British Army Goes PC

[11bee]

Don't know whether to laugh or cry...

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2030876/Afghanistan-Taliban-Hunting-Club-badges-worn-UK-troops-banned.html

I found one comment particulary amusing:

One soldier serving with The Rifles regiment in Afghanistan, and currently on leave in the UK, said: ‘The badges started off as a bit of a laugh, but they have now become collectors’ items, especially for foreign troops serving in Kabul – perhaps because they don’t do any fighting.’

It's reassuring to see that REMFs never change :)

Edited August 28, 2011 by 11bee

[4scourge7]

I`m just going to thank our guys for their service and courage.

Anything else I write just sounds wrong for ARC, but not for my next sweary letter to London.

Thanks for heads-up on this 11bee.

Cheers, Ian

[Aaronw]

Got it, no farting, no humor, sounds like a hoot.

[Jay Chladek]

With illiteracy being so prevalent in Afghanistan, I doubt most civilians would even be able to read what the patches say. Besides, the patches are pretty truthful in describing the mission IMHO. Now if it said "Afghanistan hunt club" then that might be a little offensive. But not this.

[spike7451]

It's nothing new & a non story as far as I'm concerned.The RAF did the same to JF Harrier when they made the groundcrew paint over the images of Lucy Pinder & Michelle Marsh.Some of the badges & tee shirts from various scraps are far more risque.

[Mumbles]

One soldier serving with The Rifles regiment in Afghanistan, and currently on leave in the UK, said: The badges started off as a bit of a laugh, but they have now become collectors items, especially for foreign troops serving in Kabul perhaps because they dont do any fighting.

Erm, NZ Army SAS in particular might beg to differ with that statement. They are operating in Kabul in a mentoring role and have been involved in several firefights in the city, the most recent unfortunately resulting in one of our guys being KIA.

Edited August 28, 2011 by Mumbles

[TaiidanTomcat]

I find it extremely odd that we would fight any war where the promotion of killing the enemy seems to be discouraged. What am I missing exactly? is it just some bizarre multi billion dollar a year experiment that we just aren't aware of? some odd game? If the enemy isn't worth killing, why go to war?

Lucy pinder

Michele Marsh

Edited August 29, 2011 by TaiidanTomcat

[loki]

PC Gone fookin mad!

[Raymond]

probably cos their now trying to get the taliban onside and part of the govt so they can leave?

[TaiidanTomcat]

probably cos their now trying to get the taliban onside and part of the govt so they can leave?

Killing them still OK though? because the fastest way to get them to like us would probably to quit killing them, rather than stop the whole patch thing.

FTFA

Ministry of Defence lawyers are understood to have expressed concern that any soldier wearing one of the badges who might later become embroiled in a legal case after killing an innocent Afghan would be viewed as ‘maverick’.

... And that was the moment I decided to never fire my rifle in combat again. I either shoot the taliban, which is discouraged as of late, or a round hits a civilian, and if so its murder. The safest thing to do when these are the options, is to 1. not shoot and 2. don't be the last man to die there. I refuse to fight a war for a country that can't name the enemy, and prosecutes if i guess wrong. How do even you define "innocent" vs. "combatant" when there is no identified enemy?

Edited August 29, 2011 by TaiidanTomcat

[jester292]

It won't be long before we all have to wear government issued helmets.

Aaron

Edited August 29, 2011 by jester292

[-Neu-]

I find it extremely odd that we would fight any war where the promotion of killing the enemy seems to be discouraged. What am I missing exactly? is it just some bizarre multi billion dollar a year experiment that we just aren't aware of? some odd game? If the enemy isn't worth killing, why go to war?

Counterinsurgency is really a different type of war than what we faced during WWII, or the Cold War. It requires a complete change in thinking on how to conduct war. In "Conventional" wars of the past, the relationship between politics and war was detached. Once the decision to go to war was made, political considerations took a back seat except on major strategic decisions. Furthermore, defeat was often defined by destroying the opponent's ability to conduct war. To use Clauswitzian terms, the enemy's centre of gravity was their military forces.

Counterinsurgency is completely the opposite. Against an irregular foe, that often does not maintain standing forces, the opponent's public is the center of gravity. Its really a change in how warfare is conducted. This is a quote from David Galula, who is considered one of the key thinkers in counterinsurgency thinking (and guided the thinking of David Petraeus.)

The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially political in nature. In this case, consequently political action remains foremost throughout the war… politics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary every military move has to be weighted with regard to its political effects and vise versa.

Within counterinsurgency thinking, simply killing enemies may actually result in the opposite outcome; it can enrage the public and cause them to add further support to the Taliban. That doesn't mean we should not use deadly force; rather it needs to be weighed by its political effects. To do this, soldiers need to make each of their decisions very carefully; we often call this concept the strategic corporal. More often than not, the use of force is completely justified. But its always a balance. The most critical objective is building trust with the local populace and reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Why was the UK government justified in removing the badges, even when most afghans are illiterate. Two fold. First its a bloody skull worn visibly on soldiers. If that unit was on dismounted foot patrol dealing with Afghans and trying to build trust, its probably not the first thing they want to see. Second, its something that can be used as a propaganda tool by the Taliban. Its not hard for a local taliban representative to tell a local population "that says Afghan hunting unit." What is the platoon commander going to say? "no its not... its just a skull and Taliban." Western Forces have a credibility gap to overcome vis-a-vis the Taliban, why should the public believe them when they are subject to bombardment and casualties as collateral damage. Its just something that doesn't need to be there and does not reflect the mindset of counterinsurgency.

[Yuri]

Michele Marsh

Just in case someone asks "What do we fight for?"

:P

Anyway... the whole thing is dumb. Yeah, yeah, yeah, I know... pc all the time... but what about "esprit de corps"

[pigsty]

Why was the UK government justified in removing the badges, even when most afghans are illiterate. Two fold. First its a bloody skull worn visibly on soldiers. If that unit was on dismounted foot patrol dealing with Afghans and trying to build trust, its probably not the first thing they want to see. Second, its something that can be used as a propaganda tool by the Taliban. Its not hard for a local taliban representative to tell a local population "that says Afghan hunting unit." What is the platoon commander going to say? "no its not... its just a skull and Taliban." Western Forces have a credibility gap to overcome vis-a-vis the Taliban, why should the public believe them when they are subject to bombardment and casualties as collateral damage. Its just something that doesn't need to be there and does not reflect the mindset of counterinsurgency.

Nice to see someone thinking about this instead of just allowing the knee to jerk towards the lips and make the "PC gone mad" noise ...

[11bee]

Nice to see someone thinking about this instead of just allowing the knee to jerk towards the lips and make the "PC gone mad" noise ...

Not a question of a knee jerk reaction. The Taliban could just as easily tell the locals that the ISAF tags that most of the troops wear means "death to Muslims". Should we remove those as well? Maybe also have the troops remove their national flags to avoid upsetting the locals (as was done in Desert Storm). I get the entire "hearts and minds" thing, but one has to cut the guys on the sharp edge a little bit of slack. It sounds like this policy was implemented by lawyers who never served a minute of time in combat (assuming they are even in the military).

[-Neu-]

Not a question of a knee jerk reaction. The Taliban could just as easily tell the locals that the ISAF tags that most of the troops wear means "death to Muslims". Should we remove those as well? Maybe also have the troops remove their national flags to avoid upsetting the locals (as was done in Desert Storm). I get the entire "hearts and minds" thing, but one has to cut the guys on the sharp edge a little bit of slack. It sounds like this policy was implemented by lawyers who never served a minute of time in combat (assuming they are even in the military).

That's not the same at all. ISAF's "Flag" is written in Pashto which can be read by 10~50% of the populace in any given area and says, ""Help and Cooperation." Its also been in existence for eight years, unlike an unsanctioned skull and crossbones motif that is pretty universal for death. The Canadian Forces would never allow such a thing to be worn for the reasons stated above and US Forces are the same from what I have seen (though its eminently possible that some might have something similar in outposts in the east.)

Honestly the biggest proponents for the hearts and minds approach are serving military officers, particularly generals, not "lawyers." Then again the Brits have been forced to undertake more conventional operations because of being undermanned for so many years in Helmand. Maybe its reflective of the conditions they faced over the past five years.

... And that was the moment I decided to never fire my rifle in combat again. I either shoot the taliban, which is discouraged as of late, or a round hits a civilian, and if so its murder. The safest thing to do when these are the options, is to 1. not shoot and 2. don't be the last man to die there. I refuse to fight a war for a country that can't name the enemy, and prosecutes if i guess wrong. How do even you define "innocent" vs. "combatant" when there is no identified enemy?

What you describe about the issue of discrimination of lawful targets is a major issue which we face today. In some areas in the South and East of Afghanistan (Lets say the eastern provinces as well as Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul) you might have rural populations who's "guilt" breakdown is as follows;

<5% Taliban - 100% guilty (Hard Core members)

15% Casual Taliban - 70% guilty (local laborers who are paid to undertake some act by the taliban but are not committed)

25% Taliban sympathizers - 60% guilty (give material support to the enemy, but do not undertake violent acts)

55% Undecided and government supporters.

Its not easy at all. Really today we have three major ways to identify the Taliban.

#1 Contact in combat; basically if they shoot at you they are the enemy

#2 Technical intelligence: identifying opponents through electronic eavesdropping and reconnaissance.

#3 Human intelligence: identifying opponents through discussions with the local populace.

Really we combine 2 and 3 through intelligence fusion today. However #3 is extremely effective when security forces can gain the trust of the populace who then identify those who are coercing them to act against the government. Thats a significant instrument for counterinsurgency warfare and the way. Really its all about understanding the local political situation and operating accordingly. That takes a lot of work and is not easy to accomplish.

Edited August 29, 2011 by -Neu-

[-Neu-]

double post

Edited August 29, 2011 by -Neu-

[Les / Creative Edge Photo]

Counterinsurgency is really a different type of war than what we faced during WWII, or the Cold War. It requires a complete change in thinking on how to conduct war. In "Conventional" wars of the past, the relationship between politics and war was detached. Once the decision to go to war was made, political considerations took a back seat except on major strategic decisions. Furthermore, defeat was often defined by destroying the opponent's ability to conduct war. To use Clauswitzian terms, the enemy's centre of gravity was their military forces.

Counterinsurgency is completely the opposite. Against an irregular foe, that often does not maintain standing forces, the opponent's public is the center of gravity. Its really a change in how warfare is conducted. This is a quote from David Galula, who is considered one of the key thinkers in counterinsurgency thinking (and guided the thinking of David Petraeus.)

The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially political in nature. In this case, consequently political action remains foremost throughout the war… politics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary every military move has to be weighted with regard to its political effects and vise versa.

Within counterinsurgency thinking, simply killing enemies may actually result in the opposite outcome; it can enrage the public and cause them to add further support to the Taliban. That doesn't mean we should not use deadly force; rather it needs to be weighed by its political effects. To do this, soldiers need to make each of their decisions very carefully; we often call this concept the strategic corporal. More often than not, the use of force is completely justified. But its always a balance. The most critical objective is building trust with the local populace and reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Why was the UK government justified in removing the badges, even when most afghans are illiterate. Two fold. First its a bloody skull worn visibly on soldiers. If that unit was on dismounted foot patrol dealing with Afghans and trying to build trust, its probably not the first thing they want to see. Second, its something that can be used as a propaganda tool by the Taliban. Its not hard for a local taliban representative to tell a local population "that says Afghan hunting unit." What is the platoon commander going to say? "no its not... its just a skull and Taliban." Western Forces have a credibility gap to overcome vis-a-vis the Taliban, why should the public believe them when they are subject to bombardment and casualties as collateral damage. Its just something that doesn't need to be there and does not reflect the mindset of counterinsurgency.

You said most everything I wanted to and did so eloquently.

Like you said wars such as WWI and WWII are not what we are fighting now. It has not been so for decades now. The glorious history of achievements of WWI and WWII can be grand but have no relevance to modern counter insurgency war. Politics and diplomacy have always been apart of war but in the modern counter insurgency war of today they matter more than ever. Hell even in WWII insurgents, named the Resistance in occupied nations were a thorn in their invaders sides so to speak. Ask Germans how many men they had to keep in Yugoslavia for one to keep the lid down on the insurgency there.

When you are THE OUTSIDER it's easy to label you the INVADER (it matters not if your motives are moral and justified or are exploitative) and to expect the people to all just meekly comply is fool hearty. Insurgents and their behind the scenes supporters have a better chance of defeating any powerful outside military given enough time than that military can at holding onto the nation(s) they invaded, again reason as to why they invade matters not. Success or failure will be driven by how well you win or sadly lose the support of the population.

The Vietnamese who fought the USA were prepared to go on fighting for what they believed was 25-30 years or more of war. The next generation of children were being indoctrinated to fight the Americans. At that there was little hope for the US to achieve a strategic victory.

The valour and exuberance of victory in WWII is easily lived/relived in one's mind but is irrelevant to conflicts today.

[vince14]

Vince

[TaiidanTomcat]

I understand the COIN concept. But If the locals judge soldiers on personal conduct anyway, and these badges increase morale within the ranks whats the problem? You could have the troops required to sling their weapons like Somalia or better yet, carry unloaded like Beirut. weapons do send a violent message, best not to have them so ready, even better not have them at all. Its not these badges that cause distrust, its bombing a wedding. It works though because as I said personally, I am no longer worried about killing the enemy thats for sure. My main concern is surviving and staying out of a cell.

I also understand that the Taliban is a bit of a "nebulous concept" downrange, so identifying the enemy has never been easy, but the fact that one can not name or even imply who the enemy is now, is odd.

^ that could be construed as "death to afghans" or any other propaganda that the Taliban can cook up. The only thing this accomplishes is making the killing of the enemy taboo, it increases ambiguity and indecisiveness within the ranks and highlights that if you get something wrong you will be prosecuted based on symbolism taking no account of the situation. If I am court martialed for murder and I have a bible on me am I labeled a "crusader"? will that be held against me? how about my tattoos? If they inventory my footlocker and find an adult magazine is "sexual deviant" also applicable?

I also have to say that the concept of the "strategic corporal" is the most overused phrase in the modern military. The only way a corporal isn't micromanaged to death is if he takes the battery out of his radio, and there is no air/sat overwatch in the area. It happens sometimes. "I take my orders from HQ at tampabayistan" No one sees the contradiction of talking about independent leadership in the same thread where we are talking about banning a small badge that implies that war means hunting the enemy?

Look I see all of your points, and they are probably the right direction. I am happy to concede that, I just think the whole thing is strange. I also think it causes indecisiveness. I see the idea, I just feel personally that the system is not looking out for my interests. It reminds me of the joke that "in the UK everything is policed except crime" "in the army you can fight a war for a decade without an opponent" I get COIN, I just don't think this a smart way of promoting that fine balance between self defense and risk of accomplishing a tough mission, where force is secondary.

Here are some general rules the USMC likes to go by:

"Demonstrate to the world there is “No Better Friend — No Worse Enemy” than a US Marine."

"Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet."

"In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines. "

Viciousness is built into peace missions.

"you go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn't wear a veil. You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them. Actually it's quite fun to fight them, you know. It's a hell of a hoot. It's fun to shoot some people. I'll be right up there with you. I like brawling. "

Explanation of the above: ^Moreover, if the critics bothered actually to listen to Gen. Mattis's remarks -- which you can do online at NBC's San Diego affiliate website -- they would realize that he was calling for an investment in so-called soft-power resources that would help to avert combat. He was saying, in effect: "Look, I love a good fight and would enjoy shooting and killing these bastards; but we need to do the things that will make that unnecessary."^

These are all from General Mattis. Notice that they are "mindsets" not symbolic emblems. The last qoute shows that you need to make sure that your troops want to ruthlessly kill whoever crosses them, while still remembering your mission is to protect the people and prove you care. There is a balance, it disappears when you talk prosecution.

Vince! I was hoping you would share your opinion with your first hand cultural experience.

How about this:

TALIBAN HUNTING CLUB

Edited August 29, 2011 by TaiidanTomcat

[The_Animal]

"Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet."

That pretty much sums up my attitude of "protecting my family" in terms of civilian interaction. "If you are respectful of the human rights of my family: to be safe and secure in their own home; to not be hurt physically by any other individual, to be safe in a public area (such as a shopping center) while conducting routine shopping; or at school)...then we will get along fine. But the second you cross into attempting to physically hurt my family, you will find that I am become DEATH! And if you persist in those actions, I will physically lay you out stone-cold dead!"

Unfortunately it's too bad the cops don't see it that way. They call it "pre-meditated murder"...even if it is aggravated.

Edited August 29, 2011 by The_Animal