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recon flights are unarmed to avoid provoking the other side. If this flight had a pair of fighters with it, it could've caused an international incident/war. The flights are taking place over disputed territory so the Chinese already see it as an invasion of their airspace, throw in armed fighters and it makes things much worse. Same as when Russian TU-95s test our reaction they do it alone and without fighters.

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recon flights are unarmed to avoid provoking the other side. If this flight had a pair of fighters with it, it could've caused an international incident/war. The flights are taking place over disputed territory so the Chinese already see it as an invasion of their airspace, throw in armed fighters and it makes things much worse. Same as when Russian TU-95s test our reaction they do it alone and without fighters.

A bit different in that NATO jets aren't doing barrel rolls around the intrepid Tu-95.

Not sure what the solution to this is. Send in escorts and risk a fighter pilot on either side getting too boisterous, cancel the recon flights or wait for the inevitable a2a collision and the loss of the RC and it's 30 or so crew members.

This isn't going to end well....

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recon flights are unarmed to avoid provoking the other side. If this flight had a pair of fighters with it, it could've caused an international incident/war. The flights are taking place over disputed territory so the Chinese already see it as an invasion of their airspace, throw in armed fighters and it makes things much worse. Same as when Russian TU-95s test our reaction they do it alone and without fighters.

Not always fighters have been escorting lately we had a thread thar mentioned it. However it is as you say, they are breaking "rules" by doing so

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As the su-24 shoot down by Turkey showed, nobody is going to war over a single incident. Splash a Jj-11 and the Chinese will learn how to conduct professional intercepts pretty quickly.

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As the su-24 shoot down by Turkey showed, nobody is going to war over a single incident. Splash a Jj-11 and the Chinese will learn how to conduct professional intercepts pretty quickly.

What if the Chinese shot down a RC-135 to make the US learn how to conduct professional reconnaissance missions?

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In my opinion the US provokes, like the NATO does, they need to.

The Allied forces are very well trained but things can escalate but I am assured that both US/NATO are prepared for this or even 'need' an incident...waiting to happen.

Its politics, pure tactics.

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As the su-24 shoot down by Turkey showed, nobody is going to war over a single incident.

The problem is that although war is the worst response that the other side may have, it is not the only one. Using the Su-24 as an example, there were a wide range of very serious consequences: Virtually complete breakdown of Russian/Turkish diplomatic relations (which were actually not too bad prior to the incident), Russian trade sanctions against Turkey (which probably hurt both sides, but which still send a pretty clear message), Russian tourism boycott against Turkey, Russian deployment of a S-400 air defence system to Syria, Russian deployment of Su-35S aircraft to Syria, escalation of Russian bombing of Turkmen brigades operating in Syria, change of conditions which made it almost impossible for Turkey to conduct military operations in Syria except when those are right on the border, etc. The Russians may not have gone to war with Turkey, but their response to the shoot-down also didn't stop with a simple "oops, we'll be more careful next time".

In the case of these "aggressive intercepts" of US aircraft - a deliberate shootdown in international airspace will no doubt open a massive can of worms in how all sides conduct patrol missions near the airspace borders of other countries and how intercepts of those patrols are conducted; it will probably push China into stationing combat aircraft on some of the Spratley islands and it will, most likely, also severely harm diplomatic and trade relations between the countries involved. I agree that full-blown war is unlikely based on one incident (although, wars have started that way), but that is not the only reason why countries don't just go around shooting down each other's aircraft when their presence become annoying.

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What if the Chinese shot down a RC-135 to make the US learn how to conduct professional reconnaissance missions?

I guess that's why it would be a good idea to strike first and teach them the proper manners.

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>Start a potential war.

>Just to show second largest economy in the world with a population of 1.4B some "proper manners".

What could possibly go wrong.

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The obvious thing is to stop buying Chinese imports and teach them a serious economic lesson.

But the problem with that is MOST of our consumer goods come from China. We would then be forced to have those good made elsewhere for a higher price. Paying higher prices would cause inflation here and an economic slowdown (recession). By body slamming China's economy....we damage our own in the process.

So we are left with dancing around with them at lower levels.

The biggest weakness the Chinese have as a people and country is Public Criticism by the US and other Western countries. Nothing seems to stop them in their tracks better than that.

They are pushing and pushing to test what the limits are...much like a small child. China does not want a war....but they do want to be the dominant country on this planet. As a people they envy the US to a degree that is hard to fathom.

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Agreed with Steve B - China wants to piss on our tree to see if we piss on theirs too. Just like the Soviets..um..the Russians do up north. It's all small pushes to see how far you can go before someone yells.

John

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What if the Chinese shot down a RC-135 to make the US learn how to conduct professional reconnaissance missions?

What is "unprofessional" about the US flights? Are they not in international airspace? So unless they are flying in a dangerous manner (maybe the RC's are doing loops around those helpless Flankers?), I'm just not following how anything they are doing could be considered unprofessional. Please clarify....

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What is "unprofessional" about the US flights? Are they not in international airspace? So unless they are flying in a dangerous manner (maybe the RC's are doing loops around those helpless Flankers?), I'm just not following how anything they are doing could be considered unprofessional. Please clarify....

There are those that believe the U.S. is at fault for ANYTHING aggressive done towards them. Not saying that's the stance here, just pointing out that some have that view.

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According to China, the US is NOT in international airspace or waters with the recent fly-bys and float-bys around the Spratly Islands. They consider it a violation of their sovereign space.

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According to China, the US is NOT in international airspace or waters with the recent fly-bys and float-bys around the Spratly Islands. They consider it a violation of their sovereign space.

I remember there was a time where some guy in Libya kept saying similar things and then sent fighters to stage attacks on a USN carrier, they got shot down by Tomcats, I agree, different times, and different adversary, i believe the Chinese have solved the issue of who those islands belong to by building a base there, they arent ever leaving unless we trade embargo them, and thats unlikely unless you dont want an iphone, computer, camera, clothes toys pretty much anything

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According to China, the US is NOT in international airspace or waters with the recent fly-bys and float-bys around the Spratly Islands. They consider it a violation of their sovereign space.

Unfortunately, I don't believe any other nation concurs with that opinion.

Therein lies the root of the problem.

Funny how this is changing the outlook of so many nations. Just read that Vietnam may be considering giving the US rights to the their naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, in return for the US agreeing to sell them weapons. Truly ironic that Vietnam could eventually be a major US ally in the region.

Can't wait to see an F-35 in Vietnamese markings!

Edited by 11bee
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Unfortunately, I don't believe any other nation concurs with that opinion.

Therein lies the root of the problem.

Funny how this is changing the outlook of so many nations. Just read that Vietnam may be considering giving the US rights to the their naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, in return for the US agreeing to sell them weapons. Truly ironic that Vietnam could eventually be a major US ally in the region.

Can't wait to see an F-35 in Vietnamese markings!

That would indeed be a site! Awesome!

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Unfortunately, I don't believe any other nation concurs with that opinion.

Therein lies the root of the problem.

Funny how this is changing the outlook of so many nations. Just read that Vietnam may be considering giving the US rights to the their naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, in return for the US agreeing to sell them weapons. Truly ironic that Vietnam could eventually be a major US ally in the region.

Can't wait to see an F-35 in Vietnamese markings!

Why not ..... look at Japan.

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China is making a big mistake with their recent and current foreign policy. They have managed to unify most of their neighbors against them....which isn't the smartest or most profitable approach. Karma will bite them.

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Strategic Importance

The speed and scale of China’s island-building spree has alarmed other countries with interests in the region. China announced in June 2015 that the creation of islands — moving sediment from the seafloor to a reef — would soon be completed. Since then, China has focused its efforts on construction. So far it has constructed port facilities, military buildings and an airstrip on the islands, with recent imagery showing evidence of two more airstrips under construction. The installations bolster China’s foothold in the Spratly Islands, a disputed scattering of reefs and islands in the South China Sea more than 500 miles from the Chinese mainland.

The new islands allow China to harness a portion of the sea for its own use that has been relatively out of reach until now. The key thing here is that rights over waters — and the natural resources beneath them — are tied under international law to whether your coastline is nearby. So if you can claim ownership of islands in the South China Sea, you can potentially claim any lucrative resources in the waters around them. And China’s efforts to fortify its territorial claims serve more than to help it extract natural resources.

China's real estate grab at sea is adding to fears among its neighbors over how the country's rapid rise is altering the regional order. Their fear is that China, as it grows in wealth and power, will define its role as that of a regional bully that pushes around weaker states. The construction work in the Spratly Islands seems to back that up fear. It sends the message, "We’re going to do what we want here. Who’s going to stop us?"

In 1974, China seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. In 2012, China seized the Scarborough Shoal area of the sea after a three-month standoff with Filipino coastguards. And last year Beijing placed an oil rig near the Paracels, another disputed island chain, sparking deadly riots in Vietnam.

Though too small to support large military units, the islands will enable sustained Chinese air and sea patrols of the area. The United States has reported spotting Chinese mobile artillery vehicles in the region, and the islands could allow China to exercise more control over fishing in the region.

Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan have all expanded islands in the Spratlys as well, but at nowhere near the same scale as China.

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Up to 30% of the world's cargo travels through this disputed territory.

The Chinese were relative latecomers to island building in the Spratly archipelago, and strategically speaking, China is feeling left out. aid Sean O’Connor, principal imagery analyst for IHS Jane’s. Still, China’s island building has far outpaced similar efforts in the area, unsettling the United States, which has about $1.2 trillion in bilateral trade go through the South China Sea every year. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter criticized China’s actions in the region in May, asserting that, “The United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world.” The United States reinforced that assertion on Monday and angered the Chinese when it sent the Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer, within 12 nautical miles of the islands, the conventional limit for territorial waters. According to statements from David Shear, the top Pentagon official in charge of Asia and the Pacific, the last time the United States sent ships or aircraft that close to the islands was in 2012.

China’s reefs hosted smaller structures for years before the surge in construction. By preserving these initially isolated buildings, China can claim that it is merely expanding its earlier facilities, similar to what other countries have done elsewhere in the region. In recent months, China has nearly completed two of its largest island building projects, at Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Current imagery shows that China has likely started building airstrips on long, straight sections of each of those islands, which would give the country three airstrips in the area.

Militarization and Modernization

For China, the Fiery Cross Reef is the most strategically significant new island, with an airstrip that is long enough to allow China to land any plane, from fighter jets to large transport aircraft. But China’s airstrip is not the first in the region — every other country that occupies the Spratlys already operates one as well. Up to 16 J-11B fighters were recently deployed to the island, which had been labeled as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier"

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This is why China has negotiated with Russia for Su-35s. In addition to strengthening China’s hand in a hypothetical conflict, the Su-35’s range and fuel capacity would allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) to undertake extended patrols of the disputed areas, following the model it has used to apply pressure to Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Chinese aviation is still reliant in many ways on Russia. Media attention has been focused on China’s domestic development programs, including stealth fighter-bombers and helicopters. The advance of Chinese aviation capabilities is by now a common theme, with every month seeming to bring new revelations about Chinese aviation programs, like the recently posted photos of the Li Jian, or “Sharp Sword” Stealth Drone.

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While the ability to manufacture and perform design work on these projects represents significant progress, “under the hood” these aircraft often feature Russian engines. China continues to try to copy or steal Russian engine technology because of a strong preference for building systems itself.

However, purchasing the Su-35 does not reflect a shift in the preferences of the Chinese military leadership. Buying the Su-35 reflects the delicate position China finds itself now, as both a large purchaser and producer of primarily Russian-style weapons. Though self-reliance has always been important to China, it has been superseded by the strategic need to acquire cutting edge weapons systems quickly.

Viewing the purchase of the Su-35 through the lens of China’s strategic needs and events, like the recent territorial spats with its neighbors, provides a useful perspective on just why China is so eager to acquire the Sukhoi jet. Simply put, the Su-35 is potentially the best 4th Gen fighter. Though stealth has come to dominate Western aircraft design, in terms of China’s immediate strategic needs, other factors take precedence.

Even more surprisingly, superiority in air-to-air combat is not the Su-35’s key selling point (this belongs to the J-20). While the Su-35 gives the Chinese military a leg up versus the F-15s and other aircraft fielded by neighbors like Japan, the advanced Russian jet does not add significant new capabilities to conflict areas like the Taiwan Strait. Large numbers of interceptors and multi-role jets like the J-10 could easily be deployed over the Strait, or to areas near Japan like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The advantage of the Su-35 rather lies in its speed and ample fuel tanks. Like the Su-27, the Su-35 was created to patrol Russia’s enormous airspace and to be able to meet incoming threats far away from Russia’s main urban areas. China’s Air Force faces similar problems.

The South China Sea is just such a problem. A vast area of 1.4 million square miles/ 2.25 million square kilometers), China’s claims as demarcated by the famous “Nine-Dash Line” pose challenges for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) current fighters. Currently, land based PLANAF fighters, can conduct limited patrols of the sea’s southern areas, but their fuel capacity severely restricts the time they can spend on patrol. Enforcing claims far from the mainland in times of crisis requires the type of range and speed that the Su-35 possesses. The Su-35 is likely meant to help enforce China’s territorial claims, further deter regional claimants, and provide additional layers of protection in the case of escalation. The key to this is fuel.

An important improvement of the Su-35 over the Su-27/J-11B is the ability to carry external fuel tanks, which would be a major factor limiting the Su-27, which does not have aerial refueling capability. This is in addition to a 20% increase in fuel capacity over the Su-27 and air refueling capability. This later capability is another important part of China’s strategy of increasing loiter times and distances, as evidenced with the first fight of the J-11D a year ago, with an AESA radar and an in-flight refueling probe.

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The image below demonstrates the comparative ranges (two way) of Su-27s (thick yellow lines), Su-35s flying on internal fuel (thick red lines) and Su-35s with two drop tanks (thin red lines) flying from two major air bases in China. Note: All distances are estimated combat radii.

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As the image above shows, the Su-35, even on internal fuel only, offers significant advantages over the Su-27, which are limited only to quick fly-overs of trouble spots such as the Reed Bank (lile tan) or Scarborough Shoal (huangyan dao). The extra time the Su-35 can spend on station is essential to Chinese desire to deter action by the Philippines or other regional actors.

Such long-range aircraft would be able to “show the flag” for longer, or quickly intercept Philippine aircraft in the region. In the case of the Su-35, it would likely be able to outfly and outshoot any Philippine or Vietnamese aircraft (or surface vessel for that matter) largely rendering competing territorial claims a moot point.

This is the sort of fait accompli situation that China has sought to create, for example with the “eviction” of the Philippine presence from the Scarborough Shoal and repeated fly-bys of the disputed area in the East China Sea—an overwhelming Chinese presence around territorial claims, leaving the contender with only the options of significantly ratcheting up tensions and likely losing any skirmish or accepting a regular Chinese military presence.

With the ability to make extended flights over a larger portion of the South China Sea, the PLANAF is likely to increase air patrols. This could lead to more frequent encounters in more places, creating more opportunities for minor crises and allowing China to push back the “facts on the ground” which may serve as the starting point for negotiations in a peaceful settlement in China's favor. This capability, combined with China’s already significant ballistic missile forces and other “Anti-Access” weapons give China a significant trump card and thus acts as a deterrent to military challenges, giving China the ability to project military power over a larger portion of Southeast Asia and indeed, most of the ASEAN nations.

Beyond deterrence, buying a jet with longer-range purchases more than just loiter time. Areas like Hainan are more vulnerable to attack by cruise missile or carrier-borne elements than those behind the prickly hedge of China’s air defense systems. Overlapping radars, shorter ranged interceptors and powerful surface-to-air missile system make deploying aircraft to the mainland an attractive option. With its extended range however, the Su-35 should have little trouble flying from behind coastal areas to a large portion of the South China Sea.

Land based, long range patrolling Su-35s are one of the best ways to ensure that China retains the ability to restrict other contestant nations’ access to these areas.

In the meantime, while the U.S. and its allies face a potential gap in capabilities between aging airframes and delivery of the F-35, China is rapidly phasing out older platforms, upgrading legacy systems and trying to acquire newer aircraft. The Su-35 is a major step in this direction. While not on par with the U.S. F-22, the small numbers of that platform and risks of deployment make the Su-35 likely superior to anything easily deployed in the region for some time.

Furthermore, though the Su-35 is much more agile than the Su-27, similarity between the Su-35 and earlier Sukhoi platforms should mean less effort expended building a new logistics tail and retraining, leading to faster operational status and deployment. There are no clear indications whether the PLAAF, or the PLA Navy Air Force (PLANAF) would use the Su-35s, but deployment to the PLAAF Air Base in Suixi, Guangdong would complement the other Sukhois already stationed there.

While the Su-35’s technologies will benefit Chinese aviation, its larger contribution lies in enforcement and deterrence in the South China Sea. China’s currently deployed forces in the South China Sea and contested areas could already do significant damage to possible adversaries like the Philippines. Without a combat-capable Air Force and Naval forces largely composed of aging/1960s-era former U.S. coast guard cutters, the Philippines cannot effectively challenge China’s territorial claims. The Sukhoi jets’ larger fuel capacity and in-flight refueling capability mean that Chinese jets could remain on station for longer, enforcing their claims by conducting patrols and interceptions in a more consistent way. Going forward, the combination of the Su-35, China’s extant shorter range fighters, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and long range ballistic and cruise missiles could act as a, strength-in-depth, multi-layered capabilities to protect China’s claims and make others less eager to intervene if China chose to pursue conflict with its neighbors.

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China has deployed surface-to-air missiles on a disputed island in the South China Sea, according to Taiwan and U.S. officials, in a move that has alarmed the country's Asian neighbors. Chinese state media said defenses had been in place on Woody Island, part of the Paracel chain in the hotly disputed sea, for years, and denied it was militarizing the island. Satellite images taken on February 14 appeared to show several missile batteries and support vehicles, according to ImageSat International, which took the images.

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The missiles appear to be Chinese HQ-9s with a range of more than 100 miles, which would pose a potential threat to aircraft in the region. The HQ-9 resembles the Russian S300 system, but China is assessed to have developed variants of the system with a longer range, potentially up to 230 kilometers. The HQ-9 is designed to be a long-range SAM to counter high-performance aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs)

Much of China's more recent air defense modernization efforts extend from Beijing's observation of Western military campaigns beginning with the Gulf War in early 1991 and Operation ALLIED FORCE in mid-1999. During the Gulf War, the employment of precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and airborne C4I apparently awakened Beijing to the limitations of its air defense capabilities. The design of the HQ-9 SAM reportedly was influenced by these observations, and plans were made to upgrade China's C4I system.

China purchased four to six S-300PMU batteries (48 to 72 missiles) in 1991 and purchased an additional 120 missiles in 1994. In 1993 it was alleged that Israel had transferred a Patriot missile or missile technology to China, though Israel denied the charges. In 1997 the US Office of Naval Intelligence suggested that "technology from advanced Western systems may be incorporated into the HQ-9."

The HQ-9 can reach speeds of up to Mach 4.2 and it has the world's largest warhead [180-kg] to increase its lethality and integrated combat capability, compared with S-300PMU1, S-300V, PAC-2 warhead weights of 143 kg, respectively, 150 kg, 80 kg. Although the design is more traditional, but because the large weight, the destructive power is second only to the special design of its detonation device S-300V2. It's operating altitude is extends to 98,000 feet

The combat systems and C4I capability microelectronics appearance are of Western style and performance, and more impressive than the missile itself. Electronic technology is the HQ-9 advantage over the S-300, claimed to be almost equal to its level of sophistication similar products in Europe and America.

This development has ratcheted up tensions in the volatile region, already home to messy territorial disputes, with a senior Japanese cabinet member labeling China's actions unacceptable.

AIrspace and Sovereignty

By international law, the notion of a country's sovereign airspace corresponds with the maritime definition of territorial waters as being 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) out from a nation's coastline. Airspace not within any country's territorial limit is considered international, analogous to the "high seas" in maritime law.

Washington has said it will ignore any Chinese claim for territorial waters based on new man-made islands, and has flown a surveillance plane with television crews to film the dredging work, sparking bitter Chinese complaints and dark talk in the Chinese press about a coming conflict.

Global Times, a newspaper run by the Communist Party which is often seen as a mouth-piece of hardline nationalists in the government in Beijing, said that China might have to “accept” there would be conflict with the United States. “If the United States’ bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea.”

The US is not challenging China’s sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands writ large. The U.S. has repeatedly stated that it takes no position on the sovereignty of the disputed features in the South China Sea. Rather, by conducting patrols within 12 nm of some of China’s artificial islands, Washington would be providing a public assertion of the American interpretation of international law (specifically the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) regarding freedom of navigation. We’ll need a primer on applicable UNCLOS sections to understand what’s really at stake in the case of China’s artificial islands and U.S. FON patrols.

Within a territorial sea, defined by UNCLOS as 12 nautical miles, ships from all states enjoy the right of innocent passage. But ships must meet certain conditions to conduct “innocent passage.” UNCLOS provides a list of activities “considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State” and thus not included in the right of innocent passage – including (most pertinently for U.S. operations in the South China Sea) “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State” (Part II, Section 3, Article 19).

That means states are not guaranteed the right to conduct surveillance within another state’s territorial sea. So the question of whether a certain feature generates a territorial sea is of crucial importance to determining whether the U.S. Navy can send surveillance ships and/or aircraft to conduct surveillance within 12 nautical miles of that feature.

That question is answered by Part II, Section 2, Article 13 of UNCLOS, which reads, in full:

  1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
  2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own. [emphasis added]

Effectively, any feature that is only above water at low tide is a low-tide elevation (LTE) and is not entitled to a territorial sea, unless it itself is part of another feature’s territorial sea (e.g., a state’s coastline or an island). In fact, LTEs are not subject to sovereignty claims at all, unless they themselves are located within an existing territorial sea. Thus under UNCLOS a state claiming an LTE has no rationale for denying even military ships the right to approach within 12 nautical miles.

UNCLOS also specifies that “artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf” (Part V, Article 60). Rather than generating a territorial sea, artificial islands are allowed a “safety zone” of no more than 500 meters – a little over a quarter of a nautical mile.

So now we have a well-established body of international law that directly relates to China’s artificial islands: military vessels are only explicitly banned from conducting surveillance within another state’s 12 nm territorial sea; LTEs generate no territorial sea, nor do artificial islands; therefore, there is no legal reason why the U.S. Navy cannot operated with 12 nm of artificial islands that were formerly LTEs.

And yet...

Edited by Tony Stark
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