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Phasing out the A-10


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FWIW, my boss a few years ago (General type) was a Col on ground during the second go at Fallujah. You're painting a picture with stereotypes that may have been true years ago and may be true a decade or two from now. However, our current crop of Commanders are battle tested and their careers forged at war. The problem facing the Army and Marines now is these Commanders know war, not the Garrison military we'll become again.

From various readings, it seems that the high level leadership (theater command) over the last decade or two is not being rated very well. The lower ranking officers are a different story.

As far as being battle tested, I think the US military probably leads the world at this point. I'd guess that most junior to mid-level officers and enlisted have at least one combat deployment behind them, many have considerably more. The other plus is that the US military seems to have done a good job of disseminating Lessons Learned so hopefully these lessons will stay with the force as it transitions to a peacetime military.

The only downside is that our combat experience is pretty narrow. Light infantry, urban combat, counter-insurgency, with limited episodes of heavy fighting. Against a different type of opponent, we may be in for a surprise. The Israelis got a bit of a shock in 2006 when their exquisitely trained and equipped mech units went up against an opponent who had modern anti-tank guided missiles (and more importantly, knew how to use them). MRAP's and up-armored HUMVEE's are not the best solution against something like this.

If the next war is like the last two, we are good to go. If not, it will have to be another round of OJT.

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If the next war is like the last two, we are good to go. If not, it will have to be another round of OJT.

"The next war" really intrigues me (maybe I've got too much time on my hands?). Hypothetically, I would be worried about and EMP attatck both domestically and on the battlfield. To what level is US Military Hardware protected against EMP? Is your average tank or A-10 going to operate or are the electronics fried? Communications, GPS all down or severely compromised? Do we go back to WW2 level technology?

I'm reading the book "Lights out" right now, the title describes the scenario. It doesn't really address Military or the battelfield but Interesting stuff.

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As far as being battle tested, I think the US military probably leads the world at this point. I'd guess that most junior to mid-level officers and enlisted have at least one combat deployment behind them, many have considerably more. The other plus is that the US military seems to have done a good job of disseminating Lessons Learned so hopefully these lessons will stay with the force as it transitions to a peacetime military.

The only downside is that our combat experience is pretty narrow. Light infantry, urban combat, counter-insurgency, with limited episodes of heavy fighting. Against a different type of opponent, we may be in for a surprise. The Israelis got a bit of a shock in 2006 when their exquisitely trained and equipped mech units went up against an opponent who had modern anti-tank guided missiles (and more importantly, knew how to use them). MRAP's and up-armored HUMVEE's are not the best solution against something like this.

If the next war is like the last two, we are good to go. If not, it will have to be another round of OJT.

Agree with all of the above, john. I'm not for the massive cuts that are coming, I don't want the Marines cut to the bone and the Army cut to the Bone Marrow, but I understand it. I hate the idea of "kicking out" large groups of people who sacrificed so much into a lousy economy. I also don't like losing the combat experience, no matter the type its helpful to have. But,as I told a friend "We have large groups of combat experienced people who are experienced in the type of fights we hope to avoid like the plague in the future"

sequestration is serious stuff. If you want to cut funding, choices will have to be made. its that simple. Keeping the Marine Corps at 200K to keep combat experience in the ranks, and avoid releasing them into a crappy job market is no reason to stay at those numbers at such cost. I prefer about 180K, but rumor is 150K will be the final number. In which case Marines will have to do what they always do, do more with less, and rely on quality over quantity.

We can't play the "we spend waaayyy too much money on the military" card and then be upset when funding dries up and the military has to make hard choices like keeping A-10s around, or procuring a needed aircraft not from the disco era that does more missions.

The other part of this too, concerning aircraft is the cost of keeping old as hell legacy aircraft going continues to increase, and the fleets of men and materials to do so creates a further drain. eventually all your money and personnel is dedicated to barely keeping your head above water. Pilots don't fly as much because the jets are always down, the tanks never start, the AAVs just try not to sink, and the helicopters do a few laps around the flight pattern and call it a day.

General Peter Pace, was a Vietnam veteran who became the chairman of the joint chiefs. For as truly caring as Pace was about those he served with in Vietnam, he was for all intents and purposes considered a horrible chairman. however From wiki:

On one of the last days before retirement, Pace gave a speech at Chaminade High School on Long Island, the high school of the first Marine who died under his command.[11]

On June 8, 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that he would advise the President not to renominate General Pace because of concerns about contentious confirmation hearings in the Congress. The President nominated the former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen to replace Pace.[1][12][13] On October 1, 2007, General Pace officially retired at Fort Myer, Virginia.[14]

After his retirement ceremony, Pace left to visit the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. There, he left several handwritten notes dated for that day, with a set of his four-star General insignia attached to each one.[15][16][17] Each note was similar to this one:

"For Guido Farinaro USMC These are yours — not mine! With love and respect, your platoon leader, Pete Pace."

Combat experience, (and being what appears to be an honest, caring man) did not instantly translate into pure awesomeness in his role as Chairman. Again, we can't make grand sweeping judgement based on rank. And there is no "expiration date" or "certain rank" as to when someone is considered a great junior officer and then he suddenly becomes a political shill. I know privates who are wonderful at playing politics, and Lt. Cols. who I feel need a campaign adviser with them at all times.

Finally, being shot at as an infantry Sgt. in Fallujah does not instantly make one an expert on operations, intel, admin, logisitics, comms. etc. the Sgt. does not suddenly achieve military nirvana and can tell you the advantage of HIMARS vs the Triple 7, or how EFV procurment funding works, or why an F-35B is light years ahead in safety and operations compared to an AV-8B, or the physics about how an Osprey transitions from winged flight to a hover. Or what equipment needs to be replaced, supplemented, SLEPed, etc.

Edited by TaiidanTomcat
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I remember watching a history channel program about some Green Berets trapped behind enemy lines in Iraq. They needed close air support or they would be overrun and killed. I am not knocking the F-16 in anyway, but they could not see or find where the Green Berets wanted the bombs dropped from 25-30,000 feet. I thought right away where were the A-10s. If it isn't high tech the USAF doesn't want it. How very stupid. They are supposed to provide close air support to the soldiers on the ground. In my opinion the A-10 was one of the best aircraft they ever had.

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"The next war" really intrigues me (maybe I've got too much time on my hands?). Hypothetically, I would be worried about and EMP attatck both domestically and on the battlfield. To what level is US Military Hardware protected against EMP? Is your average tank or A-10 going to operate or are the electronics fried? Communications, GPS all down or severely compromised? Do we go back to WW2 level technology?

I'm reading the book "Lights out" right now, the title describes the scenario. It doesn't really address Military or the battelfield but Interesting stuff.

Great point. A lot of this stuff could end up being our Achilles heal. We (not just the military but Western society in general) are completely dependent (addicted) to GPS, networked communication and data systems, etc. One potential future adversary (now known as a PFA) has shown great interest in taking down these systems, both kinetically and though hacking. I'd be curious as to how often our military trains in conditions where these systems are denied?

GPS guided weapons / navigation systems, networked drones, blue force tracker, etc are great things to have and are one reason why the US military is in a league of it's own. However, can we still function if these cool devices are taken away from us? Do our pilots even know how to fly low level with nothing but analog instruments, a map and timer?

As far as how useful our training is in the next war, some of the skills are always going to be relevant, especially at the lower end of the force. The average 19-year old grunt has a level of training in first aid, land nav, night fighting, etc that I could have only dreamed of when I was in. Those skills remain useful no matter who you are fighting.

Higher up the spectrum (pilots) the skills they brought away from our recent conflicts may not be quite as relevant to the next show. Seems like the last time those folks were truly tested was during Desert Storm and to a lesser extent in the Balkans. Even those conflicts were against low-end opponents who were at a severe qualitative and quantitative disadvantage.

I'm not sure that spending hundreds of hours doing orbits in non-contested airspace while waiting for a CAS mission would really prepare a pilot for combat against a more technologically astute PFA that has employed a modern air defense network.

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They are supposed to provide close air support to the soldiers on the ground. In my opinion the A-10 was one of the best aircraft they ever had.

Technically, for CAS missions in completely uncontested airspace (ie - the last two conflicts), the best platform is probably an AC-130.

I'm sure we will see the AF start to run down the Special Operations force as well.

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Technically, for CAS missions in completely uncontested airspace (ie - the last two conflicts), the best platform is probably an AC-130.

I totally forgot about the AC-130! (Hey, I'm a modeler and armchair quarterback generalissimo, so forgive me).

I've only seen videos of the AC-130. I would hate to be on the receiving end of one of those.

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Ignoring the ramblings of a mad man about the USAF extorting the Canadians over air refueling and jokes about Red Pandas (BTW, I never noticed the resemblance between those two bears; I nearly spit coffee all over DUM-E when I saw that.), back to the topic at hand - the A-10

Well, I was waiting to see how long it would be. It only took three pages of armchair generaling complaining about things from 30 years ago being retired before someone realized that other CAS assets exist. AH-1, AC-130, F-16, F-15E, F/A-18, AV-8B, B-1B, B-52 and MQ-9 are all capable (and have) supported boots on the ground. Technically, the AH-64 is capable of it, but I'm still waiting for the U.S. Army to remember why they invented attack helicopters in the first place and figure out how to employ the damn thing as CAS instead of worrying about Soviet tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap. So it's not that the USAF hates the mission. And considering the number of upgrades the AC-130 have undergone in the past couple of decades, it's safe to say that AFSOC is very secure.

As for the A-10, it's not so much that the AF hates the A-10 (I doubt seriously we'd have spent the money to upgrade to C-model standard, re-wing the damn things and put datalink onboard so many of them if we hated it), it's just that there are SO MANY imminent priorities right now (and redundant assets to take on that workload), that even if you killed the F-35, we'd still likely have to cut the A-10 to be able to afford a new bomber, safety and assurance upgrades to the ICBM fleet, a new dedicated CSAR helicopter, the new tanker, additional C-17s to replace/upgrade the ones that we've flown the damn wings off of in the last 12 years, GPS replacement birds, next gen SATCOM, a new EW roadmap, etc. etc. etc.

Not to mention the fact that we haven't fielded a whole lot of truly new, innovative, munitions in quite some time, which is pretty significant when you consider the proliferation of GPS jammers, and the fielding of new classes of AAA and field artillery that can quickly and accurately take out an inbound LGB or non-stealthy cruise missile without even breaking a sweat. Tomahawks, the vaunted diplomacy tool since the Clinton era, are basically useless in a modern IADS environment. They'll never survive to the target. JASSM is better, but doesn't have anywhere near the same range, and is fielded in extremely limited numbers. JSOW is a joke.

I'd hate to be the guy trying to decide budgets. And all the posted articles point out the need to use airpower to support boots on the ground....which is great. But since Desert Storm, we've used airpower to open the theater FIRST, then get the boots on the ground, then support them. What happens when you can't even open the theater? Having a platform dedicated to supporting the boots on the ground is pretty useless when you can't get them there in the first place...

Edited by Tony Stark
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Great point. A lot of this stuff could end up being our Achilles heal. We (not just the military but Western society in general) are completely dependent (addicted) to GPS, networked communication and data systems, etc. One potential future adversary (now known as a PFA) has shown great interest in taking down these systems, both kinetically and though hacking. I'd be curious as to how often our military trains in conditions where these systems are denied?

GPS guided weapons / navigation systems, networked drones, blue force tracker, etc are great things to have and are one reason why the US military is in a league of it's own. However, can we still function if these cool devices are taken away from us? Do our pilots even know how to fly low level with nothing but analog instruments, a map and timer?

Generally speaking at least in my experience, the basics are taught and practiced first and then you get the cool toys later. No one's first solo is in an F-16.

Having said that, Its a little bit like asking what you do if your truck breaks down on the side of the road. You don't necessarily take the time to "train" for having to walk to a gas station or call a tow truck. If the "worst" happens and we have to go back to the way things were done in WWII, then we go back and do it like world war II. Its just harder and causes more casualties.

There is only so much training time, we try to use it by focusing it on our strengths rather than trying to prep for "Plan D" level scenarios. Plus things break and don't work right in peace time too, so its not exactly training you have to make additional time for. It just happens on its own plenty.

Higher up the spectrum (pilots) the skills they brought away from our recent conflicts may not be quite as relevant to the next show. Seems like the last time those folks were truly tested was during Desert Storm and to a lesser extent in the Balkans. Even those conflicts were against low-end opponents who were at a severe qualitative and quantitative disadvantage.

I'm not sure that spending hundreds of hours doing orbits in non-contested airspace while waiting for a CAS mission would really prepare a pilot for combat against a more technologically astute PFA that has employed a modern air defense network.

Thats why we have things like Red Flag, NSAWC, and mock dogfights with other aircraft that finally "prove" what the superior platform is forever. And why certain elements of the military hate using a honed kitana blade to try to cut rocks for 12 years, all so that we can decided the rock isn't worth cutting anymore.

Edited by TaiidanTomcat
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Europe won't intervene as long as Russia promises not to advance east of it's current border, they are content.

Glad to know Europe is worried about Russia attacking Alaska..... ;)

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Hit em where they aint, Maneuver Warfare and all...

It's a real threat. A very real threat.

As one of our best and brightest had previously noted, in Alaska, you can see Russia from your house.

It's all fun and games until Ivan rolls into Fairbanks.

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From various readings, it seems that the high level leadership (theater command) over the last decade or two is not being rated very well. The lower ranking officers are a different story.

As far as being battle tested, I think the US military probably leads the world at this point. I'd guess that most junior to mid-level officers and enlisted have at least one combat deployment behind them, many have considerably more. The other plus is that the US military seems to have done a good job of disseminating Lessons Learned so hopefully these lessons will stay with the force as it transitions to a peacetime military.

The only downside is that our combat experience is pretty narrow. Light infantry, urban combat, counter-insurgency, with limited episodes of heavy fighting. Against a different type of opponent, we may be in for a surprise. The Israelis got a bit of a shock in 2006 when their exquisitely trained and equipped mech units went up against an opponent who had modern anti-tank guided missiles (and more importantly, knew how to use them). MRAP's and up-armored HUMVEE's are not the best solution against something like this.

If the next war is like the last two, we are good to go. If not, it will have to be another round of OJT.

As far as training goes a push was made a couple years ago to get our Heavy guys trained up for a linear battlefield. Trust me when I say your concerns have already been fleshed out and we are striving to avoid the mistakes from the past (to include our coming reduction in forces) while knowing that we very well could be drawn into a conflict much like the one we are in now. MRAPS, MATV's, and 1151's were a fix for the fight we were in, no for a second thinks they'll be the answer for whatever else we may face, but at the end of the day you go to war with what you got instead of what you wished you had.

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GPS guided weapons / navigation systems, networked drones, blue force tracker, etc are great things to have and are one reason why the US military is in a league of it's own. However, can we still function if these cool devices are taken away from us? Do our pilots even know how to fly low level with nothing but analog instruments, a map and timer?

We did a pretty good job in '02 when none of that fancy stuff worked well. I had a buddy (MP PL, 10th MTN) whose entire job was to drop points and create accurate maps with his platoon. That former PL is now looking at BN command and those lessons learned will be translated into he trains his BN to fight a war we're not expecting.

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Ignoring the ramblings of a mad man about the USAF extorting the Canadians over air refueling and jokes about Red Pandas (BTW, I never noticed the resemblance between those two bears; I nearly spit coffee all over DUM-E when I saw that.), back to the topic at hand - the A-10

Well, I was waiting to see how long it would be. It only took three pages of armchair generaling complaining about things from 30 years ago being retired before someone realized that other CAS assets exist. AH-1, AC-130, F-16, F-15E, F/A-18, AV-8B, B-1B, B-52 and MQ-9 are all capable (and have) supported boots on the ground. Technically, the AH-64 is capable of it, but I'm still waiting for the U.S. Army to remember why they invented attack helicopters in the first place and figure out how to employ the damn thing as CAS instead of worrying about Soviet tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap. So it's not that the USAF hates the mission. And considering the number of upgrades the AC-130 have undergone in the past couple of decades, it's safe to say that AFSOC is very secure.

CAS was taken away from helicopters because they're not as tough as you think they are to 7.62. You never hear about it, but probably one of the best CAS platforms early in the war was the F-14.

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CAS was taken away from helicopters because they're not as tough as you think they are to 7.62. You never hear about it, but probably one of the best CAS platforms early in the war was the F-14.

The Marines do just fine with the AH-1. They never gave up the CAS mission after Vietnam and they never lost the know-how of how to fire while moving. The US Army got so fixated on stopping Soviet tanks that they dumped that in the USAF's lap (which is why so many guys here b*!ch and moan about it being the responsibility of the USAF) so their own air assets could focus on another threat. But after the Cold War ended, the Army has been painfully slow to adopt different tactics. As late as the Iraq War, Apaches were still firing from hover. There was the Army's famed deep strike assault with AH-64s in OIF that resulted in two battalions of Apaches becoming combat ineffective in less than half an hour.

You never hear about it, but probably one of the best CAS platforms early in the war was the F-14.

Doesn't that validate the decision the eliminate the A-10 then?

But actually, some of the most effective CAS platforms early in the war had massive payloads, more crew members to process/handle requests in short periods of time and hours of station time. Yup. Bombers.

Edited by Tony Stark
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The Marines do just fine with the AH-1. They never gave up the CAS mission after Vietnam and they never lost the know-how of how to fire while moving. The US Army got so fixated on stopping Soviet tanks that they dumped that in the USAF's lap (which is why so many guys here b*!ch and moan about it being the responsibility of the USAF) so their own air assets could focus on another threat. But after the Cold War ended, the Army has been painfully slow to adopt different tactics. As late as the Iraq War, Apaches were still firing from hover. There was the Army's famed deep strike assault with AH-64s in OIF that resulted in two battalions of Apaches becoming combat ineffective in less than half an hour.

Only reason the tomcat and B-52/B-1 were as effective as they were early on is they were the only ones that could get there, and those CAS missions they flew is apples and oranges compared to what was actually needed on ground a few months later. I don't know anything about the "famed" deep strike assault in Iraq, but the six or seven Apaches that provided CAS during the spring of '02 laid down accurate fire which NOTHING the AF provided could do until those A-10's and AC-130 showed up. AC-130's are an awesome platform but with the restrictions placed on them makes it ineffective for a large part.

Doesn't that validate the decision the eliminate the A-10 then?

But actually, some of the most effective CAS platforms early in the war had massive payloads, more crew members to process/handle requests in short periods of time and hours of station time. Yup. Bombers.

No, it had more to do with what was available. Not to mention the unique role the tomcat had providing CAS in Iraq. Different airframes for different missions, CAS means different things to different people and the role of CAS is much more today than a straffing run or dropping a JDAM. Anaconda showed the limitations of bombers and fighters providing CAS which is why within 12-14 hours later A-10's were on scene. That article is biased and leaves a hell of lot of detail out and has absolutely no perspective of how, where, and why of what happened in the spring of '02 in Afghanistan.

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It's a real threat. A very real threat.

As one of our best and brightest had previously noted, in Alaska, you can see Russia from your house.

It's all fun and games until Ivan rolls into Fairbanks.

We can have a John Milius wet dream and have those teenagers from "Red Dawn" take 'em down...

John Hairell (tpn18@yahoo.com)

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CAS means different things to different people and the role of CAS is much more today than a straffing run or dropping a JDAM.

It sure does. Most of the "much more today" is further justification for accepting the phase out of the A-10 in favor of other budgetary priorities. If you work your way back to page one of this thread, you'll see plenty of folks arguing the A-10s 30mm, ability to get down low-slow, put eyeballs on target, and loiter in a target area for an extended time are the main reasons for keeping the 'Hog. Of course, that's not the way CAS is done any more, not even by the A-10. All these whiz bang toys that bring the 'Hog up to C-model standard are designed to improve its connectivity, better network the aircraft into battlefield SA and C2 tools, carry much improved/modern targeting pods, and increase its ability to use smart and standoff munitions. In short, the C-model upgrades help give the A-10 a bunch of capabilities that other fighters have had for a long time, and bring it up to speed for the modern CAS battle.

Anaconda showed the limitations of bombers and fighters providing CAS which is why within 12-14 hours later A-10's were on scene.

Absolutely incorrect. Anaconda showed the inanity of conducting planning for a major operation as a singular service, excluding the other components and their planners, and making assumptions on expected levels of air support with absolutely zero prior coordination with the other services. Anaconda showed how a poorly constructed and coordinated command structure can doom an operation before it is even executed. Anaconda demonstrated that unity of command and unity of effort are timeless, essential, and how violating those principles will get people killed.

The "Air Force," in this case, CENTAF, had no idea Op Anaconda was even going to happen. Even worse, since Gen Franks had set up Gen Hagenback as a JTF commander (despite Hagenback not having operational control of "Joint" forces, which would've included an organic air component), Hagenback made assumptions on levels of support he'd receive as a "Joint" Task Force commander. He wasn't really a JTF commander, except in name, and in reality was only in command of Army and a few additional Marine and SOCOM chopped land units...his planner did not integrate the CAOC or any air planners outside of Army assets into the operation. And when the fecal matter hit the oscillating wind device blades, in the initial confusion of the battle, the AF sent A-10s to figure out what was going on. It wasn't any particular capability of the A-10, but rather, the training their pilots had received which allowed the A-10 pilots to peform as Airborne FACs (FAC-A), because there were almost no JTACs or GFACs on the surface to help manage the airborne portion of the fight. So absent the guys on the ground who would normally be coordinating fires, the Air Force sent their airborne equivalents. The A-10s on scene initially in Anaconda were out of ordnance in a heartbeat...but they stuck around for a long time to manage the CAS stack and get other guys into the fight and ordnance on target...again, because no prior planning had been accomplished for this, there was no XCAS on station, and the CAOC was now feeding the fight from thousands of miles away with whatever aircraft they could get on station. Air Force, Navy, Marines...it didn't matter, they were pushing anybody there, but there were precious few controllers to get these assets into place and ordnance on target. Bombers fed plenty into the fight. As did other fighters. F-15Es strafed on several occasions during Anaconda, as did many other fighters. Now I won't argue for a second that the heart and soul of the shoestring, glove save came from the guys who flew the A-10s in Anaconda...but it was their training, NOT any particular capabilities unique to the A-10 which helped end that fight.

Qualifications for the above statements, if anybody cares:

- I went to school with one of the very first A-10 drivers on scene for that Op, have flown numerous times and Large Force Exercises with him, and consider him a pretty good friend

- Anaconda directly resulted in changes to how the Air Force C2 was organized to support ops in Aghanistan, including standing up the Air Component Coordination Element ...and I deployed as a Tac Air Planner for the first ACCE at Bagram

- First hand conversations, tape review, and HOURS spent reviewing the MISREPS from Anaconda while deployed to the ACCE

- Extensive review of the rewritten CAS publications, FMs, AFDDs, Tac Manuals, and Joint Pubs on the subject

Point being, it wasn't that the AF sent A-10s because "nothing else can get the job done but the A-10...send them all!" It was, "we have no idea what's going on on the ground, we cannot communicate with any JTACs/ALOs/GFAs in the area, and we need to get on top of this disaster NOW...sent the FAC-As immediately!!! And if anything, Anaconda validated the need to update the A-10s to C-model standard, so they could perform "modern" CAS more effectively.

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Absolutely incorrect.

Well, I professionally disagree with you. The slice of the pie I'm talking about is the ineffective role most AF aircraft played in first two days of Anaconda not the standard AF excuse why they dropped the ball during the operation and why they didn't have an actual C2 up. Heaven forbid they actually took the initiative to coordinate their own logistics to get resources in proximity or you know, plan an air campaign with boots on ground. I would have felt a bit more comfortable using JTACs and the CC guys had they not screwed up a couple months before with a B-52. Why the CFACC wasn't informed until x amounts of days beforehand is a red herring for the short comings on all levels the AF displayed in '02. The Navy didn't have an issue and they had the same heads up the AF did, but only one branch was a day late and dollar short.

Edited by fulcrum1
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The Navy didn't have an issue and they had the same heads up the AF did, but only one branch was a day late and dollar short.

Actually, they did. And within Army ranks themselves, there is widespread acceptance to the fact that Hagenback "was forced to issue an emergency appeal for air and naval fires and logistical assistance."

Also:

"Hagenbeck complained in an Army Field Artillery magazine article that his ground forces received inadequate air support. In response, some in Hagenbeck’s own service joined Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps officials in charging the Army general had failed to adequately include the other components in planning for Operation Anaconda, and instead relied on their hastily assembled support only as his battle plan began to fall apart."

Seems like every service except the Army admits there was a total failure to plan appropriately for the required level of support, and even within the Army there are many who admit poor planning and coordination were the root cause of the delays in getting air power over target when things started to go badly.

The slice of the pie I'm talking about is the ineffective role most AF aircraft played in first two days of Anaconda...Heaven forbid they actually took the initiative to coordinate their own logistics to get resources in proximity or you know, plan an air campaign with boots on ground.

Pretty difficult to coordinate your logistics and align combat resources to support an operation that you don't know is going to happen because the guy in charge of it never bothered to tell the supporting services.

Again, not merely my opinion. You can read reams of professional writing about it, including the 146 page thesis written by an Army special operator who came to the conclusions I've cited above. Executive summary and quotes above all extracted from this article. That's hardly the only source of material on this subject matter though. I've read Maj Davis' paper, and was there first hand to work with TF Mountain after the Army decided the solution was to add yet ANOTHER layer of bureaucracy to the process by deploying 18th Airborne Corps HQ as CJTF-180 and put them in charge. Have you read the paper?

...the short comings on all levels the AF displayed in '02

Again, absolutely incorrect. Once the tactical assets arrived on scene, all indications are they did everything in their power and beyond to support the guys on the ground (y'know, after they found out something major was going down AFTER it had already started...and they had to make an 8-10 hour inbound leg to support the fight, since no opportunity to forward stage was allowed by the complete and total lack of notification). Numerous ROE violations by flying below altitude restrictions to provide danger close support. Strafing runs against the standing requirements because that's all they had left and the guys on the ground needed more. Strafing runs by aircraft not cleared for those operations. Numerous supports for "emergency danger close" support by guys who KNEW they were probably going to get their a** chewed when they got back for doing it. And, as I mentioned, the FAC-As basically taking over control of the entire air package from single seat aircraft and staying on station WAY past their assigned vul/legal combat hours restrictions.

Oh, and those Navy aircraft you're so proudly vaunting? Pretty sure no carrier air was getting to that fight without big wing tanking, which is a hero story in its own right in relation to Anaconda.

But I'm sorry, I forget, this is the bash the Air Force thread.

That's What I've been screaming.

Yeah, TT, you and I are in violent agreement on that front.

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I'm gonna throw down THIS budget challenge again...

Defund the 89th AW, cut Air Force One up for scrapmetal and make the President and other Beltway Bandits fly regular USAF trash-haulers like everyone else. How much does THAT open up for budget?

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