Lockheed F-104

[ChesshireCat]

Assuming there was anything in the box in the first place...Rolling Thunder was an exercise in wasting ordnance.

believe me they don't send B52's for H&I's. Targets are known to be there three to five minutes ahead, and if not they move to the alternate box (there's often three or four. Targets are tracked via sensors, and they send data 24/7.

gary

[vince14]

believe me they don't send B52's for H&I's. Targets are known to be there three to five minutes ahead, and if not they move to the alternate box (there's often three or four. Targets are tracked via sensors, and they send data 24/7.

gary

Of the estimated 90,000 casualties caused by Rolling Thunder, about 72,000 were civilians. So with 864,000 tons of bombs dropped - 211,000 tons more than were dropped during the entire Korean War - the US needed 48 tons of bombs to kill one enemy combatant. As I said, RT was a waste of ordnance.

Edited July 21, 2015 by vince14

[11bee]

believe me they don't send B52's for H&I's. Targets are known to be there three to five minutes ahead, and if not they move to the alternate box (there's often three or four. Targets are tracked via sensors, and they send data 24/7.

gary

From all that is out there, the vast majority of ARC Lights were pre-planned strikes based on vague intelligence, certainly not tracking targets real time. As was also noted, the majority hit nothing more than empty jungle or unfortunately, civilian areas. Did these inflict horrible causalities when they happened to actually hit enemy troop concentrations - absolutely. However, this was very much the exception.

[AX 365]

Back to the topic at hand, a friend on mine flew the CF-104 in Germany. His squadron was one of the ones designated in the nuclear strike role, not one of the VICON photo recon squadrons. Des said that the CF-104 was his favourite airplane to fly out of the over 40 different types in his log books. He said it wasn't terribly difficult to fly. Although it had a good, for the time, terrain mapping radar, the physical (mountains encountered during low level flights) and atmospheric (poopy visibility due to weather and industrial haze) environments of Europe were the real challenge. Was it the right aircraft for the job? Probably not but according to the Canadian government of the day it was.

In memory of the 37. The cairn at the R.C.A.F. Museum in Trenton honouring the CF-104 pilots who lost their lives in service to country

[Exhausted]

Of the estimated 90,000 casualties caused by Rolling Thunder, about 72,000 were civilians. So with 864,000 tons of bombs dropped - 211,000 tons more than were dropped during the entire Korean War - the US needed 48 tons of bombs to kill one enemy combatant. As I said, RT was a waste of ordnance.

From all that is out there, the vast majority of ARC Lights were pre-planned strikes based on vague intelligence, certainly not tracking targets real time. As was also noted, the majority hit nothing more than empty jungle or unfortunately, civilian areas. Did these inflict horrible causalities when they happened to actually hit enemy troop concentrations - absolutely. However, this was very much the exception.

Don't mean to sound rude, but Rolling Thunder was the campaign over North Vietnam, and B-52s struck exclusively in the South during the time period. I'm arguing that RT was based on a SAC-centric viewpoint that failed to realize, after Korea, that future wars were "limited." SAC, in particular, had too much influence at the top which paralyzed the American response in terms of applying tactical assets smartly. It seems that any TAC guy of the time will tell you that they were underprepared for sustained fighting (bomb shortage, weak DACT, inability to bomb through the monsoon season, basic shortcuts in aircraft design). And finally, the math of bombing coercion spelled out failure from the beginning. Rolling Thunder was a misuse, if not spectacular, of air power.

[11bee]

Don't mean to sound rude, but Rolling Thunder was the campaign over North Vietnam, and B-52s struck exclusively in the South during the time period. I'm arguing that RT was based on a SAC-centric viewpoint that failed to realize, after Korea, that future wars were "limited." SAC, in particular, had too much influence at the top which paralyzed the American response in terms of applying tactical assets smartly. It seems that any TAC guy of the time will tell you that they were underprepared for sustained fighting (bomb shortage, weak DACT, inability to bomb through the monsoon season, basic shortcuts in aircraft design). And finally, the math of bombing coercion spelled out failure from the beginning. Rolling Thunder was a misuse, if not spectacular, of air power.

Agreed, the OP had referred to the B-52 strikes (Arc Lights) as Rolling Thunder, so things went off on a tangent from there. Was aware of the difference between the two.

RT was doomed from the beginning, for the reasons you list above but you also cannot overlook the detrimental effect of the Johnson Administration's meddling in the bombing campaign.

[dmk0210]

...SAC, in particular, had too much influence at the top which paralyzed the American response in terms of applying tactical assets smartly. It seems that any TAC guy of the time will tell you that they were underprepared for sustained fighting (bomb shortage, weak DACT, inability to bomb through the monsoon season, basic shortcuts in aircraft design...

Robin Olds' "Fighter Pilot" and Chuck Horner's "Every Man a Tiger" illustrate this quite clearly. It's alarming how much tunnel vision the AF had in the 50's and 60's. It was almost as if any training that wasn't about dropping a nuke (or shooting down the other guys nuke bombers) was pretty much ignored.

Edited July 21, 2015 by dmk0210

[Exhausted]

Agreed, the OP had referred to the B-52 strikes (Arc Lights) as Rolling Thunder, so things went off on a tangent from there. Was aware of the difference between the two.

I detected that, I just quoted wrong.

RT was doomed from the beginning, for the reasons you list above but you also cannot overlook the detrimental effect of the Johnson Administration's meddling in the bombing campaign.

Yes, this is true. They felt like if they had a a big unwieldy stick they could 'temper' it and mold it into the appropriately sized response. Eisenhower experienced the same conundrum at the end of the Korean War. For SAC, those wars are nearly identical.

[dmk0210]

Its "primary role" was nuclear strike, but really, it was just a mud mover fitted mostly with conventional bombs. They were never even wired for air-2-air missiles, which, considering the aircraft was designed first and foremost to be an interceptor, that was pretty silly. For what Canada was doing with it, I don't understand why we were not using F-4's like everyone else. Heck, F-4's would have done the job of both the Starfighter AND the Voodoo.

You mean CAF's Starfighters weren't able to carry AIM-9s?

USAF '104s could.

[Exhausted]

It was almost as if any training that wasn't about dropping a nuke (or shooting down the other guys nuke bombers) was pretty much ignored.

You see this again when it comes to marketing the F-104

[ChesshireCat]

Of the estimated 90,000 casualties caused by Rolling Thunder, about 72,000 were civilians. So with 864,000 tons of bombs dropped - 211,000 tons more than were dropped during the entire Korean War - the US needed 48 tons of bombs to kill one enemy combatant. As I said, RT was a waste of ordnance.

wrong, and that's putting it mildly

glt

[huntermountain]

[Exhausted]

I think he may be onto something. Remember that Westmoreland believed that the giant Air Cavalry deployments to the country side would produce greater results than a pacification effort in the country side. His reasoning was that killing the enemy faster than they could be replaced would cripple the insurgency and thus win the war. This jives with the info Vince brought up about using bombs to measure death. Westmoreland's reasoning on the use of his forces, including air power, was unimaginative and flawed, even leading 2 well known peers to personally appeal to the Secretary of the Army to reassign him from Vietnam.

The fact of the matter is that no amount of aerial coercion over the North could have stopped the insurgency in the South because Westmoreland Americanized the ground war and neglected to stabilize the SV government. This wasn't as much as a Johnson problem as it was a military doctrine problem and, again, other Army generals and Tactical Air Command saw the flaws and tried to remedy them early in the war.

[vince14]

wrong, and that's putting it mildly

glt

Don't take my word for it, the figures quoted are from the official CIA analysis of the effects of Rolling Thunder.

[Horrido]

The great procurement mysteries of the great white North...

That would actually make for a great book title on the subject. You could run a follow-up with Funded to Die: Defense programs of the UK Aborted at Birth.

[jpk]

Robin Olds' "Fighter Pilot" and Chuck Horner's "Every Man a Tiger" illustrate this quite clearly. It's alarming how much tunnel vision the AF had in the 50's and 60's. It was almost as if any training that wasn't about dropping a nuke (or shooting down the other guys nuke bombers) was pretty much ignored.

When I look at the two major airpower branches of the US military, the air force and the navy, it seem to me the navy has been the better at decisions equipping their airpower needs from the post war period up through the late 70's. Perhaps it was because of the navy's association with the marines that has forced them to have a broader view taking into consideration their, the marine's needs, as well as the fleet's. Those decisions not only fielded a series of fighter aircraft but also a succession of purpose built attack/tactical aircraft as well. Something the USAF had ignored, building mainly go fast straight line fighter aircraft until forced to build and field the A-10. Even now their dogfighter's, the F-15 and F-16 are now burdened down with huge drop tanks and all sorts of bombs hanging off the fuselage and wings while they try once again to kill the A-10.

[TaiidanTomcat]

When I look at the two major airpower branches of the US military, the air force and the navy, it seem to me the navy has been the better at decisions equipping their airpower needs from the post war period up through the late 70's. Perhaps it was because of the navy's association with the marines that has forced them to have a broader view taking into consideration their, the marine's needs, as well as the fleet's. Those decisions not only fielded a series of fighter aircraft but also a succession of purpose built attack/tactical aircraft as well. Something the USAF had ignored, building mainly go fast straight line fighter aircraft until forced to build and field the A-10. Even now their dogfighter's, the F-15 and F-16 are now burdened down with huge drop tanks and all sorts of bombs hanging off the fuselage and wings while they try once again to kill the A-10.

This is why I drink

[TaiidanTomcat]

That would actually make for a great book title on the subject. You could run a follow-up with Funded to Die: Defense programs of the UK Aborted at Birth.

"Born to die "

[ChesshireCat]

I think he may be onto something. Remember that Westmoreland believed that the giant Air Cavalry deployments to the country side would produce greater results than a pacification effort in the country side. His reasoning was that killing the enemy faster than they could be replaced would cripple the insurgency and thus win the war. This jives with the info Vince brought up about using bombs to measure death. Westmoreland's reasoning on the use of his forces, including air power, was unimaginative and flawed, even leading 2 well known peers to personally appeal to the Secretary of the Army to reassign him from Vietnam.

The fact of the matter is that no amount of aerial coercion over the North could have stopped the insurgency in the South because Westmoreland Americanized the ground war and neglected to stabilize the SV government. This wasn't as much as a Johnson problem as it was a military doctrine problem and, again, other Army generals and Tactical Air Command saw the flaws and tried to remedy them early in the war.

will try to explain how things worked south of the 17th Parallel, and then move north. Once you got thirty to forty five klicks west of Highway One, the country was divided into what was known as "free fire zones". Some zones were as big as several hundred square miles, and once you got within fifty klicks of Laos it was kind of wide open. Or Dodge City as we called it. There were no friendlies in there with some small exceptions. There were many tribes of hill people (Montengards.) About a third of them were aligned with the NVA (local VC would have killed them). If you got caught in there, you were toast. An Arc Light raid inside the borders was not all that common, but they did happen from time to time. The most famous ones were just outside Khe Shan, and even then most were in Laos. So they were out of the country. Have also heard they did them around Bein Het and Plei Me SF camps. North Vietnam was considered to be a restricted free fire zone, in that there were areas that you couldn't touch. Route Pac Six was usually regarded as the worst. Everybody in there was armed and dangerous. Actually it was that way for the whole place. The VC, and NVA probably killed four times the civilians than our side did (real civilians). The VC counted anyone not in uniform as a civilian even if he was carrying an SKS, so one must take that into fact. In an area close to or actually inside a free fire zone, you could pretty much figure a civilian was VC or at least a sympathizer. We usually left them alone as they were a good source for intell. VC love to roll thru a village at one in the morning with a flame thrower and a sack of grenades. After the fact they'd put the blame on us. Everybody knew better. Up north every farmer was armed and would shoot at any passing plane. Every sapper was dressed as a civilian, and all VC were dressed as civilians. The CIA wouldn't have had a clue, but other sources would have. Vietnamese rangers and Koreans had a rule that if they took fire from a village, they destroyed it. If you were in it; too bad.

gary

[Alvis 3.1]

You mean CAF's Starfighters weren't able to carry AIM-9s?

USAF '104s could.

The CF-104 was quite different under the skin from the USAF variants. The basic F-104 shape was used but extensive changes in electronics were added in an attempt to make a fighter-bomber out of what had been an interceptor. In the case of the CF-104, range was critical for nuclear strike missions, so the Sidewinder positions were replaced with tip tanks. Initially, even the gun was eliminated to allow for more fuel carriage. When the nuclear mission was dropped, the gun was put back in, but anything that could have been used electrically to operate Sidewinders had been already used up for items like the Vinten recce pod. I assume any extensive rewiring would have been considered cost prohibitive, and since the expectation that the CF-104 would be replaced reasonably soon anyway (ha!) it was also not worth doing anyhow.

As a nuclear delivery vehicle, it was pretty good at that role. It was very fast at low level and reasonably small, making acquisition difficult. Over the years, it led to two F-4s (one USAF, one West German AF) being lost in mock combats, as the CF-104 was much lighter and could pull up from a dive more rapidly than the much heavier Phantom.

Once the nuclear role was dropped, the CF-104 was a lot less useful. It lacked the more precise equipment required to achieve a decent probability of a hit with conventional weapons. As a recce aircraft, it was likely still reasonably useful in the later stages of its' career.

Canadair was approached by the USMC in the early 60s to build a Spey variant of the Phantom. This was before the RN decided to go for a Spey Phantom. I'm puzzled by the request, as it would have been logistically a pain for the USMC/Navy to fly different variants of the Phantom. I assume the request was driven by the better acceleration and low altitude performance the Spey gave the Phantom, but obviously, it never went anywhere.

Canada has a weird history of aircraft procurement. It flips between overly expensive controversial projects that get canned, and inexpensive yet of dubious usefulness programs. Every once in a while, we jump onto a bandwagon at the right time, like the F-18s. Other times, we do weird things like pick the F-5 instead of some other superior ground attack aircraft, build large number then place them in storage because we actually don't have a role for them. Then, years later, upgrade them to CF-18 standards, then store them right away because we don't have enough money to actually field them.

As strange as the CF-104 may be for the roles we used it for, at least it was a high tech program keeping talent in our country employed, and we did sell a few to some other NATO countries as well.

Alvis 3.1

Edited July 22, 2015 by Alvis 3.1

[Alvis 3.1]

"Born to die "

There's a series of books called "Project Terminated" that cover loads of failed programs. Some good, some bad, and many really weird. Oddly, i happen to own several.

:P

Alvis 3.1

[11bee]

Vietnamese rangers and Koreans had a rule that if they took fire from a village, they destroyed it. If you were in it; too bad.

gary

With a plan like that, I can't believe we lost. Shocker....

Kill 'em all, let God sort them out sounds good in theory but in practice, it left a bit to be desired.

[TaiidanTomcat]

This may sound odd, but that is very classy. I like the way that was done.

(I don't know how you compliment something like that)

[ChesshireCat]

With a plan like that, I can't believe we lost. Shocker....

Kill 'em all, let God sort them out sounds good in theory but in practice, it left a bit to be desired.

I did an OP or two a little north of Duc Pho in the LZ Bronco area, and north to the Mo Duc area. Looked like a no man's land in there. Korean ROKMC ran that area, and it was booby trap city when you were not being shot at. They ran small platoons thru there that towed a small 75mm pack howitzer. They'd set up right on Highway One and just completely destroy the area they were receiving gun fire from. South of Chu Lai was home to a Vietnamese Ranger group. This bunch was right out of FT. Bragg, and were serious about their business. I watched them at least twice a month get probed by local Main Force VC. It was almost like a circus event. They would roll right thru their own wire and follow the VC all the way back home leaving bodies all over the place (civilians of course!). Those folks were sent to Saigon during Tet in 68 with the task of cleaning out ChoLon. Koreans stayed put, but at least held that area under complete control.

gary

[Murph]

Perhaps it was because of the navy's association with the marines that has forced them to have a broader view taking into consideration their, the marine's needs, as well as the fleet's.