F-22 Raptor: Ten years of service

[TaiidanTomcat]

Was the C-17 designed to replace the C-130?

Two different jobs really...

C'mon TT ... You know that... : :rolleyes:/>

-Gregg

[GreyGhost]

Right back at ya hence the Rollie eyes ...

-Gregg

[Trigger]

re the USAF 'Guy(s) in Charge (SECAF Wynne & CSAF Gen Moseley (a GREAT guy who I had the honor to brief 3x, and sit around & talk with for 45 min another time)) - the reason they were sacked was not the B-52 nuke issue, but they wouldn't stop advocating for 339 tails, vs. 187 that SECDEFs (Rumsfeld & Gates) wanted. Gen Corley (COMACC, also great guy) was also caught-up in it as well (another military member whose career stagnated at the 4-star level)

And Gates fired Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz for his support of the alternate F-35 engine — Gates didn’t appreciate people who disagreed with his views in public.

[Alan in Yorktown]

And Gates fired Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz for his support of the alternate F-35 engine — Gates didn’t appreciate people who disagreed with his views in public.

Correct re Gates. When I first had a 'staff-job' I was told - argue your point until you are blue in the face until a decision is made. And after the decision is made, support it just as hard, even if it is not the decision is not the one you advocated. Good advice still.

That said - With the various engine issues (large & small) F-35 has had I wonder if MG Heinz was correct...but IIRC there is another discussion somewhere around there where this topic could be better addressed

[DutyCat]

During competition the YF-23:

1) Was faster

2) Much more stealthier

3) Had a range approaching the F-111 WITHOUT external fuel tanks

4) Had the capability of greatly expanding its internal weapons bay with its current design.

What the AF/Pentagon stated was that the YF-23 didn't turn as tight as the YF-22.

TT; Name an a/c in the last 45 years that had greater design changes both on the interior and especially on the fuselage's aerodynamic shapes as the YF-22 did .

The YF-17 is excluded from this question because it was an AF reject and was taken out of the 'trash' by the Navy and redesigned for said Navy's requirements.

When I was working at McDonald Douglas during this time, the engineers were only slightly worried about the YF-23 maneuvering issue.

They believed that since the YF-23 SURPASSED all requirements except supercruise (It was decided for the purpose of competition to put a stealth setup on and add supercruise to the production prototype, etc) at the time of the competition, the YF-23 had a huge chance of winning.

They believed their ace-in-the-holes was the YF-23's much more stealthier design, much greater range, and its internal payload expansion capability with the current YF-23 design. I joked with saying the YF-23 was a future stealth F-111!

Ah, #4, a reason you give that it should have won, I believe was a reason the YF-23 lost. It did not have enough internal weapons capability. It would have had to be redesigned. while the F-22 already had that part right. Also, the Supercruise requirement was a big deal that needed to be demonstrated. You can't have a "stealth set up" and a separate, undemonstrated, "supercruise set up," when the whole point of the competition fly off was to show what you can do.

I recall that when the selection was made to go with the F-22, the USAF said that it was the clear cut winner.

Oh, and your pejorative comments about the YF-17 being a USAF reject and taken out of the "trash" by the US Navy are in my view misguided. Although the F-16 was clearly the better performer from a pure energy maneuver standpoint, a major factor for the selection of the F-16 over the F-17 in the USAF competition was the fact that the F-16 had the same engine as the F-15 and the USAF wanted to go CHEAP after having just dropped a bundle on the Eagle. The YF-17 was a twin engine design, which the Navy felt it needed over water. Also, the Navy wanted to mount AIM-7s from the get go, which the USAF only reluctantly did many years later on the F-16. The USAF refused to mount the Sparrow partly because of expense and partly because they felt an F-16 so equipped would threaten continued procurement of the F-15.

Unfortunately, making the YF-17 into an F-18 meant adding extra weight to support shipboard operations, a heavier radar, more fuel capacity, all of the which affected the performance and range of the Hornet. The Navy would have preferred going with a fresh design from scratch as it had been down this road before with the F-111. But as always, it is about political support and money, and Congress DIRECTED the Navy to choose from the two existing LWF prototypes as its source aircraft to develop. As the Navy could not do too much about the thrust/weight problem, it focused on systems to make it the best platform overall that it could be. Of course the SuperHornet is a further step in that direction with the realization that 99.9% of the time, in the modern era, tactical "fighter-bombers" are mostly going to be bombing, not dogfighting other peer aircraft. That is probably the way it is going to be unless in the unlikely event we go toe to toe with Russia or China.

Still, our air to air capability must be maintained, or else we will be challenged in that arena at some point by a 2nd or 3rd tier nation. We better have it when we need it.

[fulcrum1]

And Gates fired Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz for his support of the alternate F-35 engine — Gates didn’t appreciate people who disagreed with his views in public.

I was under the impression he was held accountable and fired because the program was failing not solely because he supported another engine.

[11bee]

And Gates fired Maj. Gen. David R. Heinz for his support of the alternate F-35 engine — Gates didn’t appreciate people who disagreed with his views in public.

And that is a bad thing? The good General apparently felt the need to try to sandbag his boss in public. I wouldn't tolerate that from one of my subordinates, why would Gate's feel any different?

As Alan mentioned, once the decision is made, it's time to salute and carry on with the directive. If Heinz or for that matter any of the other AF brass, had that much heartburn over certain decisions, they should have simply resigned.

I didn't know the military encouraged lower level officers to publicly complain about their bosses' decisions. Not a good way to conduct business if you ask me.

[Vaildog]

The question I have a hard time answering in my mind is if there were ever a need to defeat Chinese forces in aerial combat over the Pacific does the USAF have the numbers sufficient to do so? Right now the numbers of F-22s seem on the low side to dominate a potential conflict in the Western Pacific.

[TaiidanTomcat]

Oops

Edited January 2, 2016 by TaiidanTomcat

[TaiidanTomcat]

And that is a bad thing? The good General apparently felt the need to try to sandbag his boss in public. I wouldn't tolerate that from one of my subordinates, why would Gate's feel any different?

As Alan mentioned, once the decision is made, it's time to salute and carry on with the directive. If Heinz or for that matter any of the other AF brass, had that much heartburn over certain decisions, they should have simply resigned.

I didn't know the military encouraged lower level officers to publicly complain about their bosses' decisions. Not a good way to conduct business if you ask me.

That's a helluva can of worms there.

[Sabre Freak]

And that is a bad thing? The good General apparently felt the need to try to sandbag his boss in public. I wouldn't tolerate that from one of my subordinates, why would Gate's feel any different?

As Alan mentioned, once the decision is made, it's time to salute and carry on with the directive. If Heinz or for that matter any of the other AF brass, had that much heartburn over certain decisions, they should have simply resigned.

I didn't know the military encouraged lower level officers to publicly complain about their bosses' decisions. Not a good way to conduct business if you ask me.

There isn't enough thrust in Christendom to fix this plane.

[Trigger]

I was under the impression he was held accountable and fired because the program was failing not solely because he supported another engine.

Program delays/cost overruns were the raison d'être for the sacking (and they were a factor) but there was a history of the administration retaliating against those who didn't tow the line, even if it was only in appearance.

In a meeting with Gates at the White House, Bush expressed concern about retired Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) - a new position created in response to recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. McConnell had given an interview to The New Yorker magazine in which he characterized waterboarding as torture. Neither Bush nor Gates undertook to fire McConnell; that would have drawn attention to things like secret detention centers, "enhanced interrogation techniques," Gitmo, etc. So instead of handing McConnell a pink slip, the administration pushed him to the margins. McConnell retired the following year and the next administration gave subsequent DNIs more support.

And that is a bad thing? The good General apparently felt the need to try to sandbag his boss in public. I wouldn't tolerate that from one of my subordinates, why would Gate's feel any different?

Was it okay for Wynne and Moseley to speak their minds? In private? In public? On Capital Hill? In a speech to West Point cadets on April 21, 2008, Gates said, "More broadly, if as an officer you don't tell blunt truths – or create an environment where candor is encouraged – then you've done yourself and the institution a disservice."

Wynne and Moseley knew they were expected to support administration policy. And both knew that, when asked by lawmakers, they were required to give a personal and professional opinion, even if it differed from policy. They explained policy and gave opinions in private meetings and public testimony on Capital Hill in spring 2008.

The exclusive responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force include organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. Both AF leaders knew that their first concern was making the nation secure through air power and their second mission was to give America's airmen the equipment they needed. Part of that includes going before Congress.

The administration can submit a budget proposal, but Congress actually makes the budget. President can veto that if he wants, but Congress can override it if they have the votes.

Gates didn't like the Raptor, period. He used the "it's not useful in Afghanistan and Iraq" argument. He neglected to mention that the F-22 had deployed to UAE and demonstrated its capabilities w/o a hitch and he neglected to mention that Wynne and Moseley had proposed deploying the F-22 four times. It wasn't being used because Gates himself refused to let it be used.

Gates told Wynne that the F-22 wasn't needed because the we would never go to war with our competitor nations (Russia or China). Wynne, worried that Moscow and Beijing were exporting sophisticated air defense systems to Third World nations* the US might go to war with, replied "We were not at war with the Russians when my brother was shot down over Vietnam by a Russian-made missile." Wynne's older brother was shot down and killed in an F-4C on August 8, 1966. Gates did not like hearing that.

It's no coincidence that Gates sacked both leaders around the time the Senate Armed Services Committee was finalizing appropriations bill that supported the AF's request for 381 F-22s.

Whomever was going to replace Moseley was going to have to tread a fine line line between supporting administration policy (meaning Gates) and advanced the reconstitution of US air power (meaning supporting the F-22). The new CSAF would face the same dilemma all senior officers face - support policy or resign on principle.

Three names were pitched to Gates for the CSAF job. First of which was General Kevin P. "Chili" Chilton, head of US Strategic Command. Chilton had spent 11 years of his military career with NASA as an astronaut, flown three missions on the shuttle, including commanding a mission that docked with Mir. He was the only astronaut to achieve a four star rank. Chilton wasn't deeply involved in the deliberations over the F-22, but his logbook contained entries for time in the RF-4C and F-15.

Second was John Corley. Corley also had time in fighters and he signaled that he would not take the job unless the 381 number for the inventory could be protected. He could not support killing the F-22 just because that's what Gates wanted.

Third was Norton Schwartz. Swartz had flown the C-130 and had spent much of his career piloting special operations aircraft (both fixed wing and rotary). He was a leader, a manager and an administrator. However, when he heard about Chilton's name being on the list, in Swartz's own words, he thought "Chili was the right choice."

So you've got three guesses as to who would get the job, but you'll only need one. Gates did not want a "pointy-nose guy." During his confirmation hearings, Schwartz stated that his personal preference was for more than 183 aircraft, but less than 381. He subsequently avoided any public statements on the matter.

*Eight years later, Russia has deployed S400s to Syria and they've started the delivery of S-300 missile systems to Iran.

As Alan mentioned, once the decision is made, it's time to salute and carry on with the directive.

Unless it's the A-10. BRRRRRRT!!!!!

If Heinz or for that matter any of the other AF brass, had that much heartburn over certain decisions, they should have simply resigned.

Right, because they would have been so much more effective at their jobs after they turned in their resignations and being replaced with yes-men.

I didn't know the military encouraged lower level officers to publicly complain about their bosses' decisions. Not a good way to conduct business if you ask me.

Congress requires that leaders give their opinions, both in private meetings and in public testimony. POTUS may be Commander-in-Chief, but Congress has a say in matters too. Checks and balances; I think I read about that in school once...

Secondly, the Secretary of the Air Force is a civilian position, appointed not by the Sec of Defense, but by the President.

The question I have a hard time answering in my mind is if there were ever a need to defeat Chinese forces in aerial combat over the Pacific does the USAF have the numbers sufficient to do so?

In a word, no.

Edited January 2, 2016 by Trigger

[11bee]

In a word, no.

So with China having zero deployed stealth fighters, the United States would lose if we went into combat today, "over the Pacific"?

How can this be?

[TaiidanTomcat]

So with China having zero deployed stealth fighters, the United States would lose if we went into combat today, "over the Pacific"?

How can this be?

If you take what is said about the F-35 to heart, China will "crack" stealth and then overwhelm with numbers and close to WVR (and then win of course) because none of our systems work as advertised.

Edited January 2, 2016 by TaiidanTomcat

[11bee]

If you take what is said about the F-35 to heart, China will "crack" stealth and then overwhelm with numbers and close to WVR (and then win of course) because none of our systems work as advertised.

So even if they "crack" stealth, we've still got a large number of very capable A2A fighters, do we not? And if stealth is "cracked" I guess the debate on whether we need more F-22's is somewhat moot?

Regardless, it sounds like China has all the bases covered. I guess we're truly screwed.

[Vaildog]

In a word no.

This what it feels like to watch the end of an Empire. It's really going to be humiliating to see US forces lose to the Chinese especially since the Us government and business leaders basically have allowed China to reach its current state of military superiority.

[Trigger]

So with China having zero deployed stealth fighters, the United States would lose if we went into combat today, "over the Pacific"?

How can this be?

Well, that's a very catty and intentionally misleading argument since you're ignoring the thousands of ground and surface based air defense missiles (which have historically been far more lethal than any fighter) and the hundreds of J-10s, J-11s, J-15s and J-16s already in service.

We don't have 183 combat-coded F-22s. Some aircraft for slotted for training, testing, backup aircraft inventory, and peacetime attrition reserve.

Let's say you've got 24 aircraft per squadron and you deploy two squadrons (Alaska and Hawaii). 48 aircraft with an 80% readiness rate (peacetime rates tend to be lower, wartime rates tend to be higher, so we'll use 80% for sake of discussion). So at any time you've got 38 F-22s ready to go.

You're doing CAP; let's say you need 4 aircraft to patrol an area of the sky. You'll actually have more than 4 aircraft in the air because some aircraft will be transiting between the CAP from the airfield and you need to keep aircraft on station at any given time. So that's 6 aircraft per CAP, to cover a LOT of airspace, where ranges are an issue and there are hundreds of aircraft and missiles on the other side that have the home court advantage. What about strike escort? What about knocking out air defenses? There's simply just not enough aircraft to go around.

we've still got a large number of very capable A2A fighters, do we not?

No, we don't. We currently have more A-10s (334) than we have F-15Cs (214). Like the Hog, the F-15C was due to be retired years ago.

Super Hornets are good, but they're really armed for self-defense. They can dance, sure, but they're going to be overworked with other missions. Ditto Vipers and F-15Es.

Edited January 2, 2016 by Trigger

[TaiidanTomcat]

So even if they "crack" stealth, we've still got a large number of very capable A2A fighters, do we not? And if stealth is "cracked" I guess the debate on whether we need more F-22's is somewhat moot?

Regardless, it sounds like China has all the bases covered. I guess we're truly screwed.

In the F-22 vs F-35 internet wisdom if stealth is "cracked" then the F-35 will suffer because the F-22 is kinematically superb but the F-35 is not, so the F-22 would fall back on its ability to turn and burn an the F-35 will be helpless like an F-16 (don't ask this to make sense, and of course 5th gen fighters are more than just stealth). So the helpless aircraft will be detected, Enemy will close to WVR after dodging BVR missiles, and then guns kill all the helpless Allied pilots who apparently don't train at all.

I'm just passing on what all the internet experten who never served a day are brewing up and serving and how the F-35 will be the "end of western air superiority as we know it" <--- Quote from Bill Sweetman