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F-4C Vietnam 63-7604 Sugar Foot III


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Hi Modellers!

I need photo from F-4C 63-7604 “White XN†"AF37-604" "Sugar Foot III" of the 559th TFS, 12th TFW at Cam Rahn Bay during 1969 . This marking is on the Eagle Strike 72025 decal which I have, but i can not find photo from this plane. Please help if You can.

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Jorge,

EXCELLENT site - thanks much for the lead! Do you have any other links to Cam Rahn Bay?

Zkalos,

You may find something here at the 12 TFW website. Site navigation, however, is tedious and there's no search function and the "index" is sketchy at best - you just have to plow through.

Gene K

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Thank You guys very good ! I think the decal colors, especially the blue stripes too light in the Eagle Strike decal. The Microscale version darker from what I have seen , but I read somewhere that Eagle Strike more accurate. So I don't know wich is better.

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Jorge,

EXCELLENT site - thanks much for the lead! Do you have any other links to Cam Rahn Bay?

Gene K

Not unfortunately, but you may find a few more interesting pics in this .pdf file:

http://www.aircraftprofiles.dk/wp-content/Files/Can%20Ranh%20Bay%20-%20Jan%20van%20Waarde%202008.pdf

BTW, another hard to navigate site, but some interesting stuff from the 432 TFW can also be found here in case somebody is interested:

http://udornvet1.tripod.com/

christmasbombs.jpg

Hope we can see more of Mr. Kamm's pictures in the future.

All the best,

Jorge.

Edited by f4h1phantom
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and taxing right in front of the "freedom bird"!!

I wondered about the setting (Cam Rahn or another location like Taiwan where the airplanes underwent depot maintenance). It's rare to see a Phantom so clean - the inboard pylons actually were aerodynamic aids, so were rarely taken off, and to see Sugarfoot sans outboard tanks may indicate the airplane was on a Functional Test Flight.

Gene K

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The Koku-Fan photo was taken at Yokota. Atsugi which did PDM on USN and USMC F-4s, also had a contract to do maintenance on AF F-4s which included replacing the (unending) liquified potting compound in the connectors and I think that some of the AF F-4s added a trip to Yokota to that. Also during the Pueblo Crisis, one squadron of the 12th TFW, the 558th TFS, came north and the personnel and equipment became the 391st TFS, nominally stationed at Misawa with the reactivated 475th TFW, but usually forward deployed to Korea. There was a drive-in on the north side of Yokota from which you could shoot, from the top of the building, aircraft taxiing to the end of the runway before they took off. So the slightly above angle shot often indicated a Yokota photo.

Best wishes,

Grant

I wondered about the setting (Cam Rahn or another location like Taiwan where the airplanes underwent depot maintenance). It's rare to see a Phantom so clean - the inboard pylons actually were aerodynamic aids, so were rarely taken off, and to see Sugarfoot sans outboard tanks may indicate the airplane was on a Functional Test Flight.

Gene K

Edited by gmat
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  • 8 years later...
On 5/5/2013 at 11:14 AM, zkalos said:

Hi Modellers!

I need photo from F-4C 63-7604 “White XN†"AF37-604" "Sugar Foot III" of the 559th TFS, 12th TFW at Cam Rahn Bay during 1969 . This marking is on the Eagle Strike 72025 decal which I have, but i can not find photo from this plane. Please help if You can.

The F-4C with that serial number crashed into a mountain on the 2nd attempt to land after a mission. The navigator was my uncle, 1Lt, Fred Carter and the pilot was Capt Wade Greer. They departed at 2332 on 5 November 1969.

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F-4C, 63-7604

Information on the loss of this aircraft and crew is limited at best.  Here is what I was able to find.  The aircraft was assigned to the 599th TFS, [12th TFW]. At the time of loss the aircraft was returning from an Air Interdiction mission and lost radio contact on radar approach.  

 

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7 hours ago, Michael A. said:

F-4C, 63-7604

Information on the loss of this aircraft and crew is limited at best.  Here is what I was able to find.  The aircraft was assigned to the 599th TFS, [12th TFW]. At the time of loss the aircraft was returning from an Air Interdiction mission and lost radio contact on radar approach.  

 

go to the Vietnam Memorial website, and you will a see a window to search the wall. Then you can type in the date it went down. Then your going to have to page thru the KIA's to find what your looking for. Often a guy named Roy Spencer does a write up in Air Force planes that went down. he almost always has the airframe serial number in his write ups. Rarely are there in photos unless posted by family. Note: it's now a read only site, as they couldn't keep up with the messages. Still Roy often gives you the grid data and a little about what happened in his write ups. He also will cover the crew members, and he also brings in the unarmed airframes as well as the armed ones. Know he went back as far as 1963 with data on a B26 bomber that was probably a Farmgate airframe

gary

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  • 2 weeks later...
On 5/25/2021 at 10:09 AM, GeneK said:

Condolences on your Uncle, Raider. Do you have any links or more details about the loss?

 

Thanks,

 

Gene K

Thank you! This is what I was told by the 12th TFW historian...

 

5 November 1969 both Capt. Wade A.  Greer and Lt. Fred J. Carter in F-4C 63-7604, 559 TFS were killed when their aircraft crashed returning to base. The Boxer 41 flight consisted of Major Mark Diebolt, aircraft commander and Lt. Edward Adams, navigator in lead aircraft, with Greer and Carter in number two aircraft.  They were fragged on 4 November to rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker, and after refueling attack their primary target, with alternate mission to drop their bomb under radar control.

     The pre-flight inspection, takeoff at 2332 hours, climb out, and rendezvous with the tanker went as briefed. Both aircraft took on 8000 pounds of fuel. After air-refueling, the flight checked with Center for target information. The flight was informed that weather was not suitable to strike the primary target, so they diverted to bomb under radar control. As planned all ordnance except number two’s CBU-24/Bs were dropped at 0030 hours and the flight egressed the target area.

On return to CRAB when switching radio channels over to Center Control, Number Two experienced radio difficulties. He discovered that on some frequencies he had no radio; however, others were “loud and clear.” As the flight approached base, flight lead switched radio channel over to Channel Two, CRAB Tower.  Greer’s radio worked adequately on that frequency. Flight lead then informed Number Two that if any communications difficulties develop during penetration or GCA, to go to Channel Two as a back-up.  Greer acknowledges both the instructions and radio check-in after they switched over to Channel 15 CRAB Approach Control.

Previously,  GCI vectored them to a position 36 NM southwest of the field at 20,000 feet. At 33 NM, Approach Control provided weather information  and instructed the flight to descend to 4500 feet. Because of radio difficulties, the flight commenced decent “holding hands” with Number Two on the left wing.

      Approach Control reconfirmed their position at 24 NM. Lead advised Approach Control that at one mile on final, Number Two would break off and land. At about 20 NM flight lead observed an undercast below; he also felt  he was too high and wanted the landing gear down prior to entering the clouds. At 17 NM, 250 KIAS, lead called “Gear Down”. The GIB of lead aircraft noticed Number Two’s landing lights were on and that he was in good close formation position when the flight entered the clouds. As they continued descent, the GIB felt mild turbulence and noted  the clouds began to thicken. He observed Number Two’s lights as they faded away in the clouds. Shortly afterwards, the lead aircraft broke completely in the clear.

Flight lead called, “Are you still there 42?”

The reply was, “Boxer 42 – I broke it off.” 

At about 10 NM, lead called, “Boxer 41 flight, let’s go bottom two.” 

However, there was no reply. The lead aircraft, Approach Control, and Tower made many attempts to call Number Two, but he never answered. It is estimated the aircraft impacted a mountain at approximately 0133 hours.
 
If there are any questions you wish answered, do not hesitate to contact us. You uncle's accident was the fourth F-4C to crash into a mountain approaching Cam Ranh Bay while returning from an operation in bad weather. I have a map diagram showing the runway in relation to the mountains. Will send this by email once I can locate it.
 
 

5 November 1969 both Capt. Wade A. Greer and Lt. Fred J. Carter in F-4C 63-7604, 559 TFS were killed when their aircraft crashed returning to base. The Boxer 41 flight consisted of Major Mark Diebolt, aircraft commander and Lt. Edward Adams, navigator in lead aircraft, with Greer and Carter in number two aircraft. They were fragged on 4 November to rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker, and after refueling attack their primary target, with alternate mission to drop their bomb under radar control.

 

     The pre-flight inspection, takeoff at 2332 hours, climb out, and rendezvous with the tanker went as briefed. Both aircraft took on 8000 pounds of fuel. After air-refueling, the flight checked with Center for target information. The flight was informed that weather was not suitable to strike the primary target, so they diverted to bomb under radar control. As planned all ordnance except number two’s CBU-24/Bs were dropped at 0030 hours and the flight egressed the target area.

 

On return to CRAB when switching radio channels over to Center Control, Number Two experienced radio difficulties. He discovered that on some frequencies he had no radio; however, others were “loud and clear.” As the flight approached base, flight lead switched radio channel over to Channel Two, CRAB Tower. Greer’s radio worked adequately on that frequency. Flight lead then informed Number Two that if any communications difficulties develop during penetration or GCA, to go to Channel Two as a back-up. Greer acknowledges both the instructions and radio check-in after they switched over to Channel 15 CRAB Approach Control.

 

Previously, GCI vectored them to a position 36 NM southwest of the field at 20,000 feet. At 33 NM, Approach Control provided weather information and instructed the flight to descend to 4500 feet. Because of radio difficulties, the flight commenced decent “holding hands” with Number Two on the left wing.

 

      Approach Control reconfirmed their position at 24 NM. Lead advised Approach Control that at one mile on final, Number Two would break off and land. At about 20 NM flight lead observed an undercast below; he also felt he was too high and wanted the landing gear down prior to entering the clouds. At 17 NM, 250 KIAS, lead called “Gear Down”. The GIB of lead aircraft noticed Number Two’s landing lights were on and that he was in good close formation position when the flight entered the clouds. As they continued descent, the GIB felt mild turbulence and noted the clouds began to thicken. He observed Number Two’s lights as they faded away in the clouds. Shortly afterwards, the lead aircraft broke completely in the clear.

 

Flight lead called, “Are you still there 42?”

 

The reply was, “Boxer 42 – I broke it off.” 

 

At about 10 NM, lead called, “Boxer 41 flight, let’s go bottom two.” 

 

However, there was no reply. The lead aircraft, Approach Control, and Tower made many attempts to call Number Two, but he never answered. It is estimated the aircraft impacted a mountain at approximately 0133 hours.

 

If there are any questions you wish answered, do not hesitate to contact us. You uncle's accident was the fourth F-4C to crash into a mountain approaching Cam Ranh Bay while returning from an operation in bad weather. I have a map diagram showing the runway in relation to the mountains. Will send this by email once I can locate it.

 

Norman Malayney

12 TFW historian

 

 

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14 minutes ago, 78Raiders said:

Thank you! This is what I was told by the 12th TFW historian...

 

5 November 1969 both Capt. Wade A.  Greer and Lt. Fred J. Carter in F-4C 63-7604, 559 TFS were killed when their aircraft crashed returning to base. The Boxer 41 flight consisted of Major Mark Diebolt, aircraft commander and Lt. Edward Adams, navigator in lead aircraft, with Greer and Carter in number two aircraft.  They were fragged on 4 November to rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker, and after refueling attack their primary target, with alternate mission to drop their bomb under radar control.

     The pre-flight inspection, takeoff at 2332 hours, climb out, and rendezvous with the tanker went as briefed. Both aircraft took on 8000 pounds of fuel. After air-refueling, the flight checked with Center for target information. The flight was informed that weather was not suitable to strike the primary target, so they diverted to bomb under radar control. As planned all ordnance except number two’s CBU-24/Bs were dropped at 0030 hours and the flight egressed the target area.

On return to CRAB when switching radio channels over to Center Control, Number Two experienced radio difficulties. He discovered that on some frequencies he had no radio; however, others were “loud and clear.” As the flight approached base, flight lead switched radio channel over to Channel Two, CRAB Tower.  Greer’s radio worked adequately on that frequency. Flight lead then informed Number Two that if any communications difficulties develop during penetration or GCA, to go to Channel Two as a back-up.  Greer acknowledges both the instructions and radio check-in after they switched over to Channel 15 CRAB Approach Control.

Previously,  GCI vectored them to a position 36 NM southwest of the field at 20,000 feet. At 33 NM, Approach Control provided weather information  and instructed the flight to descend to 4500 feet. Because of radio difficulties, the flight commenced decent “holding hands” with Number Two on the left wing.

      Approach Control reconfirmed their position at 24 NM. Lead advised Approach Control that at one mile on final, Number Two would break off and land. At about 20 NM flight lead observed an undercast below; he also felt  he was too high and wanted the landing gear down prior to entering the clouds. At 17 NM, 250 KIAS, lead called “Gear Down”. The GIB of lead aircraft noticed Number Two’s landing lights were on and that he was in good close formation position when the flight entered the clouds. As they continued descent, the GIB felt mild turbulence and noted  the clouds began to thicken. He observed Number Two’s lights as they faded away in the clouds. Shortly afterwards, the lead aircraft broke completely in the clear.

Flight lead called, “Are you still there 42?”

The reply was, “Boxer 42 – I broke it off.” 

At about 10 NM, lead called, “Boxer 41 flight, let’s go bottom two.” 

However, there was no reply. The lead aircraft, Approach Control, and Tower made many attempts to call Number Two, but he never answered. It is estimated the aircraft impacted a mountain at approximately 0133 hours.
 
If there are any questions you wish answered, do not hesitate to contact us. You uncle's accident was the fourth F-4C to crash into a mountain approaching Cam Ranh Bay while returning from an operation in bad weather. I have a map diagram showing the runway in relation to the mountains. Will send this by email once I can locate it.
 
 

5 November 1969 both Capt. Wade A. Greer and Lt. Fred J. Carter in F-4C 63-7604, 559 TFS were killed when their aircraft crashed returning to base. The Boxer 41 flight consisted of Major Mark Diebolt, aircraft commander and Lt. Edward Adams, navigator in lead aircraft, with Greer and Carter in number two aircraft. They were fragged on 4 November to rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker, and after refueling attack their primary target, with alternate mission to drop their bomb under radar control.

 

     The pre-flight inspection, takeoff at 2332 hours, climb out, and rendezvous with the tanker went as briefed. Both aircraft took on 8000 pounds of fuel. After air-refueling, the flight checked with Center for target information. The flight was informed that weather was not suitable to strike the primary target, so they diverted to bomb under radar control. As planned all ordnance except number two’s CBU-24/Bs were dropped at 0030 hours and the flight egressed the target area.

 

On return to CRAB when switching radio channels over to Center Control, Number Two experienced radio difficulties. He discovered that on some frequencies he had no radio; however, others were “loud and clear.” As the flight approached base, flight lead switched radio channel over to Channel Two, CRAB Tower. Greer’s radio worked adequately on that frequency. Flight lead then informed Number Two that if any communications difficulties develop during penetration or GCA, to go to Channel Two as a back-up. Greer acknowledges both the instructions and radio check-in after they switched over to Channel 15 CRAB Approach Control.

 

Previously, GCI vectored them to a position 36 NM southwest of the field at 20,000 feet. At 33 NM, Approach Control provided weather information and instructed the flight to descend to 4500 feet. Because of radio difficulties, the flight commenced decent “holding hands” with Number Two on the left wing.

 

      Approach Control reconfirmed their position at 24 NM. Lead advised Approach Control that at one mile on final, Number Two would break off and land. At about 20 NM flight lead observed an undercast below; he also felt he was too high and wanted the landing gear down prior to entering the clouds. At 17 NM, 250 KIAS, lead called “Gear Down”. The GIB of lead aircraft noticed Number Two’s landing lights were on and that he was in good close formation position when the flight entered the clouds. As they continued descent, the GIB felt mild turbulence and noted the clouds began to thicken. He observed Number Two’s lights as they faded away in the clouds. Shortly afterwards, the lead aircraft broke completely in the clear.

 

Flight lead called, “Are you still there 42?”

 

The reply was, “Boxer 42 – I broke it off.” 

 

At about 10 NM, lead called, “Boxer 41 flight, let’s go bottom two.” 

 

However, there was no reply. The lead aircraft, Approach Control, and Tower made many attempts to call Number Two, but he never answered. It is estimated the aircraft impacted a mountain at approximately 0133 hours.

 

If there are any questions you wish answered, do not hesitate to contact us. You uncle's accident was the fourth F-4C to crash into a mountain approaching Cam Ranh Bay while returning from an operation in bad weather. I have a map diagram showing the runway in relation to the mountains. Will send this by email once I can locate it.

 

Norman Malayney

12 TFW historian

 

 

I remember reading Spencer's write up on those men, and your data is much more in depth. If you read the KIA write ups, you will pick up a whole series of event taking place when landing in CRB. 

gary

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Here's a photo of Cam Ranh airfield looking South down Runway 20. The great majority of the time, landings were on Runway 02 (to the North), so the mountains seen in the background were under the approach path. The highest peak is only 3500' however as shown here . Could you post the diagram once you get it from the historian, Raider?

 

The F-4 ramp was the large rectangular area on the left in this picture. The wider runway was the main runway, and the smaller was PSP (pierced (or perforated) steel planking) at that time.

 

 

 

 

 

37908063722_a669589f0c_h.thumb.jpg.4c5c3233692b0d896ea8c2c8467cd34b.jpg

 

Gene K

 

EDIT: As an aside: the write up above states:

 

[quote] They were fragged on 4 November ... .[/quote]

 

Their callsign that night (Boxer) indicates they were flying off the Alert Pad (scrambled) rather than being fragged (preplanned).

 

Edited by GeneK
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On 5/5/2013 at 11:14 AM, zkalos said:

Hi Modellers!

I need photo from F-4C 63-7604 “White XN†"AF37-604" "Sugar Foot III" of the 559th TFS, 12th TFW at Cam Rahn Bay during 1969 . This marking is on the Eagle Strike 72025 decal which I have, but i can not find photo from this plane. Please help if You can.

Let's see the finished product when you're done... I'm curious to see how it turned out

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22 hours ago, 78Raiders said:

Thank you Gary! Where can I find the write up?

go to the Vietnam Wall, and then you see a place to search the wall. You may enter a certain day and year, or a name of your choosing. I read them a lot, and I find it humbling.

Really do try to read every write up (all branches of service). Usually glossed over to save their family even more grief, but not always! Often you will see posts made by men that were with them at the time of death, and also my the same unit. Spencer and George Veith have written more about Laos that makes sense than all the rest put together(Veith doesn't post there). Sad part about it is that much of it is coded (also to help families deal with it). After awhile you'll sorta figure out the coded phrases, and then move on.

 

Right now, I'm taking a break from the daily read, but will go back into it in early August. Much of it is nothing but a fast moving history lesson, and some of it will make you very angry. Being an I-Corp Rat, and read the daily reports trying to figure out what and where this happened. Do not pay much attention to locations (Spencer is the only one taking it down to the square foot). Remember the KIA reports were filled out by clerks back in the rear, and all the may know at best is the district or province for a location. An example is a report may call out a Marine as KIA in or around Da Nang, but then you figure the code and learn he was close to forty miles away. I wrote a letter to the Army and Marine Chief's of staff pointing this out as a disservice to a kid they should hold in the highest esteem. The CMH and Cross, and Silver Star write ups are almost always a good read. Just remember some clerks tend to over embellish. I am troubled by enlisted men that were seen captured, and never seen again. Spencer really goes into that (Laos). The SOG write ups are somewhat bland for a good reason, but once in awhile somebody speaks up anyway. SF write ups are often worth the read, but you won't learn much from them. Some of it I know why, and some of it is baffling.

 

When I was in country, I actually had little if any idea that kids were KIA everyday. Good bad or whatever. Just reading the daily reports during TET stunned me! I'm way out west (lao border area), and unless I saw body bags on a chopper I never knew the extent of the carnage. Perhaps a good thing: I just can't say. I guess we all thought we were bullet proof!

gary

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