Why did'nt the Luftwaffe bomb RAF/USAAF bomber bases?

[mike_espo]

I was wondering this. Did a google search on this. Nothing of value came up.

What a missed chance the Luftwaffe had in 42-43 if it would have diverted a few bomber gruppen to the West to bomb the Bomber Command and 8th AF bomber bases in eastern England when they had the chance....certainly nussance raids would have had some effects; morale, supply ect. It would have been effective in 44 to bomb those bases instead on terror attacks on British cities...referring to Operation Steinbock and V weapons.

Any thoughts or books on the subject?

thanks

Edited June 19, 2013 by mike_espo

[Viasistina]

Mike. My biggest question is why a isingle Luftwaffe photo recon aircraft couldn't get a picture of the D-Day invasion buildup in southern England.

[gonzalo]

Mike. My biggest question is why a isingle Luftwaffe photo recon aircraft couldn't get a picture of the D-Day invasion buildup in southern England.

The Germans knew about the build up. They didn't know when or where the invasion was going to happen. The Germans thought Patton was going to lead it but, the reality was he was put in charge of a fake Army. They were fooled so well that even on the day of the invasion they thought it was a diversion.

[Procopius]

I was wondering this. Did a google search on this. Nothing of value came up.

What a missed chance the Luftwaffe had in 42-43 if it would have diverted a few bomber gruppen to the West to bomb the Bomber Command and 8th AF bomber bases in eastern England when they had the chance....certainly nussance raids would have had some effects; morale, supply ect. It would have been effective in 44 to bomb those bases instead on terror attacks on British cities...referring to Operation Steinbock and V weapons.

Any thoughts or books on the subject?

thanks

I believe Hitler forbade intruder missions like those practiced by the RAF, believing it was better to shoot Allied aircraft down over Germany.

[Slartibartfast]

Um, any decent book describing the Battle of Britain will have documented that Germany almost bombed the RAF out of existence in southern England. But, after England responded to the (inadvertant) bombing of London-area civilians one night by sending their own bombing raid over a population area, Hitler demanded terror bombing of civilian areas which gave the RAF the respite it needed to rebuild its forward bases and replace its lost fighter aircraft and air crews.

[toadwbg]

Um, any decent book describing the Battle of Britain will have documented that Germany almost bombed the RAF out of existence in southern England. But, after England responded to the (inadvertant) bombing of London-area civilians one night by sending their own bombing raid over a population area, Hitler demanded terror bombing of civilian areas which gave the RAF the respite it needed to rebuild its forward bases and replace its lost fighter aircraft and air crews.

Agreed, and this is well illustrated in the excellent book, "Duel of Eagles". Furthermore the Luftwaffe failed to effectively attack or neutralize the RAF command and control infrastructure, such as radar and communications.

[Edgar]

Um, any decent book describing the Battle of Britain will have documented that Germany almost bombed the RAF out of existence in southern England.

Another often-repeated myth, which is now completely discredited my modern researchers; only one airfield was put completely out of action, and for only 24 hours, during the whole Battle. The Germans chose the wrong targets, even, at times, the wrong airfields, and believed their own miscalculations of aircraft losses. They weren't even aware of how the Civilian Repair Organisation was putting dozens of Hurricanes and Spitfires back into the fight.

Punch a hole in a grass-covered airfield, and anybody, with a wheelbarrow, can fill it in again, which is what happened. The forward (Kent) bases were abandoned because they weren't getting adequate warning, so were always fighting with a height disadvantage.

Rather than reading only "Duel of Eagles," add Stephen Bungay's "The Most Dangerous Enemy," James Holland's "Battle of Britain," and Patrick Bishop's book (with the same title) to your library.

Edgar

[jester292]

JG 26: Topguns of the Luftwaffe covers this well from the German perspective. The book is by Donald Caldwell.

Aaron

[billw]

If the Luftwaffe failed to establish anything close to air superiority over England during the Battle of Britain, then I would think any concentrated effort to bomb England in '42 or '43 or later would not have been any more successful. The RAF would have been even stronger and the USAAF was building strength on a daily basis. Many more Allied fighters to contend with, and the Luftwaffe using basically the same aircraft they had during the Battle. Would the questionable amount of damage done with nuisance (or bigger) raids been worth the cost in aircraft & pilots? Probably not.

BW

Edited June 19, 2013 by billw

[11bee]

By mid-war, Britain had a very robust air defense system. I'm sure the German's could have gotten a few light bombers through but any damage would have been minimal, certainly not enough to slow down the bomber offensive. Also at this time, the Luftwaffe had refocused most of it's bombers east so at best, they only had a small number of aircraft available. Many (most?) of the bases in the UK featured dispersed parking spots and off-base ammo dumps so it would have been difficult to inflict any real damage without a truly massive bomber force.

The only time the Germans really had success in this area was when they bombed a base in Russia that was hosting a USAAF B-17 force overnight and took out nearly a full group of American heavies.

Edited June 19, 2013 by 11bee

[Steve N]

From what I've read, the Luftwaffe was always considered a tactical air force, and the bombers in particular were used mainly to support operations of the ground forces. The B of B was the closest they came to a strategic bombing campaign, and even then it was mainly an effort to neutralize the RAF as a prelude to invasion. Germany's bomber force was always quite small compared to the Allies, and after mid-1941 was laregely tied up supporting Operation Barbarossa.

It was always a numbers game. Despite the fantasies of the "Luft '46" crowd, once the Allies got on a full war footing, Germany had no chance of beating our combined manpower, resources, and production capacity. With some better strategic decisions they might have prolonged the conflict, but their fate was completely sealed when Hitler decided to take on thr USA and USSR simultaneously.

SN

[SBARC]

I think after Stalingrad....the war was a done deal with a pre-set conclusion. The only question was how long Germany could hold out. The German losses on the Eastern Front in men and machines was pretty horrific. By 42-43 the Germans were fully invested in the war against Russia and the war against England was in a mostly defensive mode. England had no resources such as oil and the channel was a freakishly difficult piece of water to cross and launch an invasion of the British Isles. And with the Allied Airforces build up in the UK.....it was a much tougher place than during the B of B. The decision to invade Russia was the final nail in Hitler's coffin.......it's baffling he didn't see what happened to the French when they invaded Russia and learn from history....but people from smaller countries really can't understand how big some countries can be. The Russians definitely knew their history and repeated history when the Germans invaded.

[Ranger74]

Concur with what was said above:

-England was a much tougher target with improved radar systems and better interceptors

-German bombers had been focused on Russia and the Mediterranean (against Allied shipping). The Luftwaffe had taken terrible losses in transports AND bombers trying to supply Sixth Army at Stalingrad

-A lot of German production of mult-engine aircraft was being converted to night-fighters to oppose the British night bomber streams

-Aviation fuel became scarcer as the Allied bombing campaign became more effective, and

-American medium bombers and allied fighter sweeps were making airfields in northwest France and the Low Countries less tenable as bomber staging bases.

Jeff

[-Neu-]

I think after Stalingrad....the war was a done deal with a pre-set conclusion. The only question was how long Germany could hold out. The German losses on the Eastern Front in men and machines was pretty horrific. By 42-43 the Germans were fully invested in the war against Russia and the war against England was in a mostly defensive mode. England had no resources such as oil and the channel was a freakishly difficult piece of water to cross and launch an invasion of the British Isles. And with the Allied Airforces build up in the UK.....it was a much tougher place than during the B of B. The decision to invade Russia was the final nail in Hitler's coffin.......it's baffling he didn't see what happened to the French when they invaded Russia and learn from history....but people from smaller countries really can't understand how big some countries can be. The Russians definitely knew their history and repeated history when the Germans invaded.

Just to expand on that, the German training system was poorly run and wartime production wasn't much better. Even the losses from BoB were never fully replaced, and every campaign compounded the arm's earlier problems. Stalingrad was bad, but the Luftwaffe's worst losses occurred in the Mediterranean. Between Tunisia and Sicily, the Luftwaffe over two thousand aircraft, and thousands of experience air crew. If you want to point to a definitive turning point, its July/August 1943. The luftwaffe lost 1,700 aircraft during the Sicilian campaign, the Kursk offensive and defending Schweinfurt. It was an unmitigated disaster... defending against the USAAF/RAF raids in those two months cost the Luftwaffe over 30% of its fighter pilots and probably over 80% of its aircraft. This was a force that was already severely reduced in capability from just two years before.

As a general point, the idea of the Luftwaffe as a great force in WWII is a bit of a myth. After 1940 it quickly diminished in capability. By late 1943 it was a completely spent force that encountered significant difficulty in mounting any effective operation.

[Flyingfortress]

The Luftwaffe also had a habit of following bombers back to their bases and shooting them up as the bombers came in on their final approaches. This was often done very late in the day when daylight was fading. If I recall, the B-24s of the Second Air Division was often hit as they returned to their bases and as 11BEE stated, the Russian airfield raid was the costliest loss of US bombers on the ground in combat. Really good question asked by the way!

[Hal Marshman Sr]

The 2 jagdgeschwadern , JG-2 and Jg-26 stationed in France during this period did mount "Tip and run" small raids on English coastal harbors with some small success, but if was get in and get out before RAF defensive fighters could arrive on the scene, and it was being done with small units of fighters carrying bombs, and at low level in order to try and stay below effective radar detection.. By this period of time, anything larger in force would have been detected forming up in France and Holland, and the necessary steps would have been taken by the RAF, and later also the USAAF, to meet them over France, before they even got a sniff of British air. Hal Sr

[vince14]

It all comes down to the strategy behind the build-up of the Luftwaffe prior to the war. The aim of the Germans was to use Blitzkreig tactics which would swamp local defences and, frankly, it almost worked - were it not for the physical barrier of The Channel, World War Two in Europe would have been finished by the end of 1940 as no European army (including the UK) at that time could defeat the German war machine. Hitler could then have focused everything against the Soviets and might have taken Moscow in '41, which could have ended the war. The US wouldn't have got involved in Europe at all.

So the Luftwaffe was built from the ground up as a tactical force, designed specifically to support the Army. The plan was to knock out the opposition so quickly that a strategic bomber force would never be a requirement. By the time 1942 rolled around, the Germans were too thinly stretched to effectively fight on three fronts and defeat became inevitable once the UK and Russia held out. It wasn't the case of the Germans not thinking about bombing the bases, they simply didn't have the right materials to do it. Put it this way - the German war effort was like Usain Bolt, designed to win a 100m sprint but would never compete in a full marathon.

Vince

[Slartibartfast]

To further expand on the Russian connection, a significant portion of the Wehrmacht was sent east for Barbarossa. If Hitler had been sane, he would have concentrated on and finished Britain before absolving his agreement with Stalin. Lucky for the Allies, Hitler was anything but sane.

Edited June 20, 2013 by Slartibartfast

[Hal Marshman Sr]

Again, to expand on the Russian connection, Had the Germans invaded Russia in the spring as was originally planned, they might well have taken Moscow, and probably won the war. Big But, his buddy Mussolini decided to invade the Balkans, and got into big trouble. Hitler had to go in also, to pull Benito's chestnuts out of the fire. Those 3 months in the Summer of 1941 more than likely cost Hitler the war. When he finally did invade the USSR in Sept, Winter came too hard and soon, and Germany was ill prepared for it. Pulling Italy's chestnuts out of the fire in No Africa also took up resources that could have been put to better use in Russia. Hal Sr

[Slartibartfast]

I should clarify my first post. While certainly causing damage to RAF bases in the south and east, it was the attrition of crew and aircraft that nearly felled the RAF. Both sides had unsustainable losses during the battle.

Later the Luftwaffe initiated small raids against coastal installations, typically Fw 190 Jabos outfitted with a bomb flying at low level in hit-and-run tactics.

[Mumbles]

Those 3 months in the Summer of 1941 more than likely cost Hitler the war.

I would argue that Hitler's war was lost as early as 1940, when Britain was neither defeated or otherwise reduced to non-combatant status in the Battle of Britain. With British forces out of the game in Western Europe and Africa, and a cessation of hostilites in those theatres, the resulting resources available to move against the Soviet Union I would think would have tipped the balance in the east for the Axis.

[MikeC]

Mike. My biggest question is why a isingle Luftwaffe photo recon aircraft couldn't get a picture of the D-Day invasion buildup in southern England.

Don't want to derail the thread, but the short answer is that reconnaissance aircraft, usually operating singly, did not tend to get over here, get the pictures, then make it back to base without being intercepted. Between about 1941 and 1944, when Me262 recce aircraft were sent over London to assess V2 damage, practically no effective sustained reconnaissance took place.

That being the case, even if the Germans did see a large concentration of troops and materiel, they had no way of knowing whether this was normal or a build-up. You need several sorties over a sustained period to compare in order to determine this.

If you're interested in finding out more, I recommend this book: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spies-Sky-Secret-Battle-Intelligence/dp/1408703629

[Hal Marshman Sr]

I would argue that Hitler's war was lost as early as 1940, when Britain was neither defeated or otherwise reduced to non-combatant status in the Battle of Britain. With British forces out of the game in Western Europe and Africa, and a cessation of hostilites in those theatres, the resulting resources available to move against the Soviet Union I would think would have tipped the balance in the east for the Axis.

You make a valid point. Additionally, the writing was on the wall the day he declared war on the USA. Perhaps I should have said in my brief statement, the war vs the Soviet Union.

[mike_espo]

Not sure where this thread went.

What I am saying is: The luftwaffe in the west had some offensive capability in mid late 43 into early 44. Operation Steinbock should have been an offensive attempt to hit the 8th AAF bases in Eastern UK instead of the wasteful terror bombing of London. Also, the V weapons should have also been used against bomber bases in Eastern England as well. Stupid operational blunder by Luftwaffe Command/Hitler.

Surely, this would have had some effect on the day bombing campaign and thus, easing the burden on the poor civilan population of the reich.

[11bee]

Not sure where this thread went.

What I am saying is: The luftwaffe in the west had some offensive capability in mid late 43 into early 44. Operation Steinbock should have been an offensive attempt to hit the 8th AAF bases in Eastern UK instead of the wasteful terror bombing of London. Also, the V weapons should have also been used against bomber bases in Eastern England as well. Stupid operational blunder by Luftwaffe Command/Hitler.

Surely, this would have had some effect on the day bombing campaign and thus, easing the burden on the poor civilan population of the reich.

I think this was answered multiple times. General consensus is that the Luftwaffe didn't have the strength to do any significant damage to the hundreds of RAF / USAAF bases at this point of the war.

WRT to the V-weapons, they were lucky if they could hit a huge metropolitan area like London, let alone an airbase, let alone a specific part of an airbase that would cause catastrophic damage and take a large portion of the bombers out of action.