had we (and by we I mean the DoD, Congress and critics) learned actual lessons of the past. The DoD is a revolving door of people coming into a project with too many moving parts, trying to make a positive change but ultimately being unable to do so due to micromanagement, rules that lock them into a specific course of action and constant criticism when the results aren't achieved. Congress cares only about their next reelection, so I don't expect anything out of them. But as with any problem, sitting around and constantly b!tching about them has never succeeded in contributing anything constructive towards actually solving them.

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I agree with the other posts, the program has to succeed and ultimately it will but the delays are just mind boggling. The Israeli's stated in 2012 that the JSF's stealth features would remain effective against top-line threats for only another 5-10 years. They will be lucky to even have this aircraft in fully operational service by then.

That totally wasn't an political invention to protect Israel's homegrown Avionics industry.

Is it possible that the F-35 will be the first aircraft in history to be obsolete before it's even in full service, deployed in significant numbers?

No

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The JSF program started in 1996, the prototype X-35 first flew in 2000, and the first F-35 flew in 2006. Teething problems should be expected, but for a 20 year old program it has a lot of problems. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and the F-16 in 1974, and within a few years were in operational service. The F-15 got its first air to air kill in 1979, just 7 years from the first flight, and the F-16 bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

In WWI a fighter went from concept to prototype to combat and on to obsolete in about 9 months. Why'd the F-15 take so long to develop, then?

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Some of the other "cutting edge" systems such as the FLIR are already shown to be lacking compared to the latest designs that are out there today. Is it possible that the F-35 will be the first aircraft in history to be obsolete before it's even in full service, deployed in significant numbers?

Again, an apples to oranges comparison as F-16s, F-15Es and A-10s don't have internally mounted IR systems. A pod is easy to develop and field. It's building off of existing systems, it only has to integrate with a few systems on the carrier aircraft and there's still a market for them. And while the carrier aircraft "benefits" from the addition of a pod, that pod also comes at a cost. In the case of the F-16 and F-15E, it's a 5G maneuvering limitation. In the case of the A-10, it comes at the cost of a weapons station.

The F-35 was designed to take everything you see hanging from an F-16 - bombs, missiles, pods, gas bags - and put them all inside an airframe. At some point, a design element must to be locked down if you want to move forward into production (otherwise you'll never get into production). Does the Sniper ATP offer a better image than the F-35's onboard system? IDK because I've never seen the F-35's system and not many people have (I have seen Sniper and it's very good). Are upgrades to the F-35's system on the road map? That's the important question.

As for "obsolescence," the ATF program was initiated in June 1981, less than ten years after the Eagle's first flight and only two years after it first drew blood. And if the F-35 is obsolete before it enters service, then what does that say about the entire fleet of fourth generation aircraft?

Edited by Tony Stark
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Something made me think... if we still had a draft, most would probably be more supportive of military spending when it means newer technology could be keeping their loved one safer...

Unrelated, Spreitler has a point. You want the FLIR built for the F-35 to serve the platform better than a pod serves a variety of different aircraft. I don't know if the F-35's biggest issue is the FLIR, but it either needs to be right or go.

Edited by Exhausted
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In WWI a fighter went from concept to prototype to combat and on to obsolete in about 9 months. Why'd the F-15 take so long to develop, then?

If I had the time, I'd create a graph that shows the relationship between what year an aircraft was designed and how long it's development took. My guess is that the result would be a flat line at a 30 degree angle. The more technology advances, the longer it takes to work out the bugs and get the thing into service.

The scary part is trying to imagine how long the next fighter is going to take to get fully operational. 30+ years sound reasonable?

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I don't know if the F-35's biggest issue is the FLIR, but it either needs to be right or go.

My uneducated guess is that the FLIR is nowhere close to being the F-35's biggest issue. I also don't believe it's "broken" per se, just that in the time it's taken to get the F-35 operational, other, more capable systems have been developed and fielded.

I would also think that somewhere down the road, the FLIR will be upgraded but that is probably a long, long ways off.

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You want the FLIR built for the F-35 to serve the platform better than a pod serves a variety of different aircraft. I don't know if the F-35's biggest issue is the FLIR, but it either needs to be right or go.

Who ever said that it was "wrong"?

No one has ever said that the F-35's IR system was broken. The only whines (and that's what it is, a whine) are coming from Tyler Rogoway and Dave Majumdar - both of whom are hacks that have not only been repeatedly discredited by those with actual operational experience in these matters, but they have even contradicted themselves - that the F-35's EOTS hardware is now dated as it was based on emerging technology that was included in the first generation Sniper pods (and again, Sniper's a really good system). They have speculated about the upgrade capabilities of the EOTS. Rogoway whined about the lack of a infrared pointer, but what Rogoway either doesn't know (or more likely, doesn't care to say as it would undermine his rants) is that JTACs are getting new pointers with which to designate targets for attack aircraft.

And the F-35 may not be as reliant upon IR to attack ground targets as previous generations of aircraft have been. IR pods such as Sniper are range-limited and their views can be blocked by clouds and smoke (this was a problem during the Gulf War; both the weather was bad at the outset of the war and smoke from burning oil wells hampered ground attack and CAS in the latter half of the war). The F-22 already has very (scary) capable ground targeting with its older AN/APG-77 AESA radar and the F-35's AN/APG-81 AESA radar's advanced air-to-ground modes include high resolution mapping, multiple ground moving target indication and track, combat identification, electronic warfare, and ultra high bandwidth communications.

Edited by Tony Stark
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If I had the time, I'd create a graph that shows the relationship between what year an aircraft was designed and how long it's development took. My guess is that the result would be a flat line at a 30 degree angle. The more technology advances, the longer it takes to work out the bugs and get the thing into service.

That's exactly why the ATF program office first opened in 1981. You don't sit around waiting to design your next aircraft, you start planning it as soon as your brand new ones hit the ramp.

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Who ever said that it was "wrong"?

No one has ever said that the F-35's IR system was broken. The only whines (and that's what it is, a whine) are coming from Tyler Rogoway and Dave Majumdar - both of whom are hacks that have not only been repeatedly discredited by those with actual operational experience in these matters, but they have even contradicted themselves - that the F-35's EOTS hardware is now dated as it was based on emerging technology that was included in the first generation Sniper pods (and again, Sniper's a really good system). They have speculated about the upgrade capabilities of the EOTS. Rogoway whined about the lack of a infrared pointer, but what Rogoway either doesn't know (or more likely, doesn't care to say as it would undermine his rants) is that JTACs are getting new pointers with which to designate targets for attack aircraft.

So what do they do when they don't have JTACs on the ground, like every airstrike in Iraq for the last two years.

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Who ever said that it was "wrong"?

No one has ever said that the F-35's IR system was broken. The only whines (and that's what it is, a whine) are coming from Tyler Rogoway and Dave Majumdar - both of whom are hacks that have not only been repeatedly discredited by those with actual operational experience in these matters, but they have even contradicted themselves - that the F-35's EOTS hardware is now dated as it was based on emerging technology that was included in the first generation Sniper pods (and again, Sniper's a really good system). They have speculated about the upgrade capabilities of the EOTS. Rogoway whined about the lack of a infrared pointer, but what Rogoway either doesn't know (or more likely, doesn't care to say as it would undermine his rants) is that JTACs are getting new pointers with which to designate targets for attack aircraft.

And the F-35 may not be as reliant upon IR to attack ground targets as previous generations of aircraft have been. IR pods such as Sniper are range-limited and their views can be blocked by clouds and smoke (this was a problem during the Gulf War; both the weather was bad at the outset of the war and smoke from burning oil wells hampered ground attack and CAS in the latter half of the war). The F-22 already has very (scary) capable ground targeting with its older AN/APG-77 AESA radar and the F-35's AN/APG-81 AESA radar's advanced air-to-ground modes include high resolution mapping, multiple ground moving target indication and track, combat identification, electronic warfare, and ultra high bandwidth communications.

Whoa there nelly, nobody said anything was wrong; only that an integrated system designed for the platform needs to serve (key word here, ahem) the F-35 better than a pod would, out of mercy for the tax payers. That doesn't mean the FLIR needs to out-LITENING the LITENING pod, that means it needs to do the best it can from within the whole package.

Next thing: ground pointers aren't the preferred method for targeting. In current usage with the Marines, who are strong leaders in developing air-ground management, ground pointers initially aid in designating the general target, but the aviators redesignate with their onboard LITENING pods for weapons release. After handing off the target, the aviator disregards the ground pointer. We don't know how the F-35 will handle this but relying exclusively on the ground pointing devices shows that we are transferring more power to the grunt either because ground pointing devices/training are improved or we are taking a step back from current (2012) norms.

So what do they do when they don't have JTACs on the ground, like every airstrike in Iraq for the last two years.

Whether the ground pointer or the onboard pod delivers final guidance, it seems the lack of either option, or a trusted equivilent, would be significantly detrimental to people depending on certain types of support.

Edited by Exhausted
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Unrelated, Spreitler has a point. You want the FLIR built for the F-35 to serve the platform better than a pod serves a variety of different aircraft. I don't know if the F-35's biggest issue is the FLIR, but it either needs to be right or go.

it took the A-10 21 years to get FLIR, bro.

I’ve noted multiple times around the web, with no credible rebuttal to date I might add, that there were 291 F-16 Block 1 and 5 deliveries before the first 'nominally' useful Block 10 was built. To keep perspective, the YF-16's first flight (official) was Feb 74, and the first definitive and fully capable Block 30/32 F-16s for the US first flew Feb 87. Counting all partner nation deliveries, approximately 1800 F-16s were delivered before the fully capable Block 30/32s. Until the Block 30/32, all the capabilities of the F-16 were less than what was envisioned by the planners (just not the so-called 'Reformers'). The Block 30/32s were the first F-16s with full Beyond Visual Range-engagement and night/precision ground/maritime attack capabilities. They were the first with full AIM-7/AMRAAM/AGM-65D/HARM capabilities. They were also the first with Seek Talk secure voice communications. Until Block 30/32, the F-16 was mostly a hot rod for knife fighting on blue-sky days. At Block 30/32 and beyond, it was what the users wanted in the first place. An ‘all-weather combat aircraft’ to the users, or what the so-called ‘reformers’ refer to as ‘ruined’. Fielding 1800 F-16s aircraft before you reach a 'baseline' in Block 30/32? Thirteen years after first flight? I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: THAT is 'concurrent development'.

To varying degrees, the same phenomenon can be shown for the F-15, and the F-18's, just look a the program history and the rationales behind the differences in variants.

http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2014/02/concurrency-and-f-35-cbs-60-minutes-re.html

F-35 first flight 2006 + 13 years= 2019. 2019 is FOC and Full Rate Production, and that's with STOVL and Carrier requirements.

Next. F-35 has integrated sensors. Its not just a pod vs pod. comparison. Thats as silly as saying Tom BRady is shorter than peyton manning, so Peyton is the better QB. IE you are taking one single metric, height and determining hundreds of other factors based on that.

The mere fact that you are comparing FLIR to FLIR shows you don't know what the differences are. In this case its confederated systems vs integrated systems.

"The human brain relies on five senses: sight, smell, taste, touch and hearing. It takes information from each of these sources and analyzes the data to understand our surrounding environment.

Similarly, the F-35 relies on five sensors: Electronic Warfare (EW), radar, Communication, Navigation and Identification (CNI), Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and the Distributed Aperture System (DAS). The F-35 “brain”—the process that combines this stunning amount of information into an integrated picture of the environment —is known as sensor fusion....

...Defining “Fusion”

At any given moment, a huge influx of data flows into fusion from sensors around the aircraft—plus additional information from datalinks with other in-air F-35s. Fusion takes all information from those various sources and combines it into a centralized view of activity in the jet’s environment.

Many 4th generation aircraft were designed for a crew of two. The pilot flew, and the “back-seater” analyzed data displayed on various screens. For a single-seat jet like the F-35, the system must gather relevant data automatically and display it in a way that allows the pilot to fully concentrate on flying the mission ahead.

While the pilot flies, fusion actively interprets real-time sensor data to give him or her perhaps the most valuable advantage of all: reliable situational awareness.

Pieces of the Puzzle

F-35 fusion has the ability to take partial data from each sensor and combine it to make an accurate assessment. It not only combines data, but figures out what additional information is needed and automatically tasks sensors to gather it—without the pilot ever having to ask....

...It’s All About Math

So, what is this entity that works so tirelessly to “fuse” all the information together?

The answer: math equations....

...“Fusion is easy when all the data agrees—but every now and then, there are discrepancies,” Tom reveals. “It makes it harder when sensors give misinformation or are in conflict.”

It’s math that figures out what data to believe, when to believe and how much to believe. No one knows this better than Kent, who has been the Target Identification (ID) expert in F-35 fusion for the last 13 years following his time in the U.S. Air Force.

“For ID fusion, it’s a lot of probability theory,” he shares....

...The Fusion Evolution

While the concept for fusion was first conceived in the 1970s on the F-15 program, no one ever fully succeeded in standing it up in an aircraft system until the F-22....

...That was “Fusion 1.0.” The F-35 takes it one step further.

“The F-35 not only has the ability to proactively collect and analyze data, but it adds the ability to share it amongst the fleet and work as a pack,” he explains. “That’s ‘Fusion 2.0.’”

When asked about what’s ahead for sensor fusion, both Tom and Kent see it continuing to evolve...."

Thats the difference comparing "FLIR to FLIR" is like me comparing my throwing Arm to Tom Brady, and if I throw the ball one yard further I am superior. Turns out there is much more to being an elite QB than just having a strong arm. Its intelligence and processing power, knowledge, awareness, and sensor fusion with the Cameras that are stealing the other teams signals.

Its not ancient history people, have you heard of the Block I Super Hornet just about 13 years ago? That was a Super Hornet with all the legacy Hornet Avionics stuffed into, declared operational --with all the AESA and snazzy avionics to come later with Block II, and hopefully retrofitted to the block I jets capable of handling the mods later.

TLDR? its not black and white. F-35 FLIR and sensors have huge advantages over legacy pods (and pilots have said as much, not least of which is the airplane or hanging weapons don't get in the way of the pod) and the SNIPER is going to have some advantages over it, just like SNIPER has advantages over other pods and Vice Versa. The screen in (certain models of) F-14 was bigger and betterer than the the Strike Eagle, that didn't make the strike eagle obsolete, or second class.

So what do they do when they don't have JTACs on the ground, like every airstrike in Iraq for the last two years.

Two years!?

I'm glad you brought up Iraq. Did you know that US involvement in WWII only took 4 years (1941-1945) ? And Iraq has been going on for close to 25 years now... you would think we would have all the bugs worked out. (1991-present) Will this project every be done? we have thrown trillions into it.

No I don't have time for you to explain the differences, or context. Just noting the timelines.

In WWI a fighter went from concept to prototype to combat and on to obsolete in about 9 months. Why'd the F-15 take so long to develop, then?

A Japanese designer said in WWII an airplane was obsolete in just 18 months. pretty crazy when you think about.

The good old days:

Precursor-Aircraft.jpg

Again what you are seeing is the government being far more stringent and utterly repellent of cranking out 1,800 + airplanes and finally get the standard version a full 13 years after its was declared "operational" they do things differently now than the rock and roll 70s and 1980s.

There is a constant push-pull between wanting to get the airplanes on the ramp, and wanting to work everything out and test it. And thats nothing new and certainly not with the F-35. Whats funny is all the whiners who said the US gov bought nothing but lemons back in the disco era and changes needed to be made, are now getting exactly what they asked for.

Edited by TaiidanTomcat
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The scary part is trying to imagine how long the next fighter is going to take to get fully operational. 30+ years sound reasonable?

about that, and only about a quarter way through we will have people telling us how fast the JSF got into service, and forgetting all the problems it had.

Geez guys, the F-35 was only 8 years from first flight to operational!! What is taking so long!?!? that's only double the F-15 which took 4!! :deadhorse1:

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