Is this article on the A-10 legitimate?

[Aurora Mark]

As a former infantier who loved what the A-10 and the crews did for us, I found this article pleasing. But, without stirring the pot with opinions, can I ask you all whether this is in fact true?

http://www.jqpublicblog.com/congress-issues-air-force-sharp-rebuke-bars-a-10-retirement/

Thank you.

Mark.

[boom175]

yes

[fulcrum1]

You can read it for yourself....

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735

Edited September 30, 2015 by fulcrum1

[Fellow Hobbyist]

Congress...what morons.

[TaiidanTomcat]

Air force spends billions upgrading/rewinging A-10s, plans to use them until 2030.

Congress made military cuts mandatory (sequestration), now is mad when the military doesn't cut what it wants.

Blames air force for entire thing. Internet laps it up.

Scapegoating successful, the air force will have to cut other (also needed) areas instead, along with delays in modernization. This article is great at perpetuating this.

A-10 is for the purpose of supporting troops in dubious wars of great length and expense before leaving anyway and is not of much value in the Pacific which is where the US military is being told to shift. Air Force is damned either way

Congress is not "mission focused" the A-10 is a jobs program to many districts and is much more about that than ground troops.

Edited September 30, 2015 by TaiidanTomcat

[TaiidanTomcat]

Also ARC begins it's 12th A-10 thread

[Aurora Mark]

Might be the case. And there are a lot of emotions and opinions connected to this. I just wanted to make sure that this was something credible.

Truth is, there are a lot of infantiers here in Canada who are going to be extremely happy about this. I can't tell you how many times in my tours we were very, very, very happy to have the A-10 overhead, and how many times if not for what they were able to do... ...well... things would have been very difficult for a number of us.

Thank you guys for answering my question.

Cheers,

Mark.

[Waco]

This is an egregious offense in the established civil-military relationship in how the United States prepares for war and provides combat capability to the Joint Force at large. As an airpower professional, this makes me very angry, and I hope the other services sit up and take notice of the precedent this establishes. For now, this over-reach is aimed at the Air Force, but it could shortly turn towards any of the other services at will. Regardless of what you think about the A-10, this is very dangerous path to tread.

First of all, what this legislation likely does is reduce available air-to-ground combat power, at least in the short term. Along with the gradual drawdown of the A-10 towards retirement, the AF planned to use manpower positions--specifically maintenance--garnered from that reduction to begin resourcing F-35 standup. As F-35 operations expand, the number of billets required to maintain, support, and sustain that force will likewise grow. However, with the A-10 retirement now halted, and the Air Force legally prohibited from spending any money towards its retirement, planning for retirement, or placing into storage, it is very clear the AF will not be able to shift any resources from the A-10 to the F-35. The AF likewise is prohibited now, legally, from reducing any manpower currently allocated to the A-10...so even streamlining A-10 support (since it's an established platform, with well documented procedures, etc.) is off the table. In short, the AF cannot expand F-35 maintenance, support, or sustainment billets using any manpower positions from the A-10. Likewise, the AF cannot create new billets, because it is Congressionally capped for for total manpower numbers, and is still in a gradual drawdown to meet those Congressionally mandated numbers. So the requirement is there--F-35 fielding will continue, but the resources are not. In order to meet the manpower demands of the F-35, the USAF will now have to garner those positions from elsewhere, and so fighter maintenance-support-logistics positions will most likely be moved from the F-15E and F-16 communities to meet those demands. Remember, you cannot legally move any of those from the A-10 now. The F-15E and F-16 maintenance communities are already undermanned and over-tasked, so readiness, availability, and overall USAF air-to-ground combat power from those platforms will likely decrease as you take away a sizeable chunk of their infrastructure. Unintended consequences of second and third order effects. The overall A-10 availability remains the same, but there is a net decrease in the other fighters with air-to-ground missions, so, in the end, the Joint Force gets less of that capability.

Second, Congress has created conflicting language within its own guidance, and set the AF up to be unable to meet the requirements set forth regarding disposition of the A-10. As noted above, the USAF is prohibited from "planning for retirement" any of the A-10 fleet. It is prohibited from using any funds to support those activities. Yet Congress has likewise required the AF to, “commission an appropriate entity outside the Department of Defense to conduct an assessment of the required capabilities or mission platform to replace the A-10 aircraft.” We'll get to the root of how this conflicts with the USAF's legal, statutory obligations later, but for now, it appears impossible to conduct an assessment (ie, commission a study, direct outside research, etc) on replacing the A-10 when you are prohibited from performing any activities related to planning for the retirement of the A-10. Further, Congress also feels that it can not only dictate the capabilities or mission sets such a replacement platform must provide, but that it can lays those out in excruciating detail. As noted in the OP, Congress has specified that a replacement platform must, "include the ability to engage moving, camouflaged, or dug-in troops; the capacity for armor-piercing weaponry, including cannons and missiles; the 'ability to remain within visual range of friendly forces and targets to facilitate responsiveness to ground forces and minimize re-attack times'; the ability to operate beneath low cloud ceilings, at low speeds, and within the range of typical air defenses found in enemy maneuver units; and most critically: '[t]he ability to deliver multiple lethal firing passes and sustain long loiter endurance to support friendly forces throughout extended ground engagements.'”

Ignoring the conflicting guidance from Congress about preparing for retirement/replacement, I must ask, are these requirements from 1975 or from 2015? Because, quite frankly, even A-10s do not execute their missions in this fashion, nor have they for some time. The advent of the A-10C, with targeting pods, datalink integration, advanced comms, and standoff weaponry allows the A-10 to perform its mission from higher altitudes, at increased range...in much the same fashion as other platforms, like the F-15E and F-16 which are now receiving reduced support to preserve A-10 capacity. In addition, I think it is GREATLY worth noting the "typical air defenses found in enemy maneuver units" are NOT conducive to A-10 operations. As early as Desert Storm, A-10s had to be pulled from front line operations (against the Iraqi Republican Guard, in that case) due to the operational losses and damage rates which were quickly rendering A-10 units combat ineffective. While offensive capabilities have increase, the commensurate increase in A-10 defensive capabilities has NOT kept pace with the modernization of Air Defenses, and A-10s would NOT survive in a modern, contested environment. Nevertheless, Congress has written a set of requirements to assess any A-10 replacement which are straight out of 1975, and are focused nearly exclusively on the A-10s initial design principles....principles which, in fact, do not fit in well to a modern, Joint employment concept for air-to-ground fires.

Back on track...thirdly, this legislation wholly removes one of the Department of the Air Force's three primary reasons for existing. The USAF is responsible to organize, train, and equip air, space, and cyberspace forces in support of the Joint Force and the Combatant Commanders. This legislation squarely takes away the AF's ability to equip (and organize, by dictating manpower allocations) in support of its role. Congress has stopped providing objectives and missions, and is literally reaching down to the individual platform/weapons system level to dictate force structure. This is WHOLLY in contradiction to how the entire US Department of Defense is organized. The President should set national security strategy and objectives, the SECDEF and JCS should distill these into national defense strategy, and the combatant commanders should then set the requirements and capabilities they require to meet these objectives. The services then organize, train, and equip their forces to meet those requirements. Congress, with its budgetary role, is then responsible for funding these initiatives. Note how nowhere in this process does Congress set the strategy, nor establish the requirements and capabilities the Combatant Commanders need in their specific areas-of-responsibilities. In dictating USAF equipment (and organization), Congress has short circuited the entire process.

Furthermore, as an airpower professional, it also means that Congress has officially determined that it knows better than folks who have spent a lifetime studying and preparing to meet National Defense requirements how best to meet the capabilities required to achieve our national security objectives. Mind you, this is also a Congress that has the lowest military experience in history. As airpower professionals, we are taught to be advocates and experts on airpower, its employment, and linking it to the other service capabilities and to the other instruments of national power. This legislation blanks all of that completely out of relevance. It's hard to understate how game changing this mandate truly is. The way this legislation is written, Congress is setting precedent that it will not only dictate the funding provided to the services, and what is should be spent on, but also how it will be spent, regardless of whether the capabilities yielded are a good match to the Combatant Commanders requirements. It is dictating how the services will equip and organize themselves, regardless of whether those decisions will result in an ability to meet the Combatant Commanders requirements. And it is disregarding decades of doctrine regarding the employment of airpower in support of national defense objectives, as studied and interpreted by airpower professionals. Insulting is the kindest word I can think of. This legislation even goes so far as to set the conditions and requirements for testing/analysis of any potential A-10 replacement. Really? Is that really where we think we ought to be going with US DoD programs? Congress will henceforth have the ability to dictate the terms of acquisition, organization of the force, operational testing, and requirements for national security. That is the precedent set by this language.

Finally, I think it's important to note the other services are also affected by this precedent. I wonder how the Marine Corps will react when Congress dictates the timelines at which they can retire Harriers as they ramp up their F-35 operations? Or how they Corps will react to Congress writing the testing milestones and development guidelines for its next amphibious assault craft? I hope the Navy has no new class of ships they are looking to bring online when they are unable to retire some older ships of the line due to future Congressional language. When the Army is told it cannot purchase new sidearms, and must continue to use the M9 Beretta, and must NOT spend any funds searching for a replacement, remember, this is the legislation that set precedent for those actions.

Regardless of what you think of the A-10 as a weapons systems, I think it is critical to see how ridiculous this legislation is, and the impact that it has on the individual military services' ability to organize, train, and equip their forces in support of national defense. At this point, we would be better served dissolving the service headquarters, and letting Congress assume those roles. Because at this point, the service chiefs and their staff appear to be serving a redundant role to the one Congress has taken upon itself.

[Jennings]

Regardless of what you think of the A-10 as a weapons systems, I think it is critical to see how ridiculous this legislation is

Remember, this is the same congress that has voted to repeal the Affordable Care Act more than 50 times (so far). Ridiculous is their middle name. No, it's their first name *and* their middle name.

[Trigger]

This is the same Congress that measures their success not by balancing the budget, but by the government not shutting down. "Ridiculous" is a polite R-word to describe our Legislative branch.

[Murph]

An utterly outrageous case of overreach by Congress in the name of maintaining jobs in their home district. The price will eventually be paid in blood at which time Congress will point fingers at everybody but themselves.

Regards,

Murph

[82Whitey51]

Hey, the military leadership sucks as bad as the Congress and the Commander In Chief. The Pentagon is full of guys riding out their last few years in to pick up their pensions. No one wants to rock the boat.

EDIT: Fixed it B)

Edited October 1, 2015 by 82Whitey51

[Waco]

If that's what you truly believe, then there's nothing anybody can say that's going to change your mind. In my experience, that is far from the truth, and I definitely do not feel that is true of current leadership in the USAF, nor on the vast majority of the Air Staff. Additionally, most of the folks I know on the Joint Staff likewise work hard, dedicated hours trying to do the right things for US National Defense. In fact, I can't think of anyone I know who was ever assigned to the Pentagon who was just passing time, leaching off the government tap.

Folks who are "riding out their* last few years to pick up their pensions" do not work 16 hour days. Similarly, folks who consistently have the moral courage to stand up for what they believe is right, even when the political winds and popular/media opinion align against them are not slackers. I think General Welsh is a phenomenal Air Force Chief of Staff, and I greatly appreciate his efforts to fix a wide range of problems in the service.

Are they all like General Welsh? Nope. But I would say the preponderance of them are hard working, great Americans, trying to do the right thing in a very challenging environment.

[habu2]

Congress - the opposite of Progress.

Well said (and written) Waco.

[Alvis 3.1]

Oo, look, politics.

Really guys?

Alvis 3.1

ARC Moderation Team Bowling Trophy Hoarder