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More proof that the F-14 was the best fighter. Ever


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Way back in the mid-80s I asked one of our F-4E pilots at Ramstein about the media hype versus reality of ACM with other airplanes. He told me the F-14 was actually rather easy to beat. He said one of the keys to dogfighting was being able to judge your opponent's energy state and adjust your tactics accordingly. With most other fighters it's fairly difficult to do, but when the Tomcat's wings started swinging out, you knew he was low on energy and was therefore more predictable and easier to kill.

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You're right, it's not even close. The Blackbird far exceeds the Tomcat.

sr71-sunset-afterburner.jpg

Yeah, I'll certainly second that motion. NOTHING before or since is as sexy as an SR-71 or A-12. I leave out the YF-12 because that big round nose looks pretty funky.

Darwin

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A good friend of our family has spent the last 24 years in the Marine Corps with several thousand hours as a pilot in the H-53E. He did two combat tours in Iraq in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then a tour as an Air Liaison Officer with a USMC Force Recon Company in far western Iraq. He spent most of his time coordinating bomb strikes against targets of opportunity stirred up by the Force Recon guys. He said VERY EMPHATICALLY that the F-14 "Bomb Cat" was his aircraft of choice when he needed a precision attack. This was in preference to the B-52, B-1, AV-8, F/A-18, F-15E and F-16.

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A good friend of our family has spent the last 24 years in the Marine Corps with several thousand hours as a pilot in the H-53E. He did two combat tours in Iraq in the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom and then a tour as an Air Liaison Officer with a USMC Force Recon Company in far western Iraq. He spent most of his time coordinating bomb strikes against targets of opportunity stirred up by the Force Recon guys. He said VERY EMPHATICALLY that the F-14 "Bomb Cat" was his aircraft of choice when he needed a precision attack. This was in preference to the B-52, B-1, AV-8, F/A-18, F-15E and F-16.

He's not the only one to say that, either. The irony of it all is that the Tomcat became an outstanding bomb platform. If NavAir hadn't had the "not a pound for air to ground" mentality early on, the bombing capability of the F-14 may have been developed much sooner. Grumman designed a latent bombing capability from the outset, but it was never developed until it looked like the Tomcat was going to get the ax. If I recall, when the LANTIRN was first pioneered, it was a great success. The F-14 was also supposed to get the AIM-120. However, funds were only available for one of the systems. The Navy chose (rightly) to pursue the LANTIRN.

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There is some hype backlash. I would say this, no matter how capable or not capable the F-14 was at ACM, Pilots had to work very hard to make it work. Nothing is easy about Tomcats, and that is a part of the problem. Pilots and support had to work very hard, harder than other teen fighters to keep it equal with them. That's not good. I would say Tomcat pilots and others had a steeper learning curve than say an F-15 group. And that's before we get into the hardships of working on/landing on a ship.

The F-14 does not necessarily have a reputation as a great dogfighter.

The F-16 has hype. The F-14 has a cult following, and not in a good way, like The Grateful Dead, but more like "Put on this purple sweatsuit and have some Kool-aid".

The Tomcat fanboys love to fap about how awesome the AIM-54 was, but they never mention that each one weighed 1,000 pounds, or that the adapters under the belly weighed 400 pounds a piece. That's up to 5600 pounds of dead weight and drag under the belly alone (still 1600 pounds of dead weight if you'd already fired off your AIM-54s), weighing and dragging you down during BFM. With stores and fuel, the Tomcat paid a penalty in maneuverability. And Navy policy was that the AIM-54 was only to be used to defend the boat against a raid by a Soviet bomber regiment. AIM-7, AIM-9 and the gun were to be used against fighters.

When the F-14 was clean (no AIM-54 rails on the belly or under the wings, and no external tanks), light on fuel, with all systems working, and below 20K (the lower the better, below 5,000 was it's best spot) it could be a very capable fighter in the right hands.

So it was one or the other - stripped down and low (and vulnerable) as a BFM platform, or loaded up with Das Überflugkörper - but it couldn't be both.

The Tomcat community was known for being somewhat cavalier regarding missile launches. They knew the envelopes well and had good cockpit indications, so most shots in training probably would have been good shots in combat, but they just didn’t have enough rigor in the debrief. It was due to debriefs and exchanges with Air Force F-15s that valid shot criteria started to quickly spread through the Tomcat community.

During training against F-15s, F-14 crews had to be spot-on perfect with everything, from radar set up, to formation, and even comms, if they wanted a chance to "live". Once engaged, the Tomcat pilot had to keep his speed up to maintain his options (see Scott Wilson's aforementioned comment about the Tomcat's energy state) and then know when it was worth it to give up energy for a shot, knowing there was another Eagle in the arena.

Digital Flight Control System was introduced in 2000 (only six years before the last D retired, and just three years before the A retired). The DFCS provided enhanced maneuverability and improve some of the Tomcat’s messy low-speed handling characteristics by means of an aileron-rudder interconnect. Like the F110, it was the realization of a dream from the early days of the program, when there was never quite enough funding. DFCS markedly improved the capability of all F-14s, allowing pilots to perform more aggressive maneuvers in dogfights such as pirouettes. Basically, with the F110, new radar, and DFCS, the Navy didn't get the Tomcat they wanted until six years before its retirement.

He's not the only one to say that, either. The irony of it all is that the Tomcat became an outstanding bomb platform. If NavAir hadn't had the "not a pound for air to ground" mentality early on, the bombing capability of the F-14 may have been developed much sooner. Grumman designed a latent bombing capability from the outset, but it was never developed until it looked like the Tomcat was going to get the ax. If I recall, when the LANTIRN was first pioneered, it was a great success. The F-14 was also supposed to get the AIM-120. However, funds were only available for one of the systems. The Navy chose (rightly) to pursue the LANTIRN.

VF-1 and VF-2 looked into dropping bombs as far back as 1988, but the Navy had the A-6, so there wasn't much call for a Bombcat until after the Intruder was retired in 97. While I'm of the opinion that scrapping the A-6F was probably one of the stupidest decisions NAVAIR's ever made, the Bombcat was a very competent and capable ground attack platform.

One of the factors that contributed to the Bombcat's success was the huge display in the back seat, larger than the F-15E's MFDs, which was originally intended to display radar data, provided an excellent display for LANTIRN video.

Edited by Tony Stark
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VF-1 and VF-2 looked into dropping bombs as far back as 1988, but the Navy had the A-6, so there wasn't much call for a Bombcat until after the Intruder was retired in 97. While I'm of the opinion that scrapping the A-6F was probably one of the stupidest decisions NAVAIR's ever made, the Bombcat was a very competent and capable ground attack platform.

One of the factors that contributed to the Bombcat's success was the huge display in the back seat, larger than the F-15E's MFDs, which was originally intended to display radar data, provided an excellent display for LANTIRN video.

I'm right there with you on the decision to terminate the A-6F development. I would imagine that the Navy had all their chips on the Super Hornet at that point. In regards to the PTID, a couple of VF-11 drivers said they even used the LANTIRN/PTID combo in place of the TCS chin pod.

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I'm right there with you on the decision to terminate the A-6F development. I would imagine that the Navy had all their chips on the Super Hornet at that point. In regards to the PTID, a couple of VF-11 drivers said they even used the LANTIRN/PTID combo in place of the TCS chin pod.

Nope, it was the A-12 Avenger II.

The Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program began in 1983 to develop a long range, very low observable, high payload, medium-attack aircraft to replace the Intruder in the carrier-based, medium-attack role. It was to have more advanced LO characteristics than the F-117A, have a significantly greater payload, and be in service by the mid-1990s.

The McDonnall Douglas/General Dynamics team won ATA in 1988 (kinda by default as Grumman never submitted a final bid). First flight was planned for December 1990. The Navy wanted 620, the Marines wanted 238. There were plans for the USAF to adopt the 400 A-12s to replace the F-111 (in a reversal of the NATF program with a navalized-ATF replacing the F-14) and it was promoted as a possible replacement for the Tornado IDS. Cost estimates were $100M per aircraft,

The A-12's performance capabilities would have been in roughly the same class as existing aircraft. The key improvement over existing aircraft, not inherently obvious when comparing specifications, was stealth. While today's radar can detect existing naval aircraft at a range of 50+ miles, the A-12 was designed to remain undetected until approximately 10 miles away. This would result in significant operational and survival benefits for the A-12 since defenders would have little opportunity to engage the aircraft once detected so close to the target.

Early in 1990, MDD/GD revealed delays and projected cost increases. Due to complications with the composite materials, aircraft weight had increased to 30% over design specification. Not good for a plane that has to operate from a carrier. Most of the excess weight was due to the composite material needed to support the stress and loads. The technology for manufacturing composites, especially for the complex shapes of an airplane, was state-of-the-art. General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas had to develop the technology during full-scale development because they had limited experience in building large structures using composites. Technical difficulties with the complexity of the radar system to be used also caused costs to increase. One estimate had the A-12 consuming up to 70% of the Navy's aircraft budget within three years. After delays, its critical design review was successfully completed in October 1990 and the maiden flight was rescheduled to early 1992.

A government report released in November 1990 documented serious problems with the A-12 program. In December 1990 SECDEF told the Navy to justify the program and deliver reasons why it shouldn't be canceled. The response given by the Navy and MDD/GD failed to persuade him and he canceled the program in the following month, on 7 January 1991, for breach of contract.

After the cancellation of the A-12, the Navy elected to pursue Super Hornet program in 1991 as an intirm solution.

Between 1993 and 1994, the Navy partnered with DARPA on the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) to draft requirements for a common aircraft that would meet the VSTOL needs of the United States Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. In parallel to the CALF program, the AF and the Navy initiated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program in late 1993 as a result of the DoD's Bottom Up Review (BUR) of US military forces and modernization plans. In September 1993, the results of the BUR were formally announced and the major tactical aviation results of the BUR were to continue the ongoing F-22 and F/A-18E/F programs, cancel the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF - a 1990 AF project looking into an F-16 replacement) and the A/F-X (1992-93, same goals as the ATA program) programs, curtail F-16 and F/A-18C/D procurement and initiate the JAST Program. The JAST program was to define and develop aircraft, weapon, and sensor technology that would support the future development of tactical aircraft. The JAST program initiated conceptual design studies with Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt and Whitney. The objective of these studies was to define a technology maturation program, but was not focused on flight demonstration of a specific aircraft concept. The program subsequently moved from a broad, all-encompassing program to one that would develop a common family of aircraft to replace several aging US and UK aircraft.

norgrum_jast.jpg

JSFs.jpg

calf_lockheed_01.jpg

By the end of 1994, the JAST program had absorbed CALF program. CALF, then renamed ALF, became the primary focus of JAST. Congress subsequently mandated the merger of JAST with the DARPA Advanced Short Take-Off / Vertical Landing program. As JAST was already considering STOVL variants, this merger was accommodated with comparatively little disruption. The JAST Program initially explored a wide range of potential strike warfare concepts using six-month, Concept Exploration (CE) study contracts awarded in May 1994. The findings of the CE studies showed that a "tri-service family" of aircraft was the most affordable solution to the collective joint-service needs. The tri-service family would entail a single basic airframe design with three distinct variants: Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) for the U.S. Air Force to complement the F-22 Raptor and replace the aging F-16 Fighting Falcon and the A-10 Thunderbolt; Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) for the U.S. Marine Corps to replace both the AV-8B Harrier and the F/A-18 C/D Hornet; and a Carrier (CV) variant for the U.S. Navy to complement the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. Due to the continued interest by the UK MOD, a representative was assigned to the JAST program office and discussions were begun regarding a new MOU governing participation in the JAST program.

ssf_lockheed_01.jpg

lockmart_jast.jpg

CwExmJo.jpg

The JAST Program Office announced the award of 24 contracts for concept definition and design research on 22 December 1994. The JAST program received 150 proposals. The contracts were awarded in five broad areas: weapon system concepts, avionics, air vehicle structures and materials, propulsion concepts / components, and modeling, simulation and analyses. Focus of the contractual efforts is on research related to definition of Joint Strike Aircraft Weapon Systems and Technology Maturation to reduce the cost for the next generation of Joint Strike Warfare weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

In the spring of 1995, all three of the contractor teams selected derivatives of the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F119 engine to power their aircraft. Accordingly, in November 1995, P&W was awarded a contract for preliminary design of each of the primary JSF engine concepts. Concurrently, General Electric was awarded a contract to investigate whether the GE F110 or YF120 could be developed into an alternate engine for one or more of the JSF variants. In 1996, the YF120 was identified as the "best fit" for a tri-service solution and GE initiated preliminary design efforts. Several Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)-level program reviews were conducted in late 1995. The final Requests for Proposal (RFP) were issued to the contractors in March 1996. By that time the JAST program name had changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Following the completion of the CALF Pase II critical technology validation contracts in spring of 1996, all efforts were consolidated under JSF.

In regards to the PTID, a couple of VF-11 drivers said they even used the LANTIRN/PTID combo in place of the TCS chin pod.

F-15s use Sniper pods in a very similar capacity. Of course, targeting pods such as Sniper and LANTIRN are G-limited to about 5G or so, so, yeah...

F-15C_850111_KBAF_20150710_KenMiddleton_9x16_web_DSC_0080.jpg

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F-15s use Sniper pods in a very similar capacity. Of course, targeting pods such as Sniper and LANTIRN are G-limited to about 5G or so, so, yeah...

A bit of a drawback for an A2A application one would think. Although the Navy's intent to put a FLIR in the nose of a drop tank doesn't really seem to be that much of a step forward either. What's a S/H g-limit with a centerline tank?

Anyone know how well the Sniper pod is integrated with the F-15C? Does it provide a targeting queue in the HUD (or on the pilot's helmet mounted sight) or is it more of a head-down application, where the pilot needs to be looking at the display in the cockpit?

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A bit of a drawback for an A2A application one would think. Although the Navy's intent to put a FLIR in the nose of a drop tank doesn't really seem to be that much of a step forward either. What's a S/H g-limit with a centerline tank?

Anyone know how well the Sniper pod is integrated with the F-15C? Does it provide a targeting queue in the HUD (or on the pilot's helmet mounted sight) or is it more of a head-down application, where the pilot needs to be looking at the display in the cockpit?

Which is why the whole idea is grasping at straws, trying to stay "relevant."

Instead of modifying the Super Hornet’s airframe’s structure or wiring, the partners decided on modifying a 480 gallon centerline fuel tank to carry 330 gallons of fuel + the IRST system. The drawback to this approach is that a centerline tank with IRST needs to stay on the airplane in combat, compromising its aerodynamic performance and radar signature. IDK what the g-limit on the SH's IRST tank-pod is, but it's not going to be good (it's probably similar to Sniper or Talon HATE ).

ELEC_IRST_Tank_Cutaway_LMCO_lg.jpg

IRST is expected to deploy on the F/A-18 Super Hornet in 2017.

A similar approach was suggested for the USAF’s F-15C/D fleet, but it would have been a full centerline pod, rather than a fuel tank with additional capabilities. Boeing and Lockheed-Martin already had a history of cooperation on the F-15. Boeing has already installed Lockheed Martin’s Tiger Eyes system, which includes an IRST as part of its suite, on in Korean F-15K and RSAF F-15SG Strike Eagles.

The Pentagon’s FY 2012 budget proposed to end funding for the F-15 program, but Lockheed Martin and Boeing continued to develop “SpectIR” as an option that “will be transportable across a wide range of platforms.” The FY 2013 Presidential Budget for 2013 shows the USAF F-15C SpectIR program picking back up again in FY 2015, and the Air National Guard has its own options. Because IRST is an open ANG requirement for Homeland Defense, the US ANG can just use National Guard & Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funds to buy a system, once it’s ready.

Lockheed Martin has privately funded the SpectIR dedicated IRST pod, and is conducting tests to demonstrate its readiness. They see the market extending well beyond F-15 fleets. Integration work for the team will obviously be easier on Boeing and Lockheed Martin “teen series” fighters like the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18. Nevertheless, other platforms around the world would be eligible, if manufacturers or customers wanted to fund integration.

Another effort, called Talon HATE, is a Boeing pod that combines datalinks for secure communication with stealth platforms, and an IRST sensor up front. That combination fits a "critical tactical need," and Boeing is schedule to begin delivery to F-15C squadrons in 2015.

main_p1645960.jpg

Talon HATE, aka, "I fly an F-15, but let me figure out a way to make the Raptor guys completely change their tactics so I can get and use their sensor info." You have to give up a Datalink position within the Raptor formation to support it. It's awful. It's heavy, it has some maneuvering limitations, and it can't be jettisoned. Even the guys who were the target audience for hate it.

As an interesting aside, the F-22 was supposed to have IRST built in. Raptors already have the space and wiring already in place, but the IRST was shelved back in the EMD phase when budgets were getting cut all the time.

Edited by Tony Stark
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A bit of a drawback for an A2A application one would think. Although the Navy's intent to put a FLIR in the nose of a drop tank doesn't really seem to be that much of a step forward either. What's a S/H g-limit with a centerline tank?

Anyone know how well the Sniper pod is integrated with the F-15C? Does it provide a targeting queue in the HUD (or on the pilot's helmet mounted sight) or is it more of a head-down application, where the pilot needs to be looking at the display in the cockpit?

This is the paradox for the "high-G/dogfight/just dodge them SAMs" crew. The F-35 is "comprised" because it can pull 9G fully loaded without over-Ging sensors or having to ditch tanks, systems, bombs, and other add ons. But other aircraft are "better" because when unloaded over a test range they can pull more G and go faster. You can't run jamming pods on a Growler above Mach .9 and it's not pulling any Gs with those pods on, nor can they jettison them. So we have G limits and speed limits that don't match what we see on paper. Just like we see speed and G restrictions on various other ait craft as they are increasingly loaded with external sensors and jammers.

If you believe the hype about what the future holds in terms of air defense it's clear the old way won't work. You can't dump ordnance and start mixing it up everytime it looks like trouble because you are swatting and running from wasps while allowing the nest to grow instead of attack at the heart of the swarm and eliminating it. I firmly believe that the our enemies are smart enough to create SAMs we simply can't dodge no matter how great the pilot or plane, and even if we could they aren't going to be sending one at a time.

You don't train "knife fighting" you train people to kill. So when they run into someone looking to "knife fight" you kill them whIle they try to "knife fight" i am no fan of fighting fair and I notice the people who are aren't going to be the ones who's lives are directly affected by their insistence on "nobility" and "fairness"

Which brings us to the F-14 and why we didnt really see the kind of upgrades people were hoping for in terms of delaying retirement.

I also want to point out that since the USN retired it, they hated the Tomcat. Even more so since it did CAS and the USN has always secretly hated ground troops. Amidoingthisright?

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Nope, it was the A-12 Avenger II.

The Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program began in 1983 to develop a long range, very low observable, high payload, medium-attack aircraft to replace the Intruder in the carrier-based, medium-attack role. It was to have more advanced LO characteristics than the F-117A, have a significantly greater payload, and be in service by the mid-1990s.

The McDonnall Douglas/General Dynamics team won ATA in 1988 (kinda by default as Grumman never submitted a final bid). First flight was planned for December 1990. The Navy wanted 620, the Marines wanted 238. There were plans for the USAF to adopt the 400 A-12s to replace the F-111 (in a reversal of the NATF program with a navalized-ATF replacing the F-14) and it was promoted as a possible replacement for the Tornado IDS. Cost estimates were $100M per aircraft,

The A-12's performance capabilities would have been in roughly the same class as existing aircraft. The key improvement over existing aircraft, not inherently obvious when comparing specifications, was stealth. While today's radar can detect existing naval aircraft at a range of 50+ miles, the A-12 was designed to remain undetected until approximately 10 miles away. This would result in significant operational and survival benefits for the A-12 since defenders would have little opportunity to engage the aircraft once detected so close to the target.

Early in 1990, MDD/GD revealed delays and projected cost increases. Due to complications with the composite materials, aircraft weight had increased to 30% over design specification. Not good for a plane that has to operate from a carrier. Most of the excess weight was due to the composite material needed to support the stress and loads. The technology for manufacturing composites, especially for the complex shapes of an airplane, was state-of-the-art. General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas had to develop the technology during full-scale development because they had limited experience in building large structures using composites. Technical difficulties with the complexity of the radar system to be used also caused costs to increase. One estimate had the A-12 consuming up to 70% of the Navy's aircraft budget within three years. After delays, its critical design review was successfully completed in October 1990 and the maiden flight was rescheduled to early 1992.

A government report released in November 1990 documented serious problems with the A-12 program. In December 1990 SECDEF told the Navy to justify the program and deliver reasons why it shouldn't be canceled. The response given by the Navy and MDD/GD failed to persuade him and he canceled the program in the following month, on 7 January 1991, for breach of contract.

After the cancellation of the A-12, the Navy elected to pursue Super Hornet program in 1991 as an intirm solution.

Between 1993 and 1994, the Navy partnered with DARPA on the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) to draft requirements for a common aircraft that would meet the VSTOL needs of the United States Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. In parallel to the CALF program, the AF and the Navy initiated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program in late 1993 as a result of the DoD's Bottom Up Review (BUR) of US military forces and modernization plans. In September 1993, the results of the BUR were formally announced and the major tactical aviation results of the BUR were to continue the ongoing F-22 and F/A-18E/F programs, cancel the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF - a 1990 AF project looking into an F-16 replacement) and the A/F-X (1992-93, same goals as the ATA program) programs, curtail F-16 and F/A-18C/D procurement and initiate the JAST Program. The JAST program was to define and develop aircraft, weapon, and sensor technology that would support the future development of tactical aircraft. The JAST program initiated conceptual design studies with Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt and Whitney. The objective of these studies was to define a technology maturation program, but was not focused on flight demonstration of a specific aircraft concept. The program subsequently moved from a broad, all-encompassing program to one that would develop a common family of aircraft to replace several aging US and UK aircraft.

norgrum_jast.jpg

JSFs.jpg

calf_lockheed_01.jpg

By the end of 1994, the JAST program had absorbed CALF program. CALF, then renamed ALF, became the primary focus of JAST. Congress subsequently mandated the merger of JAST with the DARPA Advanced Short Take-Off / Vertical Landing program. As JAST was already considering STOVL variants, this merger was accommodated with comparatively little disruption. The JAST Program initially explored a wide range of potential strike warfare concepts using six-month, Concept Exploration (CE) study contracts awarded in May 1994. The findings of the CE studies showed that a "tri-service family" of aircraft was the most affordable solution to the collective joint-service needs. The tri-service family would entail a single basic airframe design with three distinct variants: Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) for the U.S. Air Force to complement the F-22 Raptor and replace the aging F-16 Fighting Falcon and the A-10 Thunderbolt; Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) for the U.S. Marine Corps to replace both the AV-8B Harrier and the F/A-18 C/D Hornet; and a Carrier (CV) variant for the U.S. Navy to complement the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. Due to the continued interest by the UK MOD, a representative was assigned to the JAST program office and discussions were begun regarding a new MOU governing participation in the JAST program.

ssf_lockheed_01.jpg

lockmart_jast.jpg

CwExmJo.jpg

The JAST Program Office announced the award of 24 contracts for concept definition and design research on 22 December 1994. The JAST program received 150 proposals. The contracts were awarded in five broad areas: weapon system concepts, avionics, air vehicle structures and materials, propulsion concepts / components, and modeling, simulation and analyses. Focus of the contractual efforts is on research related to definition of Joint Strike Aircraft Weapon Systems and Technology Maturation to reduce the cost for the next generation of Joint Strike Warfare weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

In the spring of 1995, all three of the contractor teams selected derivatives of the Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F119 engine to power their aircraft. Accordingly, in November 1995, P&W was awarded a contract for preliminary design of each of the primary JSF engine concepts. Concurrently, General Electric was awarded a contract to investigate whether the GE F110 or YF120 could be developed into an alternate engine for one or more of the JSF variants. In 1996, the YF120 was identified as the "best fit" for a tri-service solution and GE initiated preliminary design efforts. Several Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)-level program reviews were conducted in late 1995. The final Requests for Proposal (RFP) were issued to the contractors in March 1996. By that time the JAST program name had changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Following the completion of the CALF Pase II critical technology validation contracts in spring of 1996, all efforts were consolidated under JSF.

F-15s use Sniper pods in a very similar capacity. Of course, targeting pods such as Sniper and LANTIRN are G-limited to about 5G or so, so, yeah...

F-15C_850111_KBAF_20150710_KenMiddleton_9x16_web_DSC_0080.jpg

-what other weapons did this Eagle carried?

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