It's 'treason' to talk about the A-10

[toadwbg]

Kind of a tradeoff. The AH-64 can fly under lower ceilings than an A-10 and the AH-64D has a radar and a version of the Hellfire that guide on it, but it means getting closer to their work. The A-10 can stay above the weather and rely on a CSW for all weather attack, but at that point any CSW carrying aircraft can do the same job, while generally carrying way more weapons.

Regards,

Murph

Thanks. Not my area of expertise.

[Johnopfor]

You know, they are in a sense, and have absolutely no issue with that role. In fact the USAF takes great pride in supporting the troops on the ground from when they deploy on Air Force transports, get their resupply from Air Force tactical airlift, get medevaced by USAF PJs, and have CAS supplied by Air Force aircraft, all while operating with impunity from enemy air attack or even enemy reconnaissance due to Air Force air dominance while relying on USAF ISR. And the Air Force is doing their best to keep providing this support for the Army trooper in the field in this difficult funding environment while a bunch of people who have no clue about the subject circle jerk over a jobs program.

Regards,

Murph

The reasons why the army doesn't have the CAS role....

The Key West Agreement

Pace-Finletter MOU

Johnson-McConnell

Agreement

But at least the Army did try.....

Army fixed-wing CAS 1

Army fixed-wing CAS 2

Army fixed-wing CAS 3

Army fixed-wing CAS 4

I find it interesting that the Air Force consistently says that the way they carry the CAS mission is fine, but the Army disagrees. I would also still like to know why the Air Force chose a 40 year old platform that the Army prefers to stay in service to kill off instead of, let's say a 70 year old platform, who's mission could be re-rolled to the B-1 and B-2. By the way, the Marines have the ability to carry out their own CAS missions, with those Harrier and Hornets that you failed to mention.

This is coming from a former knuckle-dragging Army vet who wish that we had a USAAC, because if we did, we wouldn't be having this conversation. (I'm joking about the USAAC part, but it doesn't seem like a bad idea now)

...and quit talking about the F-35 being just a jobs program, that's supposed to be the future....when they get long delaying problems worked out.......and it finally enters full service.......and I start collecting Social Security........

Edited April 12, 2015 by Johnopfor

[Murph]

I find it interesting that the Air Force consistently says that the way they carry the CAS mission is fine, but the Army disagrees.

The Air Force feels that the Army does better with the N1ke Hercules for air defense and the M60A1 for an MBT, feel free to get back to us why the Congress and this forum shouldn't be all over this.

Regards,

Murph

Edited because the filters think anything with N1ke is spam.

Edited April 12, 2015 by Murph

[Trigger]

I would also still like to know why the Air Force chose a 40 year old platform that the Army prefers to stay in service

Actually, the Army really doesn't care. In 1982, the US Army introduced AirLand Battle, which emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces. AirLand Battle replaced the previous doctrine which placed emphasis on direct contact with advancing forces and was what drove the A-10's design requirements.

The US Army knew in the mid-late 80s that the A-10 was not survivable in uncontested airspace and wouldn't work well with AirLand's emphasis on AI. Couple that with the discovery that the A-10’s structural design life was significantly less-than-specified, and that would require remedy either via an extensive and expensive modification program and/or replacement of much of the A-10’s structure or the development of a replacement aircraft far earlier than anticipated. So the Air Force started looking for a new aircraft that was better suited for AirLand. Two candidates were looked at, the YA-7F and the A-16 concepts. The USAF presented this to the Army who approved of this, "Fine with us, just so long as you still provide CAS." Decades later, the Army was again presented with the retirement plan for the A-10 when the sequester budget axe fell. Once again, they did not protest or challenge this decision.

So historically, the Army's has been pretty agnostic about the A-10.

These guys don't have any complaints about the CAS they got.

More satisfied customers

Crowd-pleasers!

By the way, the Marines have the ability to carry out their own CAS missions, with those Harrier and Hornets that you failed to mention.

Well if the Marines can do it with Harriers, Hornets and F-35s, doesn't that validate the decision to retire the A-10 after 40 years?

First off, we need to take a look at Marine Air. We're told that Marine Air centers around the infantryman. Source: teh interwebs. Like so many other things read on teh interwebs, this is not entirely true. The tasks of Marine aviation fall into the following six functional areas:

• Offensive Air Support (OAS)
  
• Antiair Warfare
  
• Assault Support
  
• Air Reconnaissance
  
• Electronic Warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles.
  

OAS involves air operations that are conducted against enemy installations, facilities, and personnel in order to directly assist in the attainment of MAGTF objectives by destroying enemy resources or isolating enemy military forces. Its primary support of the warfighting functions is to provide fires and force protection through CAS and DAS. The application of OAS can sometimes be decisive by directly or indirectly affecting an enemy’s center of gravity. OAS allows the commander to influence the battle by projecting firepower to shape events in time and space. It also allows the commander to shape the battlespace by delaying enemy reinforcements, degrading critical enemy functions, and manipulating enemy perceptions, which ultimately results in protection of the force. Marine fighter/attack squadrons (VMFAs), Marine fighter attack (all weather) squadrons (VMFA[AW]s), Marine attack squadrons (VMAs), Marine light/attack helicopter squadrons (HMLAs), and Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadrons (VMU) provide OAS during OAS missions. OAS includes two categories: CAS and DAS.

1. CAS is an air action performed by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces.
   
2. DAS. DAS is an air action against enemy targets at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. Close coordination of the fire and maneuver of friendly forces is a qualifying factor for a DAS
   

Thus, CAS is not the primary mission of Marine Air. It is a subset of only one of six core missions. Much like how CAS is a subset of one of the USAF’s core missions, Global Strike.

CAS is a tactical instrument. Tactical is the art of winning engagements and battles, strategy is the art of winning wars. Success at the operational level can promote success at the tactical level. The employment of aviation at the operational level during Operation Desert Storm served to disrupt Iraqi command and control, degrade defenses, and demoralize troops. The success of Operation Desert Storm’s operational goals contributed to tactical successes during the ground operations phase. Success at the tactical level can foster success at the operational level; however, success at the tactical level can prove indecisive unless linked to operational goals. An good example of success at the tactical level fostering success at the operational level would be the Allied efforts in the South Pacific during World War II.

The Gulf War contains recent examples of tactical events that impacted the operational level of war. During the first 6 months of Operation Desert Shield, 1st Marine Division spent a great deal of time scrutinizing the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. Planners learned that Iraqi artillery was very effective in trapping Iranian soldiers in confined areas called firesacks, where thousands of Iranians perished. The firesack, like our engagement area, is an area along an enemy avenue of approach intended to contain and destroy an enemy force with the massed fires of all available weapons. Studies of the two obstacle belts in Kuwait and the positioning of more than 1,200 Iraqi artillery pieces behind those obstacle belts indicated that when the Marines attacked, the Iraqis meant to trap them in at least two firesacks. Marine planners also recognized that their available aviation ordnance was not sufficient to destroy the Iraqi artillery during the first phase of Operation Desert Storm. Therefore, planners designed a series of combined-arms raids to defeat the Iraqis’ plan before they even attacked into Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm kicked off on January 17, 1991. On January 19th, Marine aircraft conducted their first raid. Coalition forces were going to move an artillery battery, escorted by a light armored infantry company, close to the Kuwaiti border at night. A Marine EA-6B Prowler EW aircraft was to be stationed inside Saudi airspace to jam the Iraqis’ radars until after the entire artillery battery had fired on a designated target. As the artillery battery started to withdraw, EA-6B aircraft would stop jamming just long enough for the Iraqis to detect the battery’s movement before it began jamming again. The intent was to cause the Iraqi artillery to respond to Marine indirect fires. Once the Iraqis began firing, a Marine forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]) in a Marine F/A-18 Hornet detected the Iraqis’ muzzle flashes and directed a flight of Marine F/A-18s to roll in on the firing Iraqi artillery. The plan’s goal was to convince Iraqi artillerymen not to man their artillery pieces for fear that every time they did so Marine aircraft would attack them. By the third week in February, after a series of these raids, the plan’s goal was achieved. UAVs showed Iraqi artillerymen abandoning their howitzers as Marine aircraft began attacking their positions. These successful raids at the tactical level had dramatic effect at the operational level. The fear of an attack from aviation assets made Iraqi artillery ineffective in the final phase of the war. This undoubtedly saved many lives and contributed to the strategic success of Operation Desert Storm.

A good example of success at the tactical level can proving indecisive unless linked to operational goals would be the claim that CAS is crucial to COIN. We just spent the past 14 years involved in a COIN in Afghanistan and while there were plenty of successful CAS missions flown, the strategic mission there failed. The Taliban are still there. The country is just as unstable as it was before. CAS made no strategic difference. The same thing happened in SE Asia 42 years ago.

CAS doesn't win wars and the Marines know this. From the Allied Bombing of Germany during WW2 to Desert Storm, it's been proven that long range, deep strike has a greater affect toward achieving victory. It is for this reason that CAS is a tactical subset of a strategic mission.

For the past 40 years, the USMC has moved from having multiple, limited role aircraft (F-4, F-8, A-4, A-6, AV-8A) towards having a few multi-role types (F/A-18, AV-8B) and ultimately to a single multirole aircraft - the F-35 - to accomplish its missions; including CAS. How can it be that the proclaimed “masters of CAS” be narrowing down their fleet to only one aircraft that isn’t the A-10?

Let’s start by looking at the dedicated ground attack AV-8B, which first flew in 1978 - two years after the first A-10A combat squadron stood up at Myrtle Beach AFB, SC. When the Harrier II entered operational service in 1985, it had a single engine, no internal gun, no radar, no night attack capability, and very limited weapons carriage. With the exception of the vectored thrust engine, it was as simple as the A-10, but without the rugged construction. Within two years, the Marines introduced the first AV-8B with a built in night attack capability. In 1993, the first radar-equipped AV-8B+ was introduced. The Harrier II was always more advanced than the A-10 in capabilities and versatility (and became more like the Hornet). Why? Why did the Marines choose to go with this fragile, single engine aircraft to provide such a crucial mission instead of the A-10? Because the Marines reached the conclusion that effective CAS was not wed to low and slow only. Likewise, the USMC has enjoyed considerable success with the F/A-18 Hornet.

The reason Marine Air is so well regarded isn't because of anything special or dramatically different in how they train for it or employ it. It's because Marine Ground Forces understand the use of air power both on the tactical and strategic level. Whereas the Army views air power (IMO, myopically) only to be subservient to the whims of a Corps commander.

So It’s not that the AF needs to be more like the Marines. In many ways, they already have been pivoting that direction in the form of updating the A-10 to the A-10C standard so it can operate 24/7 and use PGMs, GPS and basically work with the rest of the fleet and secondly, ultimately replacing niche-role aircraft with multi-role aircraft. So now we literally have a case where people simultaneously are suggesting that the USAF needs to be more like the USMC, while criticizing the USAF for investing in the same programs to perform the same missions as the Marines are. In fact, it’s the Army that needs to take a few pages from the Marine Corps’ playbook when it comes to the implementation of air power.

This is coming from a former knuckle-dragging Army vet who wish that we had a USAAC, because if we did, we wouldn't be having this conversation. (I'm joking about the USAAC part, but it doesn't seem like a bad idea now)

I find it amusing that one of the "solutions" (to a problem that doesn't exist) is to make the Army more like the Marine Corps. This is a good example of the myopic viewpoint towards airpower that many in the Army have. They think that airpower should be subservient to the Corps commander.

...and quit talking about the F-35 being just a jobs program, that's supposed to be the future....when they get long delaying problems worked out.......and it finally enters full service.......and I start collecting Social Security........

He wasn't talking about the F-35. It's the A-10 that's a federal jobs program.

Edited April 12, 2015 by Trigger

[TaiidanTomcat]

I find it interesting that the Air Force consistently says that the way they carry the CAS mission is fine, but the Army disagrees.

Wait--Where does the Army "disagree?" They also get CAS from the USMC and Navy. Do they disagree there too?

We have 14 years of real world history to look at. Not theory, not exercises, not demonstrations. actual combat.

I would also still like to know why the Air Force chose a 40 year old platform that the Army prefers to stay in service to kill off instead of, let's say a 70 year old platform, who's mission could be re-rolled to the B-1 and B-2.

There are thousands of aircraft in the US inventory that do CAS. There are around 150 strategic bombers total-- in the western world. (unless I'm forgetting someone) Thats it. And those bombers also support army ground operations directly.

As it is there is talk of cutting the B-1 as well, so you might lose that and the A-10. Which sucks:

The airmen of the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron and 9th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Unit provided more than 25 percent of the total fixed-wing close-air support coverage for coalition ground forces in Afghanistan every day by launching the most B-1 sorties executed on a single deployment in more than 10 years of sustained conflict.

Over the course of the six-plus month deployment, the squadron flew more than 770 combat sorties, encompassing over 9,500 hours, to provide 24 hours of coverage every day.

They also responded to more than 500 troops-in-contact situations, with the enemy as close as 300 meters from friendly forces, and another 700 priority air requests, delivering more than 400 weapons on target.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/08/02/the-air-forces-record-breaking-b-1-deployment/

24/7 coverage? yes please.

By the way, the Marines have the ability to carry out their own CAS missions, with those Harrier and Hornets that you failed to mention.

They do indeed, but assets not directly under the Marine command go into the big pool of air assets that the air commander uses. All the air assets have to be directed and commanded from one place. So whether the A-10 is flying with USAF or US Army written on the side, the same rules apply. That is jointness. That's the way things are done now. Waco can tell you about it better than I.

If the army calls for support and there is a Navy Rhino near, then they respond. They don't leave and call the A-10s on the way out because those aren't guys in their own uniform down there. The GWOT has basically made everything subservient to the ground, all assets from all services are being utilized the best way we know how, often to the detriment of other missions. If there is a better way things can be done, I'm all ears.

BTW The Marines also lost the battle over retiring the battleships.

This is coming from a former knuckle-dragging Army vet who wish that we had a USAAC, because if we did, we wouldn't be having this conversation. (I'm joking about the USAAC part, but it doesn't seem like a bad idea now)

I'm curious how you think the USAAC was any better or worse when it comes to this subject.

Look I'm a knuckle dragging Marine and I'm appalled at these old wive's tails about the USAF and CAS. I'll complain about the USAF being soft and spoiled all day and all night, but they have been the real deal the last 15 years in combat. I've met plenty of USAF people who have lost limbs over seas. EOD, Convoy guys, Combat MPs, etc. This 1980s era inter service garbage that people think applies today needs to cease. None of that old crap tracks with what is happening currently. NONE. Ive never seen any of this with the Air Force. The Air Force hates the A-10 is akin to bigfoot as far as I can tell. Everyone claims it exists, no one has seen it and none of the stories have any consistency. Its so old men can feel they have some inside info, and because men are too cool to watch soap operas but we crave the he said she said.

However I have spoken with A-10 pilots and JTACs and army helicopter who can't figure why the Army uses its Apaches as a deep maneuver asset. The Army needs to retool the way they do CAS. And that is no one's fault but theirs as the USMC has been doing it the right way with rotors for decades, and there is clearly a model there to adopt

...and quit talking about the F-35 being just a jobs program, that's supposed to be the future....when they get long delaying problems worked out.......and it finally enters full service.......and I start collecting Social Security........

I think it took a full 20 years for the A-10 to finally get the ability to fight at night...

The Air Force feels that the Army does better with the N1ke Hercules for air defense and the M60A1 for an MBT, feel free to get back to us why the Congress and this forum shouldn't be all over this.

Regards,

Murph

lost it

Edited April 13, 2015 by TaiidanTomcat

[fulcrum1]

Can someone give me the 411 on weather attack Helos (Apache, other) can do the job of the A-10? Maybe it's been covered before in one of these threads?

No agenda here, just curious. :cheers:/>

It cannot. The limitations of the range, speed, weather, altitude, vulnerability and munitions carried by rotary wing leave it best suited for overwatch/cca in direct fires applications which is how they've been employed for the last ten years or so for both the Marines and Army.

[fulcrum1]

However I have spoken with A-10 pilots and JTACs and army helicopter who can't figure why the Army uses its Apaches as a deep maneuver asset. The Army needs to retool the way they do CAS. And that is no one's fault but theirs as the USMC has been doing it the right way with rotors for decades, and there is clearly a model there to adopt

How would they know? They're not maneuver. Within maneuver that falls under fires who would run the docc with the CAB at the DIV level which hasn't happened in some time. The doctrine employing the Apache changed awhile ago and is currently being flown in a Force Pro role much like Marine Rotary wing in OEF with both still needing the Air Force for CAS.

[11bee]

Did you not get the memo that the Air Force is responsible for the Army's Soldiers?

Pretty sure the AF is also "responsible" for the Marines. Although obviously the Marines have in-house assets, I'm pretty sure the AF also provides just a bit of support for your boys as well. There is no way the Marines could get to and win a major fight without the AF.

Not sure what the issue is, the AF is responsible to support the Army. They get hundreds of billions to provide transport, CAS, medevac and multiple other services to the Army (and the other services). Those are their missions and they've been assigned since day 1. Why else do you think the AF has all those transports, AC-130's, A-10's, etc?

To just support the Coast Guard?

[TaiidanTomcat]

Pretty sure the AF is also "responsible" for the Marines. Although obviously the Marines have in-house assets, I'm pretty sure the AF also provides just a bit of support for your boys as well.

If the air force does something for someone and no one complains did it ever really happen?

There is no way the Marines could get to and win a major fight without the AF.

But who was US Navy? Does WWII not count? WWI? Korea?

Not sure what the issue is, the AF is responsible to support the Army. They get hundreds of billions to provide transport, CAS, medevac and multiple other services to the Army (and the other services). Those are their missions and they've been assigned since day 1. Why else do you think the AF has all those transports, AC-130's, A-10's, etc?

So people can whine that they isn't doing enough?

This issue (beyond my later amended post) is that the USAF is supposed to fight and win wars, not be beholden to the army. The USAF supports sister services both directly (with things like the A-10, logistics) and indirectly (bombing air fields so the grunts don't get strafed and the A-10s shot down, nuclear readiness) The issue seems to be that people here think that the USAF is completely beholden to the US Army via the Direct support, and not even the US Army thinks that. A-10s are useless if SAMs and Fighters are about. So thats where the 95 percent of the USAF of "Not the A-10" come into play.

http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-mission/

Nothing in there about the USAF being held to a higher standard than the army has for itself. This is where things get muddled because there is fundamental disagreement on the best way to help the grunt. The goal is to win the war, ending it as fast as possible and thus saving soldiers lives, that isn't always found with CAS on the battlefield.

If the USAF truly didn't care, or was beyond helping the army with CAS, It would have sent nothing but A-10s and held back assets like B-1s and F-16s the last 14 years not even bothered sending them at all. Doing that would leave the AF with a force of just a few hundred CAS platforms rather than the thousands it has been using for over 14 years.

If the choice was A-10s or nothing vs everything except A-10s, guess what the army would pick? (spoiler alert...)

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2015/02/25/army-not-interested-in-taking-a-10-warthogs-from-air-force/